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Abstract 
 
The major objective of this thesis is to investigate whether there exists a stable 
long run and short run equilibrium relationship between real money balances 
(M1 or M2) and their determinants in Thailand. A cointegration analysis and the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) are conducted on quarterly data over 
two data set periods, 1980Q1 to 2007Q1 and 1993Q1 to 2007Q1. The results 
indicate that there exists a long run equilibrium relationship between real money 
demand (both M1 and M2) and its determinants: real income, price level, 
exchange rates, and external interest rates.  
 
The thesis also used the Vector Autoregression model (VAR) to test the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand in three different channels of 
monetary policy: the interest rate channel, the credit channel, and the exchange 
rate channel. The results find that a change in the M1 money demand has more 
effect on economic growth while a change in M2 has a stronger effect on the 
price level. In addition, the results also show that the M1 money demand is 
responsive to the transmission mechanism in all channels tested in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
                      INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a brief introduction to the thesis, discussing both the 
background and the motivation of the thesis. The research objectives and the 
scope of the thesis are presented in section two and three and the last section 
outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Research Background and Motivation 
 
After floating the Thai baht in 1997, monetary policy has increasingly been the 
center of macroeconomic policy in Thailand because after open up the capital 
account, Thailand economy widely effect by external factors and external 
shock. In addition The financial  liberalization and restructuring in Thailand  
has  contributed  to  the increased   importance  of  the  financial  sector  in  the  
Thailand  economy. Therefore, Thailand needs  more  influential monetary  
policy  to  guide  the  financial  sector  in  the  right  direction and more 
efficiency.  
 
Understanding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is the key 
successful to conduct monetary policy as a monetary authority has to choose the 
proper monetary instrument and intermediate target policy in order to reach the 
monetary goal. In addition, the policy maker have to understand the effect of 
monetary policy in economy, he central bank must have ability to control the 
key monetary variables. 
 
Another important in conducting monetary policy is the stability of demand for 
money function since it plays a key role in real economic activities and financial 
markets, particularly with respect to the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. If the money demand function is stable, it implies that money multipliers 
are stable, and monetary authorities can carry out policy actions with greater 
  2 
confidence regarding their impact on the macro economy. As the study of Sriam 
(1999) and Siklos (1995) point that the stability of money demand is one of a 
key successful in conducting monetary policy. It is, therefore important for 
policy maker to also understand the stability of money demand. 
   
The literature on the estimation of the demand for money is enormous and we 
focus here on a few papers particularly relevant to the present study, which have 
emphasized the importance of the stability of money demand and the long-run 
relationship between money demand and its determinants by using cointegration 
techniques. For example, Ahmed (1999) investigated the stability of the money 
demand function and tests for the  existence of a long-run money demand 
function for Bangladesh during the period 1975-1997. Ghosh (2000) estimated 
the long-run equilibrium relationship for M1 in five industrial countries, the US, 
the UK, Canada, Germany, and Japan. Bahmani-Oskooee (2001) analyzed 
money demand in Japan. Bahmani-Oskooee and Chomsisengphet (2002) 
studied money demand in Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, the US, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Choi and Oxley (2004) 
estimated the stability of money demand in New Zealand. All of these papers 
focused on the stability of the estimated relationship, and this thesis will draw 
on them to consider the stability of the money demand relationship for 
Thailand. 
Another popular issue in money demand analysis in Asian countries is to 
analyze the effect of financial liberation on the stability of demand function. 
Dekle and Pradhan (1997) claimed that the financial liberation and financial 
reform have contributed to the instability of money demand in Southeast Asian 
countries. Khalid (1999) estimated the degree of that foreign factor opportunity 
cost impacted on money demand in South Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore 
by applying the Johansen cointegration technique and estimating an error 
correction model with quarterly data from 1977:1 to 1993:4. He argues that 
money demand in those three countries has a long-run relationship with both 
domestic and foreign variables. James (2005) attempted to offer the new 
approach to analyze the  effects of financial liberalization on the money demand 
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in Indonesia. He found that liberalization played a major role in determining 
money demand. Moreover, he claimed that there is existence of a long-run 
relationship between broad money and its determinants when the proxy of 
liberalization is included. 
In the case of Thailand, there have been relatively few empirical studies of the 
money demand function, and most of the studies have emphasized the 
relationship between money aggregates and a range of economic indicators, and 
placed less concern on the stability of the money demand. For example, Arize, 
Spalding, and Umezulike (1991) estimated the money demand function for  
Thailand and they found that the foreign interest rate played an important role in 
money demand during the sample period. Chaisrisawatsuk, Sharma, and 
Chowdhury (2004) tested for the  stability of the money demand function and 
monetary policy making particular allowance for the potential for capital 
mobility and currency substitution in five Asian countries including Thailand, 
using quarterly data from 1980-1996. Bahmani-Oskooee and Techaratanachai 
(2001) investigated the relationship between the currency depreciation and M2 
money demand function in Thailand by using the quarterly time series from 
1977-1990. The results suggest that the depreciation of the Thai baht led to a 
fall in M2 money demand and that, therefore, monetary authorities should 
consider stabilizing the domestic currency to stabilize the economy and money 
demand. 
 
Taking the above story, this research aims to answer the question ―How 
monetary instrument transmit to economic variables in Thailand?‖ ―What is the 
effective channel for monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand?”To 
answer the question, this thesis will start by testing the stability of the money 
demand function in Thailand, using co integration and error correction 
techniques. Then, we also analyze the transmission mechanism in Thailand by 
investigating how monetary policy has been transmitted into the macro 
economy in Thailand  
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1.3 Objectives of Research  
 
There are three major objectives of this thesis:  
1. To apply the VAR model for testing the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Thailand 
2. To investigate how monetary policy has been transmitted into the 
macro economy in Thailand 
3. To analyze the stability of the money demand function in Thailand 
 
1.4 Scope of Research 
 
The key research contributions of this thesis are in the two empirical chapters, 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 4 focuses on the stability of demand for 
money in Thailand by using two quarterly data sets, data from 1993Q1 to 
2007Q1 and the data from 1980Q1 to 2007Q1. The rationale for the use of two 
data sets is that there is limited quarterly GDP data in Thailand, as the official 
database provides consistent data from only 1993Q to 2007Q1. However, 
estimates of Thai GDP data by Abeysinghe and Gulasekaran (2004), which 
closely matches the official data are also available. Therefore, this thesis utilizes 
both data sets for testing the stability of the money demand function in order to 
compare the result between the short and longer data set. The chapter focuses on 
the estimation of both short-run and long run relationship of money demand in 
Thailand, using both the narrow money demand (M1) function and the broad 
money demand (M2) function. The result of this estimation also allows the 
calculation of so-called money overhang from the long-run money demand 
function and allows one to test whether this can help to predict inflation in 
Thailand. 
 
The second key chapter of the thesis is Chapter 5, which uses the VAR model to 
test the monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand. There are four major 
channels of monetary transmission mechanism, interest channel, credit channel, 
exchange rate channel, and price asset channel. However, due to a limited data 
on asset price in Thailand, the asset price could not be tested in the thesis  
  5 
 This chapter is focused on three main channels of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Thailand, namely: the interest rate, the credit channel and the 
exchange rate channel. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis  
 
The thesis is split into six chapters; Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical structure 
of money demand models and the monetary transmission mechanism. This also 
presents a selected literature survey, focusing on money demand in developed 
and developing countries, monetary policy and the transmission mechanism in 
different countries, and an overview of Thailand‘s economic development and 
monetary policy. Chapter 3 provides respectively a discussion of the research 
methodology and the results of pre-testing the time series properties of the data 
set utilized. These chapters identify the sources of the data used in the study. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide the core of the thesis. Chapter 4 tests for the existence 
and stability of the simple money demand functions, whilst Chapter 5 uses the 
VAR framework to examine the monetary transmission mechanism. Chapter 6 
provides conclusions. 
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                                CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL DEBATES AND LITERATURE REVIEWS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the overview of monetary theories, focusing on monetary 
theories and the money demand function, and the literature reviews of the 
money demand function and the monetary transmission mechanism. There are 
three sections included in this chapter. The first section is a brief overview of 
major monetary theory development. The starting point of this section is the 
quantity theory of money, generated by classical economists, followed by the 
monetary theories of the Keynesian, Monetarist, New Classical economics, and 
New Keynesian monetary models. In addition, this section also provides the 
theoretical framework on monetary policy and the transmission mechanism, the 
explanation of the channels in which monetary policy affects economic 
activities. The second section presents the review of empirical studies related to 
the demand for money analysis and the monetary transmission mechanism.  The 
last section presents the overview of Thailand‘s economic development. 
2.2 Development of Monetary Theories  
 
In this section, we briefly review standard theories about the demand for money 
as developed by Classical, Keynesian and Monetarist economists. Our aim is to 
simply provide the background to the empirical demand for money functions 
examined in Chapters 4 and 5, rather than provide an exhaustive survey of the 
theory of the demand for money. 
 
 2.2.1 Classical Monetary Theory  
  
It seems that the classical theory is widely regarded as the first school of 
economic thought. The first formal classical monetary theory is the quantity 
theory of money which was developed by Fisher (1911). The theory identifies 
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money supply as the primary determinant of nominal spending and the price 
level. The idea behind this theory comes from the equation of exchange. This 
equation explains the relationship between the volume of transactions at current 
price (PY) and money supply times the turnover rate of money. It says that the 
quantity of money times the velocity of money is equal to the price level times 
output, which equals GDP. The equation of exchange can be written as: 
 
MV = PY,                                       (2.1) 
 
where M is the nominal quantity of money, 
V is the transaction velocity of money, 
P is the price level, and 
            Y is the volume of transaction or real output. 
 
As a standard classical assumption is that the velocity of money (V) is 
determined by payment habits and institutional factors such as the payment 
technology and the efficiency of the banking system, therefore V could be fixed 
in the short run (V is constant in the short run). In addition, the volume of 
transaction (Y) is considered also to be constant due to the classical economists‘ 
belief that the economy is always in full employment situation and output is 
influenced by only technology and resource availability. Then, the equation 
implies that in the short-run equilibrium, a change in money supply causes a 
proportional change in price level:  
                                                    
  YPVM   
                                                    PM                                         (2.2) 
 However, the quantity of money theory seems to focus on an explanation of 
mathematics, which could conclude that in equilibrium the price level is exactly 
proportional to money supply. However, the equation could not explain how a 
change in money supply affects the price level and economic activities. 
Therefore, Marshall (1923) and Pigou (1917) offered a new version of quantity 
of money, known as the Cambridge approach or the cash balance approach, 
which was less concerned about mathematics and more focused on individual 
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decisions about the optimal amount of holding money. The Cambridge 
approach is said to be the first theory that puts the emphasis on the demand for 
money. 
 
The assumption of Marshall and other Cambridge economists is that demand for 
money is a proportion of income. The equation of money demand can be written 
as: 
M
d
 = k PY                         (2.3) 
where M
d
 represents money demand (how much money people or enterprises 
want to hold), and k is a proportion of nominal income held in money balance. 
Note that the proportional relationship between the quantity of money and price 
level is dependent on the proportion of nominal income people wish to hold. 
 
Although Equation 2.2 simply transforms mathematically Equation 2.1, it brings 
out the difference between the aspects of money. The quantity theory of money 
views money as a medium of exchange and people hold money just for the 
transaction approach, while Cambridge stressed the cash balance approach 
which seems to emphasize money as a store of value (Friedman, 1970). It is 
interesting to note that classical economists believe that real output (Y) or the 
volume of transactions is a measure of economic activity. It does not depend on 
any variables in the equation of exchange (M, V, and P) but it is more 
dependent on the supply side. Therefore, a change in monetary policy affects 
only the price level but does not affect real output and other economic activity. 
In addition, the Classical economist states that money, inflation and deflation 
may temporarily be disguised in the short- run equilibrium, but not in the long- 
run. In the long- run, money only affects the price level. It can be concluded that 
in the Classical view, money does not matter; it does not affect investment, 
consumption and other real economic activities. 
 
The Classical Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
The monetary transmission mechanism of the classical approach is focused 
more on the linkage between money supply and nominal income directly. The 
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classical transmission mechanism is presented in Figure 2.1. Panel A presents 
the affect of monetary policy on nominal income. Panel B shows the affect of 
monetary policy on real income. 
 
Figure 2. 1 The Classical views of the Monetary Transmission Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, expansionary monetary policy led to an increase in 
the money supply from MS0 to MS1 in Panel A. This caused nominal income to 
grow from P0Q1 to P1Q1. As the assumption of fixed output at full employment 
level (Y ) and the velocity of money is constant (V ), then an increase in money 
supply introduced extra money into the economy. According to classical views, 
money is just a medium of exchange and people hold money for transactions 
approach. Therefore, all extra money from expansionary monetary policy will 
be spent in the economy. This cause an aggregate demand increase AD in Panel 
B shifted from AD0 to AD1, which pushes the price level and inflates it from P0 
to P1. Therefore, we can conclude that any change in monetary policy will affect 
only the price level but will not affect other economic activity in the economy. 
 
MV=PY 
AD0 
AD1 
Money supply 
MS0 
MS1 
Output 
Y 
Q 
P 
P0Q1 P1Q1 
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P0 
P1 
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2.2.2 The Keynesian Monetary Theory  
 
The stock market crash and the Great Depression of 1929, led to a massive fall 
in economic activity and a rise in unemployment on a worldwide scale. The 
inability of the Classical theory to adequately explain this major economic 
phenomenon meant that the time was ripe for alternative perspectives on the 
working of the world‘s economic system. The work of John Maynard Keynes is 
famous for The General Theory of Unemployment, Interest and Money (1936). 
The model of economic behavior–which was developed to explain the ideas in 
the so-called ‗General theory‘–the Keynesian model, provided an alternative 
that was capable of explaining the events of the depression. The Keynesian 
monetary theory attacked three basic assumptions of the Classical quantity 
theory of money, namely that velocity is constant, that full employment is the 
natural state for the economy, and that money demand is just for transaction 
purposes. Moreover, Keynesians argued that money affects both income and 
economic activity via the interest rate, which now played a central role in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
Since the Great Depression, this increased role of the rate of interest in the 
demand for money function was also accompanied by the increased importance 
of the interest rate in the transmission mechanism. While the classical theory 
claims that the interest rate is determined by the supply of savings (mainly from 
households) and the demand of investment (mainly from businesses), the so-
called loanable funds approach, Keynesians believe that the interest rate in 
financial markets is dependent on the demand for money and money supply. 
Therefore, an expansionary monetary policy leads to an increase in the money 
supply and lower interest rates in financial markets. As the interest rate reflects 
the opportunity cost of money, lower interest rates will push higher investment 
in the economy. The monetary transmission mechanism of the Keynesian 
approach is shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2. 2 The Keynesian monetary transmission mechanism 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be concluded that Keynesians believe that monetary policy not only 
affects the price as the Classical economist said, but it also affects real 
economics activities such as output, investment and the employment rate. 
Therefore, Keynesians believe in intervention from the government. 
 
However, there are some exceptions to the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Some Keynesian economists claim that investment is not always responsive to 
interest rates in the money market. In this case, the monetary transmission 
mechanism would be short-circuited in the investment goods market, and the 
linkage between the money market and the goods market would be broken.  
In addition, sometimes money demand in the money market could be horizontal 
at some low interest rate; this is called a liquidity trap (Figure 2.3). This 
situation can occur when people absorb any extra money into an idle balance, 
since they are extremely risk averse. In this case, if the money supply grows, 
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any extra money that people receive will not be spent. Instead, it will be 
absorbed into the cash balance. Thus, monetary policy will not affect interest 
rates and other economic activities in a liquidity trap situation.  
 
Figure 2. 3 The Monetary policy and Liquidity trap  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The summary of the Keynesian monetary transmission mechanism is presented 
in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2. 4 The Keynesian Monetary transmission mechanism  
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i0 
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2.2.3 The Monetarist Monetary Theory 
 
The development of the monetarist began with the restatement of the classical 
quantity of money by Milton Friedman (1956). It can be said that Friedman‘s 
view was a development of the classical quantity theory of money but was more 
focused on the demand for money. Friedman‘s demand for money can be 
expressed as: 
 
M
d
 = kPY                                        (2.4) 
 
The Equation 2.4 implies that money demand (M
d
) is dependent on the level of 
nominal income (PY). 
 
While the Keynesian theory of money demand emphasizes the three reasons 
that people hold money and claim that money demand is determined by income 
and interest rate, Monetarists argue that there is no reason to compartmentalize 
the money demand. Instead, Monetarists are more concerned about variables 
that influence the amount of money demand. Therefore, Friedman‘s new money 
demand function provides other variables that influence the amount of money 
demanded. Friedman‘s money demand function can be written as: 
 
                           ),,,,(

 deb
d rrrYPfM
e
                          (2.5)  
 
Where M
d   
is the amount of money demand, 
            P is the price level expectation,  
Y is permanent income (the expected average income in the long run), 
rB is the nominal interest rate on bonds, 
rE is the nominal interest rate on equity, and 
rD is the nominal interest rate on durable goods 
. 
The equation can imply that demand for money is positively related to 
permanent income, and is negatively related to the nominal interest rate on 
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bonds, equity, durable goods, and the price expectation. It should be noted that 
monetarists believe that money demand is stable because most variables that 
influence money demand are relatively constant due to a stable market system 
in the economy. 
  
The Monetarist Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
The transmission mechanism of the monetarist approach is similar to its 
classical predecessors where there are direct linkages between money supply 
and nominal income. Monetarists consider demand for money as stable, so a 
change in money supply will generate a surplus of money for both consumers 
and investors. This surplus of money will be spent and it will quickly increase 
the aggregate demand. 
 
  2.2.4 The New Classical Monetary Theory  
 
New classical economics was developed to argue against the Keynesian view 
that the economy should be stabilized by means of demand management by the 
government. New classical economists do not accept that there is a difference 
between short run and long run in the Keynesian analysis of the affect of 
monetary policy on aggregate demand and output. In addition, New classical 
economists believe that monetary policy actions that change aggregate demand 
will not affect output and the unemployment rate, even in the short run.  
 
It can be said that the first formal theory of new classical economics was 
‗Rational Expectations‘ which was originally created by Muth (1960) and later 
developed by Lucas (1980). The idea of the theory is similar to the classical and 
monetarist approaches in that they believe in a non-interventionist policy. Lucas 
believes in the self-correcting. He claims that when a recession is occurring, 
producers will cut their prices to attract business, as well as laborers will reduce 
their wages to attract work. This means prices deflate and purchasing power 
will be strengthened, which has the same effect as increasing the money supply. 
Therefore, government should not do anything but wait the correction out. 
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The hypothesis of rational expectations has been used for supporting some 
conclusions about policymaking. For example, Sargent and Wallace (1976) 
developed the theory of Policy Ineffectiveness Proposition. They suggested that 
if the central bank tries to lower the unemployment rate by adopting 
expansionary monetary policy, economic agents would expect that money 
supply will increase, and their expectations of future inflation will rise. Real 
wages and prices remain constant and therefore output is constant. Therefore, 
monetary policy actions will not affect the real economy. 
 
2.2.5 The New Keynesian Monetary Theory 
  
New Keynesian economics was developed to respond to the new classical 
economic theory. The major difference between the new classical economic and 
the new Keynesian theory is how quickly prices and wages can be adjusted. 
While the assumption of new classical economists is that prices and wages are 
very flexible, new Keynesian economists believe that prices and wages are 
sticky. New Keynesian theories rely on this stickiness of wages and prices to 
explain why involuntary unemployment exists and why monetary policy has 
such a strong influence on economic activity.  
 
The most well known theory of new Keynesian economics is the ‗sticky price‘ 
or ‗menu cost‘ model, which explains why prices adjust slowly. New 
Keynesians explain that the reason that firms do not change the price quickly is 
due to the cost that firms incur if the product price is changed, such as the cost 
of making a new price list. Although this cost seems to be small, New 
Keynesian economists describe how it can cause fluctuation in the short-run. 
Mankiw and Rome (1991) claim that not only do firms have to pay for the 
change of price cost, but also externalities that go along with the price change. 
They explain that if a firm reduces the price of a product because of a decrease 
in money supply, it will make the real income of customers increase, meaning 
that the purchasing power of the customers is increased and the customers might 
buy product from other companies. Therefore, firms will hesitate to lower the 
price because they do not want to assist other companies‘ sales. 
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New Keynesian economics suggests—in contrast to some new classical 
theories—that recessions do not represent the efficient functioning of markets. 
Keynesian theories say that recessions are caused by some economy-wide 
market failure. Thus, new Keynesian economics provides a rationale for 
government intervention in the economy, such as counter-cyclical monetary or 
fiscal policy. 
2.2.6 The Summaries of the Monetary Theories  
 
The summaries of the monetary theories of each school of thought are outlined 
in Table 2.1. There are four major differences among each school of thought: 
the demand for money functions, the impact of money on the economy, the 
monetary transmission mechanism, and the idea of intervention of government. 
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Table 2.1 The Summary of the Monetary Theories 
 Classical Keynesian Monetarist    New-Classical   New-Keynesian 
Money demand 
function 
For transaction 
approach only 
 Demand for money for: 
- Transaction 
- Precautionary 
- Speculation 
Money demand is stable but 
is determined by  permanent 
income, interest rates and 
price expectations 
  
Impact of money 
on economy 
   ∆M  ∆ P ∆M  ∆ P  and ∆ Q  ∆M  ∆ P or ∆ Q  ∆M  ∆ P ∆M  ∆ P  and ∆ Q 
Monetary  
Transmission  
Mechanism 
Direct 
    Base on equation 
       YPVM   
       M ↑→ P ↑ 
  Monetary policy affects 
  on price level but not on  
  output 
Indirect 
Money affect real output via 
interest rate : 
M ↑→ i ↓→  I↑→ y↑ → AD 
↑→ P ↑ 
Direct 
M ↑→ C↑→ Y↑   or P↑ 
 
 
 
   M ↑→ P ↑ 
 
M ↑→ i ↓→  
 I↑ →y↑ → AD   ↑→ P ↑ 
Is activist policy 
desirable? 
NO 
(Non-interventionist) 
 
  Belief in self- adjustment 
   of the economy 
Yes 
(Interventionist) 
 
Fluctuation can be prevented    
by conducting monetary and 
  fiscal policy 
NO 
(Non-interventionist) 
-Fiscal policy is  not an 
effective stabilization tool 
-Monetary policy affects 
nominal income but does 
not affect real income 
 
NO 
(Non-
interventionist) 
Prices are perfectly 
flexible, so monetary 
policy cannot affect 
real output in the short 
term 
          Yes 
(Interventionist) 
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2.3 The Theoretical Framework of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
Generally, the objective of monetary policy is to achieve economic growth and 
economic stability, particularly price stability. An understanding of the way in 
which change is transmitted to the rest of the economy is clearly important. 
 
The monetary transmission mechanism is usually described as a process through 
which monetary policy is transmitted into change in economic activity such as 
output, income and the inflation rate. There are three major schools of thought 
which debate on the channel of monetary transmission. The first view is the 
traditional interest rate effect or the money view, which emphasizes the role of 
money and the affect of market interest rates on the economy. The second 
channel called the credit view focuses on the role of credit in the economy. The 
third channel is called the other asset price effect. 
 
2.3.1 The Traditional Interest Rate Channels (money view) 
 
The interest rate channel is based on a traditional Keynesian economic 
approach. The channel focuses on the role of interest rates in responding to 
monetary policy and its affect on economic activities. The schematics of the 
monetary transmission mechanism of traditional interest rate channels are 
operated through the interest rates and domestic investment. The monetary 
transmission mechanism of interest rates is presented in the following diagram: 
           
M        ir          I        Y 
  
where (M) represents an expansion of monetary policy, which leads to a 
decrease in the real interest rate (ir ). The lower interest rate can imply that the 
cost of capital has decreased. Thus, investment spending is increased (I), 
thereby leading to an increase in aggregate demand and a rise in output (Y). 
 
Although the original Keynes‘ view emphasized the interest rate channels 
through businesses decisions on investment spending, many economists claim 
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that consumers‘ decisions about expenditure also affect investment spending. 
This is because consumer spending on durable goods such as housing is usually 
financed by borrowing. Therefore, lower interest rates should encourage the 
consumer to increase their spending. Hence, the interest rate channel should 
also apply to consumer spending. In addition, the major feature of the interest 
rate channel is that it puts emphasis on the real rather than nominal interest rate. 
 
Another interesting way to present the interest channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism is using the well-known IS-LM framework, which 
focuses on the equilibrium between demand for money and money supply, and 
the linkage of the money market to investment and output. The equilibrium of 
the money market and the LM curve can be show in Equations 2.6 to 2.8. 
 
The demand for money function is:         
                  );,( ryfM d     or    tt
d ryM              (2.6) 
The money supply function is:            
                             MM s                  (2.7) 
The LM curve is:           
                         MryfMM sd  ),(                                        (2.8) 
 
Where      dM  is the money demand,  
   sM   is the money supply (money supply is assumed to be fixed in  the   
short run),   
                 y      is real income, and  
                  r      is the domestic interest rate. 
 
Substituting Equations 2.6 and 2.7 into Equation (2.8 to get the LM curve 
equation: 
                                 
                                               MryMM
sd                                              
                                             Or   y
M
rt



                             (2.9) 
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For the IS curve, as per the Keynesian view, the IS curve is generated from the 
saving and investment functions. Thus the IS curve is generated by the 
following equations: 
 
The saving function is:       rayaaS 210     where     0,10,0 210  aaa         
 
                    or                    rayaaS 210                            (2.10)      
                    
The investment function is:   rbbI 10                where      0,0 10  bb    
 
                   or               rbbI 10                                               (2.11) 
 
The IS curve is:                  SI                                                  (2.12) 
 
Substituting Equations 2.10 and 2.11 into Equation 2.12 to get the IS curve 
equation: 
                                    yr 10                                                (2.13) 
 
             Where  
21
00
0
ab
ba


     and 
21
1
1
ab
a

  
 
The equilibrium of the money market (LM) and the real market (IS) is given by 
the intersection of Equations 2.9 and 2.13: 
 
LMIS     :       




y
ab
a
ab
ba
21
1
21
00 y
M



  
 
                   M
ab
aab
aba
y














21
1
1
)(
)(
21
211     (2.14) 
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Equation 2.14 demonstrates that a change in the money supply can affect the 
level of income. Based on Equation 2.14, we can calculate the money multiplier 
in the form of the coefficient ∆M as: 
 
                   M
ab
a
y 










21
1
1
         (2.15) 
 
From Equation 2.15, it is clear to represent the interest channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism through the following diagram as: 
 
  δ :  (∆M→∆r) ,  b1: (∆r→∆I), and a1 : (∆I→∆y), with  : (∆y→∆M
d
)  
 
2.3.2. The Credit View 
 
The credit view of the monetary transmission mechanism is based on a lending 
problem associated with asymmetric information in the financial market. 
According to this channel, the direct effects of monetary policy on interest rate 
are amplified by changes in the financial market. There are two possible 
linkages of the credit channel theories to explain the relationship between 
monetary policy and the financial market: the balance sheet channel and the 
bank-lending channel. Bernank and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) explain the 
bank-lending channel as the effect of monetary policy on the supply of loans by 
the banking system, while the balance sheet channel emphasizes the impact of 
monetary policy on the borrower‘s balance sheet.  
The Bank-Lending Channel 
 
The bank-lending channel is based on the financial structure in which the banks 
play a special role in the financial system, as they are suited to deal with certain 
types of borrowers who may not have access to the credit market unless they 
borrow from a bank. The bank-lending channel of monetary policy can be 
explained as in the following schematic: 
M      Bank Deposit         Bank Loan     I        Y 
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The expansionary monetary policy leads to an increase in bank deposits, which 
means the quantity of bank loans available also increases. If certain borrowers 
cannot obtain funds from outside the banking system, then the investment 
spending will increase and the volume of output rises.  
 
The major implication of the bank-lending channel is that monetary policies 
will have greater affect on small and medium firms because large firms usually 
can obtain funds from other financial institutions such as stock and bond 
markets.  
 The Balance Sheet Channel 
 
The balance sheet channel of monetary policy is based on the concept that 
changes in monetary policy not only affect interest rates, but also have an affect 
on the financial position of the borrower, both in a direct and an indirect way. 
Monetary policy can affect a firm‘s balance sheet in several channels. For 
example, expansionary monetary policy (M) leads to an increase in equity 
price (Pe) and higher investment spending (I    ), and then aggregate demand 
will be increased. The following schematic shows the transmission mechanism 
of the balance sheet channel: 
 
M      Pe       adverse selection   moral hazard  I        Y 
 
The Cash Flow Channel 
 
Another credit channel is called the cash flow channel, which focuses on 
monetary policy affecting economic activities though cash flow. Expansionary 
monetary policy, which lowers interest rates, can cause a rise in a firm‘s cash 
flow, and they improve a firm‘s balance sheet. As a result, adverse selection and 
the moral hazard problem become less severe, thereby increasing lending and 
economic activities, leading to the following schematic for the cash flow 
channel: 
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M      r      cash flow     adverse selection   moral hazard, 
                  Lending    I        Y 
It seems that the cash flow channel impact on the monetary transmission 
mechanism is similar to the traditional interest rate channel. In fact, they are 
different. The cash flow channel is more focused on the nominal interest rate 
that affects a firm‘s cash flow, while the traditional interest rate channel 
emphasizes the affect of the nominal interest rate on investment. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the balance sheet and cash flow channel is that 
those two mechanisms are involved in adverse selection. The expansionary 
monetary policy that lower interest rates can stimulate output involves the 
credit-rationing phenomenon. Credit rationing will occur in the case of a 
borrower being denied loans even when they are willing to pay a high interest 
rate. This is because the firms that have the riskiest projects are exactly the ones 
who are willing to pay the highest interest rate. Thus, high interest rates increase 
the adverse selection problem, and lower interest rates reduce the problem. 
Therefore, when the adverse selection problem is decreased, the volume of 
lending, investment and output in the economy are increased.   
     
The credit channel analysis is commonly based on the study of Bernanke and 
Blinder (1998). They offered the alternative model that explains the credit 
channel of monetary policy, and the model allows roles for bank loans and 
money rather than focusing on only money as in the traditional IS-LM 
framework. The major assumption of this model is that loans and bonds are 
imperfect substitutes, so the borrower and lender are assumed to choose 
between bonds and loans according to the interest rates on the two alternative 
credit instruments. Therefore, the LM curve of this theory is derived from a set 
of portfolio-balance on the two assets, money and credit. Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) also offered a commodity and credit curve (CC curve), which is 
generated from demand and supply for loans. 
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The demand for loan function is: 
   ),,(

 yipfLd     (2.16) 
 
      where  dL  is the demand for loan,  
                    p is the interest rate on the loan, 
                    i   is the interest rate on bonds, and 
                    y is income. 
 
The signs above each variable indicate that relationship of each variable to the 
demand for loan. This means that demands for loans positively respond to the 
interest rate on bonds and income, while negatively relating to the interest rate 
on loans. 
 
The supply for loan function can be generated from a simplified bank balance 
sheet as shown in the following table: 
Assets Liabilities 
         Reserve (R) 
Bonds  (B
b
) 
Loans   (L
s
) 
Deposit (D) 
 
According to the above table, the bank balance sheet is DLBR sb  . Since 
the reserves consist of reserve requirement and excess reserve, so the reserve 
can be written as EDR   where   is the required reserve ratio, and E is 
excess reserve. Thus, the banks‘ constraint is )1(  DELB sb . Therefore, 
the loan supply function is that: 
                                       )1(),(  

DipLs               (2.17) 
     
The Equation 2.16 implies that the supply of loans is dependent on the interest 
rate for bonds and credit, the reserve requirement ration, and bank deposits. 
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Thus, the equilibrium of the loans market is: 
sd LL                          (2.18) 
 
By subtracting Equations 2.16 and 2.17 to Equation 2.18 to obtain:  
                        )1(),(),,(   DipyipL                                       (2.19) 
  
The money market is described by the conventional LM curve. Suppose banks 
hold excess reserves equal to )1()(  Di , then the supply of deposits will be 
equal to the bank reserve times the multiplier: 
                       
           Rimm ).(     (2.20) 
where   1)1)(()(   iim .   
 
The demand for deposits can be expressed as:  
      ),(

 yiDDd              (2.21) 
 
By placing Equations 2.20 and 2.21 into variable D on the right-hand side of 
Equation 2.19 you to obtain: 
    )1()(),(   RimipL                                        (2.22) 
 
 By taking the total differencing of Equation 2.22, we will obtain: 
                                                                                  
dRmdidpRimdimRdL ipi )1())(1()()1(        (2.23)                 
 
where 0,0,0  ipim  . 
Using the differentiation to solve the left-hand side of Equation 2.19:  
    
     dyLdiLdpLdL yip                                                               (2.24) 
 
where 0,0,0  yip LLL . 
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By rearranging Equations 2.23 and 2.24 to solve p as a function of i,  y, and R to 
obtain: 
 
  
dRmmdyL
dLRimmRdpRimL
y
iiiipp
)1()(
))1()(()1())1()((




   (2.25) 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the loan market can be stated as: 
             ),,(

 Ryip           (2.26) 
 
Equation 2.26 clearly states that the interest rate on loans are positively related 
to the bond interest rate and income, but is negatively related to the bank 
reserve. 
 
To analyze the aggregate demand, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) adopted the IS 
curve as in the following equation: 
                            IS :  ),(

 piy       
  (2.27) 
 
Then, subtract Equation 2.26 into 2.27 to get: 
                         ),,,,( RyiiYy                              (2.28) 
 
Equation 2.28 is called ‗the commodity and credit curve (CC curve)‘ in 
Bernanke and Blinder‘s terms. The CC curve is negatively sloped like the IS 
curve which means that when interest rates on bonds and loans are increased, 
the volume of aggregate credits will be decreased which leads to a drop in 
investment and income. The different between the IS and CC curve is that while 
the CC curve is shifted by monetary policy actions and credit shocks in the loan 
market, the IS curve does not directly respond to monetary policy. 
 
 The credit channel on the monetary transmission mechanism, analyzed by the 
LM-CC curve can be presented in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2. 5The LM-CC curve and Monetary Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expansionary monetary policy caused both the LM and CC curves to shift 
rightward. The LM curve is shift due to increasing money supply while the shift 
in the CC curve is because of increasing bank credit. This led to a rise in output.  
 
2.3.3 Other Asset Price Effects  
 
It seems to be that a key monetarist objective to Keynes‘ traditional view of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy is that it only focuses on one asset 
price, which is interest rates, rather than considering other asset prices. Hence, 
monetarists envision a transmission mechanism in other asset prices, as well as 
real wealth transmitting a monetary affect on economic activities. There are 
several channels of asset price effects on monetary policy. 
Exchange Rate Effect on Net Exports 
 
It should be noted that the exchange rate channel relates to the interest rate 
channel because when domestic real interest rates change, it may lead to 
changes in the exchange rate. For example, when domestic real interest rates 
decrease, domestic currency becomes less attractive compared with deposits in 
foreign currency. It causes depreciation of domestic currency (E). However, 
the lower value of domestic currency makes domestic products cheaper than 
foreign goods, thereby causing a rise in the value of exports and net exports 
(NX). The exchange channel can be characterized by the following schematic 
showing the effect of a monetary policy expansion: 
                      M        ir        E  NX        Y 
CC1 
 CC0 
LM1 
LM0 
y 
r 
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Tobin’s q Theory 
 
James Tobin developed the theory called Tobin‘s q theory, to explain how 
monetary policy can affect economic activities through its effect on the 
valuation of equities (stock). Tobin defines q as the market value of a firm 
divided by the replacement of capital cost. If q is high, the market price of the 
firm will also be high. The new equipment is cheap compared to the market 
value of the firm. Thus, the firm can buy much new equipment following a rise 
in investment spending. 
 
The importance of the theory is the link between Tobin‘s q theory and 
investment spending, and how monetary policy affects the price of equity. 
While monetary policy is expanding, the public knows that there is more money 
than demand, so it gets rid of spending. This causes an increase in stock demand 
and stock price. Then, it leads to high q and investment spending as can be 
shown in the following schematic: 
M        Pe       q  I        Y 
 
The wealth effect 
 
This channel was first advocated by Modigliani (1971). The theory is based on 
his famous life cycle model of consumption, spending by the consumer on non-
durable goods and service, and it is determined by the lifetime resource of the 
consumer, not just present income. The major component of lifetime resource is 
financial wealth, which is common stock. When stock prices increase, this 
implies that the value of financial wealth rises, thereby increasing the lifetime 
resource. Hence, expansionary monetary policy led to an increase in stock price 
and wealth, consumption, and output. The feature of the wealth effect can be 
shown by the following schematic:  
 
M       Pe       Wealth   Consumption        Y 
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Table 2. 2 A Summary of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism: the link 
between monetary policy and GDP  
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2.4 The Literature Reviews of Empirical Studies 
 
As the theoretical debate in the previous section states that, the stability of the 
money demand function is a major role in monetary policy action particularly in 
terms of selecting the appropriate monetary target. Therefore, much empirical 
research has been carried out about the demand for money analysis and the 
monetary transmission mechanism in macroeconomic analysis. This section 
presents the review of empirical studies related to the demand for money 
analysis and the monetary transmission mechanism. This section consists of two 
parts: the first part provides the empirical study of the money demand function, 
focusing on the stability of money demand in both developed and developing 
countries. The second section is the literature review on the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
 
2.4.1 The Empirical Studies on Demand for money   
 
The stability of money demand has long been a major concern in monetary 
analysis because money demand plays a major role in the financial market and 
it relates to real economic activities. As the aim of monetary policy is to control 
money supply in order to achieve economic growth and price stability, if the 
money demand function is stable, it implies that the money multiplier is stable 
and its measure of the prediction of the money supply effect on aggregate 
output is stable. In addition, theoretically, the money demand function is 
dependent on economic variables such as real income, wealth, and other 
variables, which reflect the opportunity cost of holding money, such as interest 
rates. Therefore, the relationship between money demand and its determinants 
has important implications for selecting an appropriate monetary policy.  
 
As a result, empirical studies on the money demand function have been carried 
out over the past several decades. This section provides the empirical studies‘ 
surveys of money demand analysis, focusing on the stability of money demand 
and the relationship between money aggregate and economic activities in 
different countries. There are two major groups of countries concerned in this 
section, the surveys of money demand in developed and developing countries.  
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One of the pioneer studies on the money demand function in developed 
countries was generated by  Lucas (1988). He used post-war data to estimate the 
money demand in the United States. He concludes that there is evidence of a 
stable long-run relationship between M1 money holding, domestic interest rates, 
and income in the United States over the sample period. After the study of 
Lucas, many researchers attempted to analyze the money demand in the United 
States. For example, Miller (1991) adopted the Eagle and Granger cointegration 
approach (EG) and the Error Correction model to analyze the money demand 
function in the USA during 1959-1987. He found that there is a single 
cointegration relationship between broad money and its determinants. After that 
Lucas (2000) re-estimated the M1 money demand in the United States but was 
more focused on the interest rate elasticity of money demand during 1900-1994, 
and the result was similar to the previous study  that the M1 money demand in 
the United States appeared to be stable. 
 
There is also a huge amount of literature about money demand in the industrial 
countries. For instance, Ghosh (2000) applied the cointegration approach to 
estimate the existence of the long-run equilibrium relationship of the M1 
demand function in five industrial countries, including the US, the UK, Canada, 
Germany, and Japan. The empirical results of his study indicate that there is a 
long-run relationship between the M1 money demand and short-term and long-
term interest rates in the US, the UK and Canada while only long-term interest 
rates appeared to be strongly significant in Japan. In addition, he found that 
there is no evidence about a stable relationship for Germany‘s money demand 
function. This study was supported by Hansen and Kim (1995) and Bahmani-
Oskooee and Bohl (2000). They claimed that the M3 money demand in 
Germany appeared to be unstable. 
 
Bahmani-Oskooee (2001) used the Johansen cointegration model to test the 
long-run relationship between the M2 money holding and interest rates in Japan. 
This research shows that the long-run M2 money demand function in Japan is 
stable. Similarly, Bahmani-Oskooee and Chomsisengphet (2002) applied  the 
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same model  to test a long-run relationship in the M2 money demand function in 
11 OECD countries, including Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, the US, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. In addition, they also used 
the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ to test the stability of M2 money demand in those 
industrial countries. The results show that there is some sign of instability in the 
money demand function in Switzerland and the UK. However, money demands 
of the remaining countries are stable. Choi and Oxley (2004) estimated the 
stability of money demand in New Zealand, using the quarterly data from 1990-
2000 based on the cointegration and error correction models. The result 
indicates that there exists a long-run relationship for the money demand 
function. 
 
Some of the empirical studies emphasize the linkage between the money 
demand function and monetary policy. For instance, Cargill and Parker (2004) 
analyzed the money demand and monetary policy in Japan, China, and the 
United States during a deflation period. They review the history of deflation of 
those three countries and analyze the affect of deflation on money demand. The 
empirical results show that money demand in Japan is influenced by the 
deflation process, similar to the results from the United States. However, 
deflation has no affect on money demand in China. Coenen, Levin, and Wieland 
(2005) consider money demand as a monetary indicator when conducting 
monetary policy. In addition, they attempt to answer the question whether there 
is a linkage between money demand and current real output. The result indicates 
that money demand has limited information content as an indicator of 
contemporaneous aggregate demand in the Euro area.  
 
Another interesting empirical study about the money demand function is the 
study of Lim (1993). He used a set of Australian quarterly and monthly data 
from 1974-1990 to examine the relationship between the broad money demand 
and its determinants. The variables included in the model are 90-day bank bill 
rates, two and five-year t-bond rates, the inflation rate and the dummy variable, 
which represent the structural change. The cointegration result shows that there 
exists a long-run relationship for both the monthly and quarterly money demand 
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function and the error correction model (ECM) indicates that the short-run 
money aggregate in Australia was influenced by the 90-day bank bill rate. This 
was followed by Felmingham and Zhang (2001) who tested the broad money 
demand function but with a different method. They used the Gregory and 
Hansen (GH) methodology to examine the stability of money demand when a 
structural break is included, and the results indicate that the structural break was 
found in 1991 with the deep recession. Valadkhani (2005) re-examined the 
long-run determinants of the broad demand money function in Australia during 
1976-2002 by using the Johansen cointegration technique. The result is similar 
to the previous study in that demand for broad money is cointegrated with real 
income, the rate of return on 10-year treasury bonds, the cash rate and the rate 
of inflation. 
 
In recent years, there are many empirical studies analyzing the money demand 
function in developing countries. Most of the studies emphasize the stability of 
money demand and the long-run relationship between money demand and its 
determinants. Ahmed (1999) using the cointegration and error correction 
approach to investigate the stability of the money demand function and test the  
existence of a long-run money demand function for Bangladesh during the 
period 1975-1997. He also examines the parameter stability of the money 
demand function. The results suggest that there exists a single long-run 
relationship between real broad money demand, real income, and the real 
exchange rate. The short-term money demand function estimated with an error 
correction model found that real GDP and the real exchange rate have emerged 
as important determinants of the demand for money in Bangladesh. In addition, 
the results indicate that there is no evidence of a structural break in the money 
demand function in Bangladesh. Similarly, Siddiki (2000) applied the Eagle and 
Granger cointegration approach to estimate the money demand function in 
Bangladesh during 1975-1995. The empirical results suggest that there exists a 
unique long-run relationship among broad money demand (M2) and the real 
income, domestic interest rates and the unofficial exchange rate. Das and 
Mandal (2000) used the VAR model to examine the long-run stability of M3 
money demand in India during the period 1981-1998. They found that M3 
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money demand appeared to be stable although there was a financial shock 
during 1990. Wu et al. (2005) employed the ARMAX to examine the demand 
for money in Taiwan and used the rolling estimation approach to examine the 
stability of parameter estimates over time. The empirical analysis concludes that 
the money demand in Taiwan is stable and the income elasticity is less than one. 
 
Several studies focused on money demand in China such as  Hafer and Kutan 
(1994) who used annual Chinese data from 1952-1988 to test the long-run 
relationship between money aggregate and its determinants. The results indicate 
that monetary aggregate is cointegrated with income and interest rates. Chen 
(1997) also studied the stability of the long-run money demand functions for the 
M0 and M2 money aggregate  in China. The author states that M0 and M2 have 
a stable long-run relationship with their determinants both in pre- and post-
financial reform. Deng and Liu (1999) re-estimated the demand for money in 
China, both narrow money (M1) and broad money (M2), during 1980-1994. 
 
Several empirical studies of money demand in developing countries attempt to 
compare the stability of the narrow money demand and broad money demand in 
the sense of which money aggregate should be selected for monetary action. For 
example, Sriram (2002) studied the stability of long-run money demand  in 
Malaysia and found that the demand for money (M2) in Malaysia was stable 
both in the short run and long run. He also suggests that monetary authorities 
should put more emphasis on the behavior of broad money in monetary 
management. This evidence is supported by the study of Dahalan, Sharma, and 
Sylwester (2005). They compared the stability of M1 and M2 money demand in 
Malaysia and found that M2 money demand is more stable, and said it should 
be considered as the monetary target in Malaysia when conducting monetary 
policy. After that, Hussain and Liew (2006) employ the CUSUM and the error 
correction model with monthly data from 1979-2002 to analyze the M1 and M2 
money demand function in Malaysia. The CUSUM result suggests that both M1 
and M2 appeared to be stable although the Asian financial crisis occurred 
during the sample period. 
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Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005) employ the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
test to analyse seven developing countries, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The authors conclude that 
the M1 money demand is cointegrated with its determinants and the estimates of 
elasticity are stable over time for India, Indonesia and Singapore, while the M2 
money demand appeared more stable for, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. 
Another popular issue on money demand analysis in Asian countries is to 
analyse the affect of financial liberation on the stability of demand function. 
Dekle and Pradhan (1997) studied the impact of financial liberalization on 
money demand in Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. They claim that the instability in economic activities, the financial 
liberation, and the financial reforms have contributed to the instability of money 
demand in Southeast Asian countries. Khalid (1999) estimates the degree that 
foreign factor opportunity cost variables impact money demand in South Korea, 
the Philippines, and Singapore by applying the Johansen cointegration and the 
error correction model with the quarterly data from  1977:1 to 1993:4. He states 
that money demand in those three countries has a long-run relationship with 
both domestic and foreign variables. However, only income appeared to be a 
significant relationship with money demand while the interest rate has no affect 
on money demand in the short-run equilibrium. The author suggests that foreign 
factors have a stronger affect on money demand than the effect from domestic 
interest rates after financial liberation. 
It is very interesting that many empirical studies found that the financial 
liberalization has an effect on the money demand function in the short-run 
equilibrium, but the long-run relationship appeared to be stable. Pradhan and 
Subramanian (2004) study the effect of the financial innovation process on the 
stability of demand for money. They state that although financial deregulation 
and innovation has occurred in the Indian economy, the demand for money 
relationship is stable. Indeed, this research is similar to the research of Cheong 
(2003). He investigated whether financial liberalization has caused instability in 
the money demand function in Korea. The results of the research show that the 
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financial liberation has an effect on the money demand relationship but it does 
not cause instability in the money demand function in Korea. James (2005) 
attempts to offer a new approach to analyse the effects of financial liberalization 
on money demand in Indonesia by including a proxy for the process in the 
money demand function. He found that liberalization is a major role in 
determining money demand and it appears to fluctuate. Moreover, he claims 
that there is existence of a long-run relationship between broad money and its 
determinants when the proxy of liberalization is included. 
In the case of Thailand, there are not many empirical studies on the money 
demand function. Most of the studies in Thailand emphasize the relationship 
between money aggregate and economic indicators but have less concern about 
the stability of the money demand function. For instance, Arize, Spalding, and 
Umezulike (1991) estimated demand for money in Thailand based on the 
quarterly time series data for the period 1973:1 to 1985:4. They found that the 
foreign interest rate appeared as an important role in the money demand 
function during the sample period. They suggest that the Bank of Thailand 
should consider the relationship between money aggregate and external factors 
such as the foreign interest rate when operating monetary policy. Similarly, 
Chaisrisawatsuk, Sharma, and Chowdhury (2004) analyze the stability of 
money demand function and monetary policy under the capital mobility and 
currency substitution in five Asian countries including Thailand, using quarterly 
data from 1980-1996. The result of the cointegration vector indicates that 
capital mobility and currency substitution appeared to be significant factors in 
the money demand function with respect to the US dollar, the British pound and 
the Japanese yen for Thailand. Monetary effectiveness is influenced by capital 
mobility and currency substitution. They also conclude that the money demand 
function in Thailand is less stable over the sample period because of the 
transmission of international shock. The authors suggest that the monetary 
authorities should consider more about external factors when making decisions 
on monetary police action.    
 
  37 
There are some studies attempt to develop econometric techniques to analyze 
the relationship of the narrow and broad money demand function in Thailand. 
For example, Chowdhury (1997) used the Johansen cointegration and VAR 
technique to analyze the demand for money in Thailand. The aim of the study is 
to test the long-run relationship among nominal money aggregate (both M1 and 
M2), real GDP, price levels, exchange rates, and interest rates. The results show 
that there is evidence of stability of money demand in the long-run relationship 
for both M1 and M2 money demand. However, he suggests that M2 money 
demand appeared to be more desirable since the long-run elasticity for the M2 
money demand equation is within the expected range, while M1 money demand 
functions are not. On the other hand, Arize, Malindretos, and Shwiff (1999) 
analyzed the money demand function for 12 developing countries, including 
Thailand. The cointegration approach was adopted to examine the long-run 
equilibrium between real M1 or M2 money aggregate, real income, the inflation 
rate, the exchange rate, foreign exchange risk, and foreign interest rates when 
structural change is included. The results show that although M1 money 
demand has a slower response to changes in the determinants compared with 
M2 money demand, both M1and M2 need to be considered in the sense of 
conducting monetary policy. 
 
Another popular issue about money demand studied in Thailand is whether an 
external factor such as the exchange rate has a relationship with money holding 
in Thailand. For example,  Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi (1991) analyzed the 
effects of effective exchange rates of demand for money in developing countries 
(including Thailand) by using quarterly data from 1973-85. They found that 
currency depreciation causes a decline in the demand for domestic currency in 
most developing countries, including Thailand. The  paper was supported  by 
Tosporn and Pandey  (1997) who investigated the aspects of financial 
liberalization and the role of the expectation on exchange rate on money 
demand in Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea by using the Box-Cox extended 
autoregressive model with data from 1970-1989. The empirical results show 
that the expected depreciation in the black market exchange rate has a negative 
long-run relationship with money holding in Thailand. In addition, they found 
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that there is no evidence to indicate that the exchange rate influences the money 
demand differently over the period before and during the ongoing financial 
liberalization process. Therefore, the central bank must carefully select an 
appropriate exchange rate policy to support their economic goals. Another 
interesting paper that focused on the relationship of the exchange rate and 
money demand in Thailand is the study of Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Techaratanachai (2001). They investigate the relationship between currency 
depreciation and the M2 money demand function in Thailand by using the 
quarterly time series from 1977-1990. They tried to investigate whether 
currency depreciation has resulted in currency substitution in Thailand. The 
results showed that the depreciation of the Thai baht led to a decrease in baht 
holding in Thailand (M2) and a slow fall in economic activities. Therefore, 
monetary authorities should not only consider about stabilize the economy, but 
they also need to stabilize the domestic currency.   
 
Few empirical studies emphasize money demand and the inflation rate in 
Thailand. Arize, Malindretos, and Grivoyannis (2005) investigate the effect of 
inflation-rate volatility on the money demand function in Thailand and other 
seven less developed countries. The authors apply the cointegration 
methodology with the quarterly data from 1973:2–1999:4 to estimate the 
demand function. The major result concerned the relationship between the real 
money demand and the inflation rate volatility. They found that there is a 
negative relationship between real money demand and the inflation rate in 
Thailand. The authors suggest that if the policy maker ignores price, it is hardly 
going to stabilize the domestic economy. Therefore, monetary policy in 
Thailand should be operating under inflation targeting, which is more concerned 
about price stability.  
 
 
2.4.2 Empirical Studies of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
  
Since Keynes introduced the link between the monetary sector and the real 
sector, the effect of monetary policy on economic activities became an 
important issue in macroeconomics analysis. A large amount of literature has 
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studied about the channels of monetary policy effect on economic activity, 
especially the affect of monetary policy on inflation and economic growth. The 
major aim of this section is to present the surveys of empirical studies relating 
to monetary policy and the transmission mechanism in the different channels of 
the transmission mechanism. Three main channels are the concerned in this 
section: the money view or traditional interest rate channel, the credit view 
(including the bank-lending channel and bank balance channel), and other asset 
price channel (including the exchange rate channel and the wealth effect. 
 2.4.2.1 The Traditional Interest Rate Channel 
 
The interest rate channel has long been an important topic in monetary analyses 
since the traditional Keynesian approach explained that the relationship between 
the financial sector and real economic activities works directly through interest 
rates. The monetary policy action has an impact on nominal and real interest 
rates, which then affects consumers and investment spending, aggregate 
demand and output (Mishkin 1996). Many empirical studies on the monetary 
transmission mechanism focus on the interest rate channel and the role of 
interest rates in the economy. 
 
The pioneer literature on the interest rate channel is the study of Sims (1972). 
He employed Granger‘s causality criteria with the post-war US data during 
1947-1969 to examine whether money can be treated as exogenous in the 
money-income relationship. He found that the causality was unidirectional from 
money to income. After that Sims (1980) used a multivariate linear time series 
model to test whether there is some relationship between potential policy 
instruments such as interest rates and output, and the author found that the 
upward shock in nominal interest rates cause a fall in both money and output.  
 
After the study of Sims (1972, 1980), there are a number of monetarists who 
studied the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, focusing on the interest 
rate channel. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) investigate the long-run relationship 
between money, interest rates and income in the US, using a cointegration 
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approach. The research shows that there is no close relationship between M2 
and nominal income or price. On the other hand, the Treasury bill rate contains 
significant information about the future movement in real output.  Taylor (1995) 
presents the simple framework for analyzing the monetary transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy focusing on the changes in monetary policy that 
affect real GDP and inflation. He found that there was strong empirical 
evidence for substantial interest rate affects on consumption and investment. 
Meltzer (1995) studied the Japanese experience in the 1980s and 1990s during 
which the monetary policy had important impact on the economy through its 
affect on land and property value. His research stated that the asset price effect 
extends beyond those operating through interest rates, equity price and the 
exchange rate. Similarly, Nagahata and Sekine (2002) investigate the affect of 
monetary policy on firms after the collapse of the asset price bubble in Japan. 
The results show that monetary policy after the bubble burst works well under 
the interest rate channel, but it was ineffective under the credit channel. The 
credit channel was blocked because of the deterioration in the balance sheet 
condition. 
  2.4.2.2 The Credit View of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
Since the traditional interest rate channel seems to ignore the importance of the 
bank credit role in affecting the aggregate spending in the economy, Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995) offered the credit channel as an alternative view of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. There are two major channels relying on the 
credit view, the balance sheet channel and the bank-lending channel. While the 
balance sheet channel focuses on the affect of monetary policy on the balance 
sheet of borrowers, the bank-lending channel emphasizes the impact of 
monetary policy action on the supply provided by the banking system. 
 
Much of the literature used the credit views‘ framework for analyzing the 
monetary transmission mechanism. One of the most popular models of the 
bank-lending channel was proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). In this 
model, bank loans and bonds are assumed imperfect substitutes for the bank and 
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the borrower. This implies that along with the bond rate, the bank  lending rate 
is determined by loan demand and supply (Brissimis and Magginas 2005, p 
882). The major results of the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) study are that the 
bank-lending channel is not effective when the elasticity of loan supply is 
infinite and the loan demand is perfectly elastic with the loan rate. After that, 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) re-investigate the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the US during 1959-1992, using a semi-structured VAR model to 
examine the impulse functions of bank loans, deposits and securities to an 
innovation in the Federal fund rate. They found that monetary policy in the US 
during the sample periods works well through the bank deposit and bank loan 
channels with monetary tightening leading to a decrease in the size of deposits 
as well as a short-run sell of the banks‘ security holding, but had little affect on 
loans. On the other hand, changes in Federal rates affect immediately on the 
volumes of deposits and securities while having a delayed affect on the volume 
of bank loans. 
 
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) attempted to examine the movement of the 
mix between bank loans and commercial paper when monetary policy is 
changed. They found that tightening monetary policy caused the bank loan 
supply to decrease more than the reduction in commercial paper. They also 
stated that monetary policy does not affect the composition of external finance 
if the central bank operates the monetary policy through only the interest rate 
channel. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) criticized the findings of Kashyap, Stein, 
and Wilcox (1993). They questioned whether the use of the mix between bank 
loans and commercial paper as an indicator of the operation of a bank-lending 
channel is useful in terms of conducting monetary policy. They re-estimated the 
monetary transmission mechanism in the US, focusing on the affect of monetary 
policy on business investment. The results show that tightening monetary policy 
not only led to the reduction of the demand for external finance, but also 
redirected all types of credit from small to large firms, which rely more on 
commercial paper financing. This causes commercial paper to increase although 
the bank loan supply is unchanged. In response to Oliner and Rudebusch 
criticism, Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1996) re-estimated the effects of 
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monetary policy on large and small firms using their original definition of the 
financial mix, and the results were found to support their original results. 
 
Dale and Haldane (1995) adopted the VAR approach to uncover a number of 
stylized features of the monetary transmission mechanism in the UK, using data 
from 1974-1992. They used sector data to facilitate the identification of distinct 
money and credit channels in the transmission of monetary policy and to 
investigate the different responses of the private and corporate sector to 
monetary policy action. The results found that the corporate sector deposit 
significantly dropped because of monetary tightening, while the volumes of 
bank loans for firm rose in the short term. Similarly, lending volumes to the 
private sector fell immediately following the monetary policy action, while the 
deposits rose.  
 
Miron, Romer, and Weil (1995) applied the Bernanke-Blinder (1988) model to 
investigate the importance of the lending channel in the transmission of 
monetary shocks to the real economy. The research found that the most 
important feature of the model was that changes in the money supply could 
affect aggregate demand through its affect on the amount of bank credit 
available. Their model suggests that in the context of monetary policy, lending 
credit was a significant and a valid contributor in explaining the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Similarly, Ramirez (2004) extended the Bernanke-
Blinder (1988) approach to the open economy. The aim of his paper was to 
compare the effectiveness of monetary policy that predicted from the Mundell-
Fleming model and the Bernanke and Blinder approach. He concluded that the 
credit channel of the monetary transmission mechanism under the Bernanke-
Blinder model has more potential than the standard Mundell-Fleming model due 
to the Bernanke-Blinder model separating loans from the bond market, which 
makes the aggregate investment and spending more directly responsive to 
monetary policy. 
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Wu (1999) studied the role of monetary policy  under a fixed exchange system, 
focusing on the credit channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. The 
major assumptions of the study were that the foreign reserve is constant, and 
that there is perfect capital mobility in the bond market and imperfect 
substitution between loans and bonds. He found that monetary policy could be 
effective in stimulating aggregate output though the bank loan channel although 
the country is under a fixed exchange rate regime. However, the study of Wu 
was criticized by Ramirez (2001). He claimed that the assumption of a fixed 
foreign exchange reserve is incorrect because the quantity of foreign exchange 
reserves appears as endogenous under a fixed exchange rate regime. He 
examined the credit channel of monetary policy under the fixed exchange rate 
system when the foreign exchange reserves are flexible and the results indicate 
that monetary policy is ineffective in stimulating aggregate output under the 
fixed exchange rate system. Kim (1999) examined whether the credit channel 
was a majority monetary transmission mechanism in the Republic of Korea 
after a financial crisis period, using both aggregate financial data and 
disaggregated bank balance sheet data over the period 1987-1998. He found that 
the lending channel has a significant independent role in monetary policy after a 
financial crisis. 
 
Suzuki (2004) studied the monetary transmission mechanism in Australia, using 
the VAR model to examine the feature of banks‘ behavior, in which banks make 
the lending channel less dominant in the Australian economy. The result of this 
paper regarding the credit channel shows that Australian monetary policy is 
different from other developed countries such as the United States and the UK, 
where the credit channel usually appeared to be a significant operative in 
monetary policy. As Australian banks mostly borrow money from abroad to 
mitigate the effect of monetary contraction, the bank loans appeared to be less 
important in monetary action. 
 
Ahmed et al. (2005) applied the VAR model, with seasonally adjusted monthly 
data from 1996-2004, to examine the monetary transmission mechanism in 
Pakistan. The major conclusion of this study was that the bank-lending channel 
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appeared to be the most important channel in the monetary transmission 
mechanism, as a monetary tightening directly led to a decrease in the volume of 
bank lending and domestic demand, while it had less affect on the exchange 
rate. 
 
Brissimis and Magginas (2005) developed the methods of Bernanke-Blinder 
(1988) to investigate the monetary transmission mechanism. The multivariate 
cointegration approach was used in a sample of six major industrial countries, 
including the US, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. The major aims 
of this paper were to test whether the degree of asset substitutability was 
influenced by monetary policy under the credit channel operation. The authors 
found that the lending channel played an important role for the monetary 
transmission mechanism in Japan, but was not operative in the US and the UK. 
For others European countries, the lending channel lost its potency in the last 
decade. 
 
Chrystal and Mizen (2002) provided a framework of monetary policy in the 
United Kingdom in which to analyze the importance of the credit channel. Both 
credit offered by banks and non-bank financial institutions were included in the 
model. They found that the credit channel is the most important channel of 
monetary policy in the UK. Then, Chrystal and Mizen (2005) confirmed their 
previous study by using an interdependent equation to test the significance of 
lending for consumption and money. The results show that a stable credit 
equation does exist in parallel with money demand and consumption. This 
implied that the credit channel is effective in the UK. 
 
Hulsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershauser (2006) applied the VAR model to 
estimate the response of bank loans to a monetary policy shock, with an 
emphasis on the reaction of the output level and the loan rate on monetary 
policy. The results indicated that bank loan supply dropped within an expected 
decrease in the credit margin after a monetary shock; demand for loans fell as a 
result of a drop in the output and an increase in the loan rate. 
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    2.4.2.3 The Other Asset Price Channel 
 
There are three categories which are included in the other asset price channel of 
the monetary transmission mechanism: the wealth effect channel, the exchange 
rate channel, and Tobin‘s q theory (Mishkin 2001). 
 
In an open economy, the exchange rate is one of the most important factors that 
need to be considered when conducting monetary policy. Taylor (1995) states 
that under the flexible exchange rate regime, when domestic interest rates 
increase, domestic currency deposits are more attractive and can lead to 
currency appreciation. The higher values of domestic currency make domestic 
products‘ price higher than foreign products, and the net export and output fall. 
However, under a fixed exchange rate, expansionary monetary policy initially 
lowers domestic interest rates, the net capital flow and the current account 
deficit. Most literature on the exchange rate channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism focuses on the affect of the exchange rate on the net 
capital account. Taylor (2000) described how alternative channels of the 
monetary transmission mechanism influence the choice of a monetary policy 
rule and he found that the exchange rate channel has a very strong affect on 
monetary policy. However, he suggests that the central bank needs to adjust the 
interest rate in response to the change in the exchange rate when conducting 
monetary policy. 
 
The exchange rate channel usually involves an interest rate effect. Therefore, 
many studies analyze the exchange rate channel through the effect of interest 
rates on the exchange rate. Cunningham and Haldane (2000) showed the 
relationship between interest rates and the real exchange rate in the UK. They 
claimed that the exchange rate channel is an effective channel in monetary 
policy. Hwee (2004) used the real effective exchange rate as a measure of 
monetary policy and he found that the exchange rate was more effective than 
interest rates in the monetary transmission mechanism in Singapore.  
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Another other asset price channel of monetary policy is based on the effect of 
monetary policy on the bank balance sheet, called the balance sheet channel. 
Meltzer (1995) highlights that monetary policy has an important impact on the 
Japanese economy through its effect on the property value base in Tobin‘s q 
theory. The result shows that through the balance sheet effect, monetary 
contraction led to a decrease in property value, spending on housing and finally 
aggregate output dropped. The importance of the balance sheet for monetary 
policy was also addressed by Morsink  and Bayoumi (2001).They used the 
VAR model to examine the monetary transmission mechanism in Japan. The 
empirical results indicated that banks play a crucial role in transmitting 
monetary shocks to economic activity. The bank balance sheets and business 
investment are sensitive to monetary shocks. In addition, the bank balance sheet 
has a strongly significant affect on private demand and consumption, so that the 
central bank probably used the bank balance sheet as a major channel of 
monetary policy. Hosono (2006) used Japanese bank data from 1975-1999 to 
investigate how commercial banks responded to monetary policy according to 
their balance sheet. He states that the effect of monetary policy on the bank 
balance sheet depended on the bank type. Smaller banks that have less liquidity 
and more abundant capital are more sensitive to a monetary shock because the 
larger banks can diversify their risk and they can overcome the information 
problem.  
 
Some literature focuses on other channels of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. For example, Angelopoulou and Gibson (2007) used a panel of UK 
firms in manufacturing to examine the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. 
They found that UK firms showed greater investment sensitivity to cash flow 
during periods of tight monetary policy. Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro 
(2007) studied the banks‘ portfolio behavior following the tightened monetary 
policy, comparing the responses of bank loan components to the monetary 
tightening with the responses to negative output shocks. The results indicate that 
monetary tightening led to a decrease in consumer and real estate loans while 
commercial and industrial loans increased. 
  
  47 
In the case of Thailand, there are not many empirical studies concerning the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Hataiseree (1994) applied the conventional 
IS-LM model to investigate the relationship between income and money 
aggregate in Thailand during 1980-1990, using a cointegration approach to 
examine the long-run relationship between the set of variables included in 
money-income model. M1, M2 and the monetary base (MB) were used as a 
proxy of monetary aggregate while credit aggregate is proxied by business and 
household credit. The results show that there is evidence to support using 
monetary aggregate as an intermediate target in monetary policy. Following 
this, the study of Sirivedhin (1998) adopted the VAR model to characterize the 
dynamic relationship between key economic indicators in order to understand 
the monetary and transmission mechanism in Thailand. The major aims of the 
paper were to explain the impact of financial regulation and monetary policy on 
real economic activities as well as comparing the impact of a shock on interest 
rates and credit on economic indicators. The results indicate that financial 
liberalization brings about a closer lineage between domestic and foreign 
markets. The financial market in Thailand is largely influenced by foreign 
interests although the domestic interest rate is a major channel in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. However, the interbank rate shock has no impact on 
private investments, while household savings are influenced by wealth. 
 
Recently, the issue of the monetary transmission mechanism was reviewed by 
Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003). They used the VAR approach with 
seasonally adjusted data from 1993-2001 to examine the degree of pass-through 
from monetary policy to economic activities. The results of this paper stated 
that tightening monetary policy led to a decrease in output within four to five 
quarters after the policy was adopted, while the domestic price received very 
little effect from monetary policy. The authors also found that the exchange rate 
and asset price channels have been less significant compared with the credit 
channel. This implies that the credit channel, which banks play an important 
role in, is the major transmission mechanism in Thailand. After that, Hesse 
(2007) re-estimated the monetary transmission mechanism by applying the 
cointegration vector autoregression (VAR) approach to study monetary policy 
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and the monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand, focusing on how 
monetary shocks are transmitted to the Thai economy, pre-crisis and post-crisis. 
The results of this research point out that monetary policy is inconsistent in the 
pre-crisis period due to Thailand‘s open capital markets while operating the 
monetary policy under the fixed exchange rate regime. Monetary policy and 
money shock impact on inflation but not output. In contrast, monetary policy 
appeared to be more effective in the post-crisis period because the exchange rate 
becomes more flexible. 
 
This evidence is supported by the study of Disyatat, Pongsaparn, and 
Waiquamdee (2005). They claimed that the flexible exchange rate has a very 
important role in the monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand. 
Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) investigated the transmission of monetary 
policy after inflation targeting was adopted in Thailand. They also examined the 
long-run relationship between the policy rate and financial market interest rates. 
The conclusion of this paper show that there exists a long-run relationship 
between the 14-day repurchase rate and the financial market rates, except for 
the finance company lending rate. They also claim that under inflation targeting, 
the interest rate channel of transmission of monetary policy has become weak 
while the credit channel through the commercial bank lending is still a valid 
monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand.  
 
Recently, the Bank of Thailand (2008) studied on change on monetary 
transmission mechanism in Thailand. The paper focuses on the transmission 
mechanism in Thailand after the financial crisis in 1997 and during the 
monetary tightening from mid of 2004 onward. The paper concluded that 
interest channel is generally the most important channel of monetary 
transmission mechanism in Thailand. However,   the interest rate became less 
significantly for sometime in post crisis due to the excess liquidity in banking 
sector. 
 
Overall, most empirical studies in transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
in Thailand mainly focus on the degree of pass-through from the monetary 
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instrument to the monetary target, especially the impact of monetary policy on 
interest rate. This thesis will add on the literature of the transmission 
mechanism in Thailand and re estimated the monetary transmission mechanism 
in Thailand by testing three main channels; interest rate channel, credit channel, 
and exchange channel.  
 
 
2.5 The Overview of Thailand’s Economic Development  
          
This section presents the overview of Thailand‘s economic development. There 
are three parts included in this section: the economic performance in the pre-
financial crisis (1990-1996), the financial crisis, and the development of 
monetary policy after the financial crisis. Table 2.3 show the overview of 
economic performance in Thailand by dividing the Thai economy into three 
periods: the pre-financial crisis from 1990-1996, the post-financial crisis under 
monetary targeting from 1997-2000, and the post-crisis after Thailand adopted 
the inflation targeting from 2000-2006.  
 
 
Table 2. 3 Thailand’s macroeconomic performances 
a   
: GDP growth at constant 1988 price 
Variable Pre-crisis Post crisis Post crisis 
 1990-1996 (1997-2000) (2001-2006) 
  Monetary target Inflation target 
Real Economic Indicators     
     GDP growth rate 
a
 8.6 -0.69 5.04 
     Inflation rate  5.1 3.59 1.1 
     Unemployment Rate  1.6 1.9 2.3 
Monetary indicators     
    Money Supply Growth(M2) 11.6 7.9 6.3 
    Interest rate 13 10.3 7.75 
International Indicators     
  (% of GDP)    
     Trade Balance  -10.7 5.6 0.2 
     Current Account -6.8 7.13 3.35 
     Net Capital Flow 13.3 -8.08 -1.5 
         - Private Capital Flow 12.9 -11.59 -1.9 
         - Public Capital Flow 0.4 3.51 0.4 
  50 
2.5.1 Thailand’s Economic Performance in the pre-financial crisis period 
 
Since the early 1990s, Thailand has achieved a remarkably good economic 
performance with high economic growth rate and stability of the inflation rate. 
As can be seen in Table 2.3, Thailand has grown very fast with an average 8.6% 
per year during 1990-1996. The inflation rate was stable with an annual average 
rate of 5.1%, together with a narrow fluctuation of the exchange rate; it was 
fixed between 24.9-25.7 baht per US dollar. As a result, Thailand was classed 
by the World Bank as one of the eight Highly Performing Asian Economies 
(HPAES) along with Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Indonesia (Dixon 2001). 
  
 
Much of the literature attempted to explain the key ingredients of the economic 
boom in Thailand during 1990-1996. For example, Jansen (1997) claims that 
the major boom in Thailand came from the high level of private investment. 
Similarly, the study of Chowdhry (1997) demonstrated that the economic 
expansion in Thailand was driven by private investment and the growth of 
exports. Vongsiirikul and Sriphayakard (2007) suggested that Thailand‘s 
economic boom was mainly from foreign direct investment and the real estate 
boom. Overall, most of the literature demonstrates that the key ingredients of 
the economic boom in Thailand were a high rate of private investment, a growth 
in the export rate and a massive capital inflow from abroad. 
 
Over the boom period between 1990 and 1996, the private investment growth 
rate in Thailand has increased sharply from 21.0% in 1991 to 30.0% in 1994. 
This evidence is supported by the study of Jansen (1999). He showed that there 
is a close relationship between the level of private investment and high 
economic growth. The private investment in Thailand appeared around 26% of 
GDP in 1990, and it sharply increased to 40% of GDP in 1996. He also stated 
that while the investment rate in Thailand grew rapidly, domestic saving grew 
slower than the investment. The growth of investment exceeding domestic 
saving can imply that Thailand‘s investment was funded by capital inflow from 
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abroad. It is not surprising that the private capital movement in Thailand grew 
very fast from 11.0 % in 1991 to 20.8% in 1995 (see Table 2.4). 
 
The export growth rate is one of the major ingredients of Thailand‘s Economic 
boom. The study of Ciminero (1997) claimed that due to Thailand‘s low wages 
for its labor force, it attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) into Thailand, 
particularly in export industries. Therefore, Thailand‘s export grew very fast. As 
can be seen in Table 2.4, the export growth rate grew from 12.1% in 1990 to 
about 24.6% in 1995. 
 
Table 2. 4 Thailand’s economic performance during the boom period 
Year  GDP  Private Investment   Private Capital Export Growth 
  Growth rate (%) Growth (%) Movement (%) (%) 
1990 11.2 33.2 13.7 15.1 
1991 5.6 21.0 11.0 23.6 
1992 8.1 20.5 8.0 13.8 
1993 8.3 23.3 10.3 13.7 
1994 9.0 30.0 12.0 22.1 
1995 9.2 24.1 20.8 24.6 
1996 5.9 14.4 18.2 -1.8 
 
Another key factor in the economic boom was the huge capital inflow. Before 
1990, Thailand‘s economy carried on a closed financial system, in which capital 
inflows and foreign borrowing were limited. However, the globalization during 
the 1990s and a high demand for investment funds encouraged Thailand to 
change its economic system to liberalization. In 1992, Thailand opened up the 
foreign exchange market and there was concurrent liberalization of capital 
transactions. In addition, the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), an 
offshore banking center, was established in 1993 in order to facilitate capital 
mobilization. The financial liberalization under a stable exchange environment, 
and good economic performance, induced huge capital inflows into Thailand. 
The net capital flow increased rapidly from 7.8% of GDP in the period 1987-
1990 to about 13.3% of GDP in the period 1990-1996. It is important to note 
that the proportion of net capital inflow after liberalization was dominated by 
private sector, the concentration of net capital inflow during 1990-1996 was an 
average of 12.9% of GDP, while only an average annual 0.4% of GDP of net 
capital inflow came from the public sector (see Table 2.3).  
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Monetary policy before the financial crisis  
 
Prior to 1997, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) conducted monetary policy under a 
fixed exchange rate system. As the monetary policy of this period aimed to 
achieve economic growth, the BOT liberalized the financial system by allowing 
the investors easy access to foreign funds. At the same time, the BOT kept high 
domestic interest rates in order to attract capital inflow from abroad. The 
pegged exchange rate supported a good export performance and encouraged 
foreign investment. In the meantime, liberalization and the high interest rate in 
Thailand induced large inflows of foreign investment to Thailand. Therefore, 
foreign capital significantly contributed to rapid economic growth in Thailand 
during this period.  
 
After the liberalization in Thailand and the establishment of the BIBF in 1993, 
the foreign investor had more confidence in Thailand‘s economy and started 
giving funds to Thailand. The borrowing from BIBF sharply increased from 
zero in 1992 to 197 billion baht in 1993, and it continued to increase to 807.6 
billion baht in 1996. As a result, the total loans in Thailand rose from 21% in 
1991 to more than 30% in 1994. It is interesting to note that while the private 
loans increased dramatically around 22.55% on an annual average during 1991-
1996, the GDP growth rate was only 8.6% per year in the same period. 
 
As a result of huge borrowing from overseas, the current account deficit in 
Thailand increased from -4.85% of GDP in 1993 to approximately -7.9% of 
GDP in 1996. To reduce the volume of lending in Thailand during the boom 
period, the BOT introduced a restriction on monetary policy by increasing the 
minimum lending rate from 10.5% in 1993 to 13.75% in 1995. However, the 
rise in the domestic interest rate reduced lending by a very small amount since 
the private investors could borrow money from overseas with a lower interest 
rate. This implies that the action from the BOT did not have much affect on 
Thailand‘s economy. 
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The fixed exchange rate regime meant the Bank of Thailand had very limited 
room to maneuver its conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, monetary policy 
was significantly affected by the financial liberalization era (Sirivedhin 1998). 
The power of the central bank to influence monetary policy was reduced due to 
the lack of control over monetary aggregates and the uncertainty about its effect 
on real variables. Thai financial companies became less dependent on the Bank 
of Thailand. The funds that the Bank of Thailand lent to financial institutions 
sharply reduced from 54% of the monetary base at the end of 1988 to about 
20% at the end of 1996. Over the same period, borrowing abroad by financial 
companies significantly increased. 
 
The bank rate, which is the interest rate that the central bank lends to 
commercial banks, has become less important. The bank rate, money market 
interest rate, and the inter-bank rate, used to be close to each other, but after 
financial liberalization, the gap has widened significantly. The Bank of Thailand 
used to employ the bank rate as guidance for the domestic rate. However, the 
opening of financial markets implied that the inter-bank rate was determined by 
the international interest rate (Bank of Thailand 1995). This means the ability of 
the Bank of Thailand to control the interest rate was reduced. However, the 
Bank of Thailand has changed its strategy by changing the main monetary 
instrument. The open market operation on the repurchase market was adopted as 
a major instrument of monetary policy. Through this channel, the Bank of 
Thailand can influence liquidity in the money market and the short-term interest 
rate (Jansen 2001). 
 
Overall, the Bank of Thailand still has difficulty in conducting monetary policy 
due to increasing liquidity and capital inflows. To reduce liquidity, the Bank of 
Thailand used open market operations by selling government securities. In 
addition, the Bank of Thailand tried to reduce credit growth by reducing the 
maximum line of overdraft for commercial banks in 1990.  
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2.5.2 Thailand’s Financial Crisis and the Cause of the Crisis 
 
Over the boom period (1990-1996), while Thailand enjoyed a good-looking 
economy, there were some symptoms of economic problems. For example, the 
high level of the current account deficit (accounting for around -6.8% of GDP), 
high interest rates (13% per year on the average) and the instability of 
commercial banks and financial markets in terms of the huge amount of bad 
loans. However, most Thai investors and policy makers had ignored these 
problems until they were getting serious in 1996 when some terrible situations 
appeared. The business environment was getting worse due to oversupply in 
real estate. Moreover, the export growth rate fell dramatically from 24.1% in 
1995 to about -1.8% in 1996. As well, the GDP growth rate dropped from 9.2% 
in 1995 to 5.8% in 1996. Subsequently, foreign investors lost confidence in the 
Thai economy and the financial system and stopped investing in Thailand. In 
addition, they withdraw their money from Thailand. The economic 
fundamentals continued to deteriorate and it is led to heavy speculative attacks 
and the development of the financial crisis in 1997. 
 
After the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997, the issue of the cause of the crisis 
became a hot topic among economists. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) 
believe that the cause of the financial crisis involved the fundamental weakness 
of economics, such as the weakness of the financial system, the export 
performance, and the inefficiency of policy makers. Similarly, Siamwala (2000) 
also claimed that the crisis in Thailand was generated from the bubble economy 
and the bubble bursting. He also blamed the inconsistency of policy makers as 
the main problem in Thailand. Rajan (2000) indicated that the root of the 
financial crisis in Thailand was the bank panic and the devaluing of the Thai 
baht in July 1997, while Radelet et al. (1998) blamed the instability of the 
international financial market for the crisis in Asia, including Thailand. Overall, 
the major cause of the financial crisis was that too much foreign capital inflow 
that could not satirize, the instabilities on financial market, international 
speculation and inconsistency of monetary policy. 
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  The huge amount of capital flow and external debt 
 
It seems to be that the huge foreign capital inflow was the most important 
reason for the financial crisis. As the international capital markets were 
accessed easily due to liberalization, there was a sharply increase in foreign 
borrowing, especially foreign borrowing from commercial banks and financial 
institutions. Thai investors and financial companies borrowed a huge amount of 
short-term funds from abroad in dollars or other foreign currency without 
currency risk protection because they believed that the fixed exchange rate 
would eliminate the currency risk. At the same time, the high interest rate in 
Thailand attracted foreign investors to invest and lend to Thailand. It can be 
implied that the high growth rate in Thailand during the period of economic 
boom was largely financed by external funds, as reflected by the deficit of the 
capital account being around 5.4 to 8.3% of GDP during 1990-1996.  
 
As can be seen in Table 2.5, the capital inflow from abroad started to increase 
rapidly from about 7.8% of GDP in 1987-1992 to an average of 10.1% of GDP 
for the period average in 1993-1996. It should be noted that the proportion of 
net capital inflow after liberalization was dominated by the private sector. The 
concentration of net capital inflow during 1993 -1996 was an average of 10.1% 
of GDP, while only an average annually of 0.4% of GDP came from the public 
sector. Another interesting point is that after 1992 foreign direct investment 
became less proportional, while the proportion of portfolio investments and 
other investment were greater. The proportion of foreign direct investment 
dropped from 2.3% of GDP during 1987-1992 to 0.8% of GDP during 1993-
1996, while the portfolio investment increased from 0.7% of GDP to 2.1% of 
GDP at the same period. In addition, the borrowing from financial institutions 
significantly increased from 0.8% of GDP during 1987-1992 to 7.3% of GDP 
during 1993-1996.  
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Table 2. 5 The net capital inflow (as a percentage of GDP, period average) 
  1980-1986  1987-1992  1993-1996 
Total Capital Inflow 5 7.8 10.1 
Total Private Capital Inflow  2.6 8.1 9.3 
      Direct investment  0.7 2.3 0.8 
      Portfolio investment  0.1 0.7 2.1 
      Financial institution 0.1 0.8 7.3 
       Other investment  1.7 4.5 -0.5 
Official Capital Inflow 2.4 -0.3 0.4 
Source: The Bank of Thailand     
 
It is generally accepted that huge capital inflow was reflected in the external 
debt performance of Thailand. As a result of the huge capital inflow, the 
external debt of Thailand increased sharply from 40.6% of GDP in 1993 to 
around 60% of GDP in 1996. The financial crisis started when foreign investors 
saw some terrible problems in the Thai economy. Some of them withdrew 
money from Thailand and some foreign creditors recalled their debts. In the 
meantime, foreign speculators started attacked the Thai baht by buying baht in 
the spot market and selling in the forward market. 
 
Under the fixed exchange rate system, where the baht was steadfastly pegged 
with the US dollar and other major currencies such as the Japanese yen, the 
Bank of Thailand had to buttress the baht by selling the baht in the foreign 
exchange market in order to defend the baht against speculator attacks. 
However, it seems to be that this defense did not work well. The speculators 
continued attacking the Thai baht, while the capital outflow problems and others 
weaknesses of economic fundamentals still emerged in Thailand. Finally, the 
Bank of Thailand could not continue defending the speculators due to 
inadequate foreign reserves in the Bank of Thailand. Therefore, the Bank of 
Thailand decided to change the exchange rate system from a fixed exchange 
rate regime to a flexible exchange rate regime in July 1997. This caused the 
Thai currency to suddenly depreciate by 17% and it continued to depreciate. 
The Thai baht depreciated from 25 baht per US dollar in 1996 to over 55 baht 
per US dollar by January 1997. As a result, the external debt became much 
more valuable in terms of the Thai baht, and the external debt increased sharply 
from 60% of GDP in 1996 to over 90% of GDP by the end of 1997. Some 
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domestic investors, especially financial companies, could not respond to the 
debt. This led to the non-performing loan (NPLs) problem and it developed into 
the financial crisis in 1997. 
 
       The current account deficit  
 
The issue of the growth of the current account deficit had been discussed among 
Thai economists for several years before the financial crisis. However, the 
dramatic growth of exports during 1990-1996 helped stabilize the current 
account deficit. As can be seen in Table 2.6, the export growth rate grew from 
15.6% per year in 1990 to 24.6%  in 1995, and the current  account deficit 
narrowed from -8.3% of GDP in 1990 to -5.4% of GDP in 1994. However, the 
problem of the current account deficit appeared in the Thailand economy in 
1995 when the import growth dramatically increased from 18.4% of GDP in 
1994 to 31.8% of GDP in 1995, while the export growth grew around 24.6% 
during the same period. This caused the current account deficit to rise from -
5.4% of GDP to 7.9% of GDP in 1996. 
 
Table 2. 6 The current account deficit 
Year  Export Growth Import Growth Trade balance/GDP 
Current 
Account/GDP 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1987 32.8 41.49 -0.03 -0.59 
1988 37.07 48.87 -0.06 -2.34 
1989 25.16 27.27 -0.07 -3.32 
1990 15.08 29.76 -0.11 -8.32 
1991 23.58 15.6 -0.1 -7.53 
1992 13.78 6.08 -0.07 -5.47 
1993 13.66 12.47 -0.07 -4.87 
1994 22.13 18.4 -0.06 -5.4 
1995 24.61 31.84 -0.09 -7.86 
1996 -1.8 0.57 -0.09 -7.9 
1997 3.66 -13.42 -0.03 -2 
1998 -6.75 -33.77 0.11 12.7 
1998 7.43 16.9 0.08 10.2 
  Source: The Bank of Thailand (online) 
 
The current account deficit reflects the overspending in Thailand‘s economy. It 
can be said that the huge current account deficit in Thailand was mainly due to 
the domestic consumption and domestic investment exceeding local production. 
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In addition, the current account deficit in the boom period was also shadowed 
by the domestic investment and saving gap in Thailand. As can be seen in 
Figure 2.4, domestic private investment had exceeded domestic private savings 
since 1990. The savings to GDP ratio dropped from 40.2% of GDP in 1990 to 
35.2% of GDP in 1991, and then the ratio steadily declined to 31.8% of GDP in 
1997. On the other hand, the investment ratio dramatically increased from 8.4% 
of GDP in 1990 to 41.6% of GDP in 1991. After that, this ratio stayed at around 
39-41% of GDP during 1991-1996. This evidence can imply that the growth in 
Thailand was heavy dependent on foreign funds due to domestic funds not 
being enough for the domestic investment demand. 
 
Overall, the problem of the current account deficit was not caused only by 
external stability problems, but also showed the deficiencies of the domestic 
financial market. Thailand entered into an economic recession period. 
 
Figure 2. 6 The investment/GDP ratio and the savings/GDP ratio 
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        The attack on the Thai baht by international speculators 
 
Another major cause of the financial crisis was the attack on the Thai currency 
(baht) by foreign speculators. The speculators started attacking the Thai baht in 
May 1997 when they saw some signs of economic problems in Thailand, such 
as a sharp fall in exports and huge capital outflows into Thailand, while the Thai 
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government continued to defend the Thai baht. The common strategy of 
attacking the Thai currency was by buying the Thai baht in the spot foreign 
exchange market while selling in the forward market. Under the fixed exchange 
rate system, where the Baht was steadfastly pegged with the US dollar and other 
major currencies such as the Japanese yen, the Bank of Thailand had to buttress 
the baht by selling the baht in the foreign exchange market. Consequently, the 
Bank of Thailand spent 90% of its foreign reserve in order to defend the baht 
against speculator attacks. This defense worked until June 1997, but the 
speculators continued attacking the Thai baht; also, the capital outflow 
problems and others weaknesses of economic fundamentals still emerged in 
Thailand. Finally, the Bank of Thailand could not continue defending against 
the speculators due to inadequate foreign reserves in the Bank of Thailand. 
Therefore, the Bank of Thailand decided to change the exchange rate system 
from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible exchange rate regime in July 
1997. This caused the Thai currency to a suddenly depreciate by 17%. As a 
result, the external debt became much more valuable in terms of the baht. Some 
domestic investors, especially financial companies could not respond to the 
debt. This led to non-performing loan (NPLs) problems and developed into the 
financial crisis of 1997. 
 
Financial instabilities  
  
After the liberalization, Thai commercial banks and financial companies 
borrowed dollars from abroad and lent in Thai baht. Actually, the borrowing in 
US dollars and lending in baht were running an exchange rate risk, but Thai 
banks and financial companies ignored that risk because of the experience of the 
fixed exchange rate as well as the confidence of policy makers. In addition, 
these loans were used for long term domestic lending. Then, after the exchange 
rate system was changed from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime, the 
currency went from 25 US dollars in July 1997 to over 50 US dollars in January 
1999. Companies that had borrowed dollars suddenly had much more debt in 
terms of the Thai baht. The foreign creditors started recalling their debts and 
withdrew money from Thailand. At the same time, many financial companies 
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suffered from overexposure to the real estate sector where the prices were 
falling. Borrowers who had borrowed from domestic financial companies could 
not generate enough income to cope with their debt, as well as those who had 
borrowed from abroad could not generate enough local currency income to 
service the dollar debt. Then, the total size of non-performing loans became 
larger. 
 
Inconsistent monetary policy 
 
There is much literature that blames the inconsistent monetary policy in 
Thailand for the financial crisis in 1997. For example,  Anwar and Gupta (2006) 
stated that Thailand‘s financial crisis was driven by policy errors, particularly 
the process of capital account convertibility (CAC) in 1990 and the creation of 
the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF)  in 1993 while the financial 
system in Thailand was unstable. Similarly, the study of Jansen (2001) stated 
that the inconsistent monetary policy was seen in the liberalization of the 
financial market and increasing capital mobility while maintaining the fixed 
exchange rate. With the liberalization and large capital inflow, the domestic 
interest rate should have fallen. Instead, due to the tight monetary policy there 
remained high interest rates and the gap between domestic rates and foreign 
rates was large. The gap between domestic interest rates (inter-bank rate) and 
the international interest rate (LIBOR) was 1.5% on the average during 1985-
1990, and increased to about 3.6% on the average during 1990-1995. The large 
interest rate gap led to exchange rate expectations. Hence, the exchange rate 
market started speculating against the baht in the second half of 1996. During 
this period, the Bank of Thailand had to defend the exchange rate by using 
foreign reserves. Finally, the Bank of Thailand had not enough foreign reserve 
to defend the baht, and so changed the exchange rate regime. Moreover, the 
high gap brought about large foreign borrowings by bank and other private 
companies which led to the external debt problem during the crisis (Alba, 
Hernandez, and Klingediel 1999). 
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The Monetary Policy after the Financial Crisis 
 
After the financial crisis in 1997, Thailand demanded an immediate policy 
decision to solve the major problems such as the financial instability, the 
fluctuation of the exchange rate, and the external debt problem. Then, the policy 
priority turned toward the restoration of external and internal stability, including 
the reform of the weaknesses of the domestic financial system, restoring 
external and internal stability, and recovering the investors‘ confidence.   
 
Financial restructuring  
 
To restore the confidence of the investors in the financial market, the Bank of 
Thailand managed to turn the financial crisis into an opportunity to reform the 
financial system. Therefore, financial restructuring was adopted as a major and 
urgent policy to solve the crisis. The financial restructuring in Thailand has 
involved the injection of liquidity into the financial market by the Bank of 
Thailand, the closure of insolvent commercial banks and financial companies, 
and transferring the bad loans and bad assets from financial companies to the 
central management agency. 
 
To save the overall financial system, the commercial banks and financial 
institutions were forced to take the initiative to clear their own assets and 
borrowings from their balance sheet. After the Bank of Thailand publicly 
announced that 58 financial companies were suspended during June and August 
in 1997, the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) was entrusted to 
provide a guarantee of deposits and liabilities for the remaining financial 
institutions. Furthermore, the Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA) was 
created in October 1997 to review the rehabilitation plans of the 58 suspended 
financial institutions and to supervise their liquidity process. After that, on 8 
December 1997, the FRA announced that 56 financial companies were 
permanently closed and the assets of these companied were transfer to the FRA. 
In addition, the Asset Management Corporation (AMC) was established. The 
AMC was entrusted with the responsibility of bidding for the lowest quality 
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assets as a buyer of last resort to prevent a fire sale of the 56 closed financial 
companies‘ assets. 
 
The weakness of the financial system in Thailand still appeared after the first 
process of financial restructuring. Thus, the Thai government continued to the 
second process by announced the comprehensive financial restructuring 
package on 14 August in 1998. This plan contained four major aspects. 
 
Firstly, to accelerate consolidation of the commercial banks and financial 
companies, the Bank of Thailand committed 7.5 billion US dollars for viable 
financial companies to recapitalize those companies. 
 
The second aspect was the encouragement of private investment in the banking 
system. This measure started by recapitalizing commercial banks and financial 
companies and thereby restoring and maintaining their solvency.  
 
The third aspect was the development of a framework to create the private Asset 
Management Companies (AMCs) which gave greater flexibility to manage the 
non-performing loans of the financial institutions. In these aspects, financial 
institutions were allowed to set the individual AMC. The aim of the policy was 
to encourage the creation of private AMCs, through which the banks could 
separate the good assets and bad assets and improve the balance sheets. The 
benefit of establishing the AMCs was that the commercial banks could 
concentrate on the management of good assets and new landing. 
 
The last aspect was providing the public funds to recapitalize viable financial 
institutions. For commercial banks and financial companies which were unable 
to recapitalize, the Bank of Thailand intervened by taking over, merging 
companies, and closing down some commercial banks and financial companies. 
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The IMF package  
 
 The internal and external stability needed to be restored immediately after the 
financial crisis started in July 1997. Thus, just a few weeks after floating the 
exchange rate, the Thai government decided to receive assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a stand-by credit. On 20 August 1997, a 
package of 17.2 billion US dollars including multilateral assistance from other 
donors was granted. However, Thailand also had to adopt the IMF program for 
recovering from economic problems. The main requirements from the IMF 
were identifying and effectively closing the 58 financial institutions, targeting 
the fiscal policy (fiscal policy surpluses 1% of GDP), maintaining the managed 
float exchange rate system with intervention limited to small fluctuations, and 
targeting the broad money growth rate of 7%  at the end of 1997. In addition, 
this program also targeted other economic indicators such as the target of GDP 
growth rate for 2.5 % in 1997, and 3.5% in 1998, and the inflation rate should 
be 4 to 5 %. 
 
 
Thailand’s economic performance after the financial crisis 
 
 
After adopting monetary targeting in the monetary policy in 1997, the economic 
performance in Thailand recovered very fast. As can be seen in Table 2.7, the 
GDP growth rate recovered from a fall of 10% in 1998 to grow approximately 
4.4% in 1999 and it continue to grow around 4.8% in 2000. In addition, the 
inflation rate dramatically decreased from 7.2% in 1998 to 1.8% in 1999. The 
export growth rate also grew vary fast from -33.8% in 1998 to 16.9% in 1999. 
However, the good economic growth did not imply the financial sector was 
completely recovered. As can be seen in Table 2.7 the growth of net capital 
flow continued to decline and private investment growth also decreased 
continually due to investors still having no confidence in Thailand‘s financial 
system.  
 
Later on, after Thailand had finished the IMF program and formally adopted the 
inflation targeting as a new monetary framework in May 2000, Thailand‘s 
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economy achieved economic consistency with price stability and sustainable 
economic growth. The inflation rate in Thailand was stable at 0.7% in 2000 and 
slightly increased to 1.3% in 2001. The annual GDP growth rate during 2000-
2005 averaged 5%; private investment growth rate became positive from 2000. 
 
Table 2. 7 Thailand’s economic performances after the financial crisis  
 Monetary Targeting  Inflation Targeting  
   1997 1998  1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth rate 
 (%) 
-1.4 -10.5 4.4 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.0 6.2 4.5 
Inflation rate 
(%) 
4.7 7.2 1.8 0.7 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.6 
Growth of private 
investment (%) 
30.5 -7.9 -5.7 -8.5 -7.5 8.5 3.1 5.9 2.4 
Growth of private 
Saving (%) 
16.0 8.8 -0.5 5.3 4.0 2.5 4.4 2.6 
8.4 
Import growth rate  
(%) 
-6.8 7.4 19.5 -7.1 4.8 18.2 21.6 15.0 16.4 
Export growth rate  
(%) 
-13.4 -33.8 16.9 31.3 -3.0 4.6 17.4 25.7 26.0 
Current account 
balance  (% of GDP) 
-2.0 12.7 10.2 7.6 5.4 5.5 5.6 4.2 -2.1 
Growth of net 
private capital flow  
-7.6 -15.5 -13.5 -9.8 -3.9 -5.7 -8.8 -0.7 6.9 
The effectiveness of the Thai monetary policy 
 
Theoretically, the efficiency of monetary policy can be explained by the IS-LM 
model. The affect of monetary policy in the real economy is dependent on the 
elasticity of the IS and LM curves. For example, expansionary monetary policy 
can have a small affect on output if the IS curve steeply, while it can have much 
affect if the IS slope is flat, and it has no affect in the case of the IS curve being 
vertical. On the other hand, if the LM curve is flat, monetary policy has less 
affect on output than when the LM curve is steep. In addition, the efficiency of 
monetary policy is also related to the exchange rate system in each country. 
Under the fixed exchange rate system and open capital account, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy was limited because the central bank had to 
sterilize the exchange rate. Moreover, there is a conflict between domestic goals 
and the external balance. For instance, expansionary monetary policy led to an 
increase in the quantity of money and a falling interest rate and an increase in 
domestic investment. However, low interest rates can make a capital account 
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deficit due to capital outflow. This means monetary policy was ineffective in 
the fixed exchange rate regime. In contrast, monetary policy appears more 
effective under the flexible exchange rate system. The current account deficit 
from expansionary monetary policy would affect exchange rates, the domestic 
currency would depreciate and it would cause higher exports and lower imports. 
This implies that a trade balance can restore the current account deficit. 
 
In Thailand‘s case, the monetary policy during the boom period seemed to be 
ineffective because of policy inconsistency. The major inconsistency in 
monetary policy conduct was that Thailand had an open capital account while 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate, which traditional theory explains is clearly 
ineffective. This policy led to huge capital inflow into Thailand. However, with 
the liberalization and large capital inflow, the domestic interest rate should have 
fallen but the Bank of Thailand attempted to use tight monetary policy by 
keeping the interest rates high. This led to a large gap between domestic and 
international interest rates and the exchange rate expectations. The exchange 
rate market started speculating against the baht in the second half of 1996. At 
the same time, the interest rate gap also brought about large foreign borrowing 
by domestic banks and other private companies. During this period, the Bank of 
Thailand had to defend the exchange rate by using foreign reserves. 
Unfortunately, the Bank of Thailand did not have enough foreign reserve to 
defend the baht and so changed the exchange rate regime to a flexible exchange 
rate regime. This led to the external debt problem during the crisis  (Alba, 
Hernandez, and Klingebiel 1999). 
 
 
2.5.3 The Monetary Framework Development  
 
After Thailand‘s exchange rate system was changed from basket currency to a 
managed floating currency on July 1997, Thailand demanded immediate policy 
decisions to solve the major problems such as the financial instability, the 
fluctuation of the exchange rate, and external debt. Therefore, Thailand received 
financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund. During the IMF 
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program, the Bank of Thailand had to use the IMF program. The major 
objectives of the IMF program were sustainable growth and price stability. 
 
The primary objective of the monetary policy was stabilization of local currency 
and inflation. The monetary policy framework was aimed to defend the local 
currency at the fixed rate. However, the changing of the exchange rate regime in 
July 1997 and financial liberalization affected the way in which monetary 
policy was conducted in Thailand (Sirivedhin 1998). It automatically moved 
from direct control of financial market to indirect control and a market-
conforming instrument. The Bank of Thailand needed to consider the new 
monetary framework. To conduct monetary policy under the flexible exchange 
rate to reach the ultimate goal of sustainable economic growth, the Bank of 
Thailand had considered three alternative frameworks (Jantarangs and 
Sodsrichai 2000), namely a discretionary monetary policy with multiple targets, 
monetary targeting, and inflation targeting. 
 
In the discretionary monetary policy with multiple targets, the central bank 
would consider many monetary goals like inflation, the exchange rate, the 
money supply aggregate, as well as sets of monetary instruments to achieve 
some optimal combination of them. However, this system works well for a 
country where the central bank has a very strong reputation, like the USA. The 
second framework is called monetary targeting. Under this framework, the 
domestic money supply is used as an intermediate target in order to reach the 
ultimate goals of sustainable growth and the stability of price. This approach 
will be ineffective if the relationship between the monetary aggregate and 
inflation is unstable. There was some argument about using this framework in 
Thailand. For example, Jansen (2001) addressed the fact that many countries 
have observed that financial liberalization and the integration of the 
international financial market has made less predictability in money demand 
and money aggregate. This led to difficulties in conducting the monetary policy. 
The last framework is the inflation targeting. Under this framework, the 
inflation rate will be set as the objective of monetary policy. The central bank  
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has to announce publicly the inflation target that it wants to achieve. In addition, 
the central bank also needs to make and publish the inflation forecast regularly. 
 
Based on monetary targets, the monetary targeting will be efficient if the money 
supply, which is chosen as the intermediate target, has a stable long-run 
relationship with the ultimate target (GDP or inflation rate). For instance, the 
change in money supply must be closely related to the GDP growth rate and the 
relationship should move in the same direction. In addition, the central bank 
must be able to control the intermediate target. In Thailand‘s context, the 
previous report seems to provide empirical evidence, which supports the 
adoption of monetary targeting in Thailand. For instance, the reports of 
Hataiseree (1994) and Hataiseree and Phipps (1996) show that the changes in 
narrow money (M1) and broad money (M2) were found to cause a change in 
GDP in the same direction. Therefore, after adopted the floating exchange rate 
system on July 1997, a monetary targeting was adopted as a new framework in 
Thailand in order to control money supply and affect economic growth. Under 
that framework, the domestic narrow money supply (M2a) was used as an 
intermediate target as the Bank of Thailand found that M2a seemed to be more 
stable, predicable, and controllable compared with M3. In addition, the ultimate 
goals of this framework were low inflation and sustainable growth. 
 
However, the monetary targeting did not work very well in Thailand due to the 
Bank of Thailand having difficulty in controlling the money supply as a result 
of  the open capital mobility, particularly the period of huge capital flow; as 
well, there was an instability in the relationship between the money aggregate 
and macroeconomic variables. In addition, the Bank of Thailand found that the 
monetary targeting was inefficient due to fact that the relationship between the 
money aggregate and economic growth could not be predicted. Thus, the Bank 
of Thailand announced the adoption of inflation targeting as a new monetary 
policy framework in Thailand in May 2000 and they continue using this 
framework until present. 
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Under inflation targeting, the Bank of Thailand has appointed the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) in 2001 to set the monetary policy in order to attain 
price stability conducive to sustainable economic growth. In addition, the MPC 
also monitors the factors contributing to external stability and financial 
imbalance. The main instrument of monetary policy is the short-term interest 
rate under central bank control. Since the Bank of Thai first adopted the 
inflation targeting in 2002, the 14-day repurchase is used as a key instrument of 
monetary policy. However, the Bank of Thailand has changed the key 
instrument to 1-day repurchase interest rate in 2007, as it is more flexible. 
 
Moreover, the PMC adopted core inflation (exclude raw food and energy) as its 
policy target with the range of 0-3.5% in a quarterly average. However, if the 
target is missed the MPC will be required to explain the reason to the public. In 
the case of Thailand 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter started by reviewing the development of monetary theories and the 
framework of the monetary transmission mechanism. In general, the monetary 
theory was first created by classical economists who believed in a self-adjusting 
economy and non-invention from government. In the classical view, money 
demand is for just transaction approach, and then any action from monetary 
authorities will affect only the price level but will not affect real economic 
activities. However, Keynesian economists argued that money demand is not 
only for transaction, but people also want to hold money for unexpected 
spending and precautionary reasons, and demand is dependent on income and 
interest rates. As changes in interest rates affect money holdings, then monetary 
policy affects economic activities via interest rates. The second part of the 
chapter has presented the surveys of the empirical studies on money demand 
analysis and the monetary transmission mechanism. Although there is much 
literature on the money demand and the monetary policy in different countries, 
there were only a few studies in the case of Thailand. Most of the studies in 
Thailand emphasize the relationship of money demand and its determinants, and 
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the relationship between monetary instruments and economics activities. This 
thesis will draw on that literature to consider the stability of money demand and 
the transmission mechanism in Thailand. 
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CHAPTER 3   
 
UNIT ROOT TESTS AND THE PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
  
As one of the most important conditions for economic time series analysis is to 
use stationary data, therefore we need to make sure that all variables included in 
the model appeared to be stationary. This chapter provides the overview of 
stationary time series analysis and the result of unit root tests. The chapter is 
divided into five parts. The first part briefly reviews the concept of 
nonstationary time series and unit root tests. The second part of this chapter 
provides the empirical results of unit root tests, focusing on the Augmented 
Dickey and Fuller, and the KPSS unit root tests. The third section presents unit 
root tests under the assumption of structural change. Two procedures are used in 
this section: Perron‘s (1997), and Zivot and Andrew‘s (1992) procedure. 
Section four presents the empirical results of structural break test and the 
conclusion of the chapter is presented in the last section. 
 
 3.2 Stationary Time Series and Unit Root Tests                 
3.2.1 Stationary and Nonstationary Time Series 
 
To use stationary data is the major condition for analysing time series because if 
nonstationary variables are used in the time series analysis, the result of testing 
may be biased and it may lead to spurious regression
1
 and the statistic cannot be 
used properly. Spurious regression is first suggested by Yule (1926). He 
claimed that if the trending nonstationary is used in the regression equation, the 
estimated coefficients in regression are statistically significant when there is no 
true relationship between the explained and explanatory variables. This was 
supported by the study of Granger and Newbolt (1974). They concluded that the 
regression equations which contained nonstationary time series frequently 
encountered high 
2R  and very low Durbin-Watson statistics. They also 
                                                          
1
 Spurious regression is the regression with no economics meaning, although R
2 
is high and t-
statistic appears to be significant. 
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suggested that when estimating regression with series data, if the value of 2R  is 
greater than Durbin-Watson statistics, then one should suspect a spurious 
regression. To detect the stationary data, we need to  understand the nature of 
stationary and nonstationary time series. 
 
3.2.2 Testing for Stationary and Unit Root Test. 
 
In general, there are two common ways to detect nonstationary variables of time 
series data. The first way is an informal observance of a time series plot of 
variables to see there is any obvious trend in the series or not. Another method 
is the unit root testing, which is a more formal method of detecting 
nonstationary data.  
 
The pioneer formal standard test for detecting unit roots was developed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979). The basic objective of the Dickey and Fuller 
approach is to test the null hypothesis that ρ = 1 for the first order auto 
regression, AR(1)  as in Equation 3.1:              
 ttt YY   1      (3.1) 
 
where tY        is the time series variable at time t, 
   1tY    is the lag of the time series variable, 
    ρ  is  the coefficient of lag of the time series,  
            t        is time, t = 1, 2…, and 
   ε t is the disturbance term which is independent and identically 
distributed (iid) with zero mean and variance. 
  
If |ρ| = 1, the equation can be written as ∆ y t-1 = et and tY  series is said to be co-     
integrate order 1, or time series tY  contains a unit root and the series is 
nonstationary 
     |ρ| < 1, time series tY  will converge (as t → α)   to a stationary series. 
   |ρ| > 1, time series tY  is nonstationary and variance of the series grows 
exponentially. 
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Indeed, instead of testing for ρ =1, there is an alternative version of the same 
equation. Equation 3.1 can be re-written by subtracting 
1t
Y on both sides to 
obtain a different version on the test: 
  
ttttt YYYY    111  
ttt YY   1)1(                      (3.2) 
 
Equation 3.2 can be re-written as:  
 
              ttt YY   1   ;      )1(                       (3.3) 
 
where δ is the coefficient of the lag in the first difference time series. If δ = 0, it 
implies that ρ   = 1, meaning that the series tY contains unit roots and it can be 
conclude that the series tY  is nonstationary. 
 
The null hypothesis of the unit root test can be written as Ho: δ = 0 and the 
alternative hypothesis is H1: δ < 0 
 
Consider the hypothesis δ = 0. This hypothesis states that there is a unit root 
present in the variable. The alternative hypothesis is always expressed as H1: δ 
< 0. It implies that the test considers only one side test (or left side) and the 
relevant critical values are all negative values. If a t-statistic is less negative 
than the critical value, the null hypothesis of the unit root test cannot be 
rejected. On the other hand, the hypothesis is rejected when the t-statistic is 
greater negative value than critical value. 
 
To avoid the undesirable effect of misspecification, Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
developed their model to take into account two different classes of 
nonstationary process. The first model contains a drift in the random walk 
process, as present in Equation 3.4: 
ttt YY   1    (3.4) 
 where α is constant  
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Since most macroeconomic time series often exhibit strong time trends, Dickey 
and Fuller take account of the time trend in the model. Hence, another equation 
is that: 
 tttt YTY   1       (3.5) 
 
where    T is time trend  
              βt   is the coefficient of time trend. 
Therefore, three different equations can be used for detecting the unit root. 
Those three equations can be written as: 
 
                  ttt YY   1        (3.6a) 
 ttt YY   1        (3.6b) 
tttt YTY   1       (3.6c) 
 
The difference between the three equations concerns the presence of 
deterministic element   and . Equation 3.6a presents a random walk model, 
the second equation, 3.6b, adds interception term (drift), called a random walk 
with drift model. The last equation, 3.6c, represents random walk with drift and 
linear time trend. 
 
The common interest in those three equations is the coefficient δ. In case δ = 0, 
the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected, then the series tY  contains a 
unit root and it can be said that series tY  is nonstationary. On the other hand, the 
null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected and series tY   is stationary if δ > 0. 
 
In practice, the DF test is represented by the t- statistic for the lagged dependent 
variable. If the DF statistic has more negative than critical value, then the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected and it can be concluded that the series is a 
stationary process. 
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3.2.3 The Augmented Dickey and Fuller for unit root testing (ADF) 
   
An original Dickey-Fuller test (DF test) is valid if only the error term ( t ) 
appeared to be white noise. In other words, the assumption of the DF test is that 
the error term is uncorrelated. Indeed, the error term t will be auto-correlated if 
there are autocorrelations in the dependent variable of the regression model. 
Therefore, Dickey and Fuller (1981) introduced an alternative approach to test a 
unit root in the case where the error term is unlikely to be white noise. This 
model is well known as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF test).  
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF test) test is actually the extension of the 
DF test by including the extra ρ lag value on the dependent variable tY  in 
order to eliminate autocorrelation. 
 
Consider the simple autoregressive process AR (ρ):  
                          ttttt YYYY     ...2211   
Subtract 1tY  from both sides of the equation to obtain:  
  ttttttt YYYYYY     122111 ...  
 
It can be re-written as:  
 

 
p
i
tititt yYY
1
1        
where  
1 i  
Similar to the original DF test, there are three possible alternative models of the 
ADF models:     
 

 
p
i
tititt yYy
1
1       (3.7a) 
  

 
p
i
tititt yyy
1
1           (3.7b)                 
             

 
p
i
tititt yyty
1
1      (3.7c) 
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The hypothesis of ADF testing is the same as the original DF test. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of the unit root test is that H0:  δ = 0 and the alternative 
hypothesis is H1:  δ < 0    
 
Practically, the ADF procedure will be tested by comparing the absolute value 
of the ADF statistic (t-statistic of δ) with the MacKinnon critical value2. If the 
absolute value of the ADF statistic is greater than the absolute value of the 
critical value, then the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected and the series is 
stationary. On the other hand, if the ADF test is smaller than the critical value, 
then the series is nonstationary. However, in case the time series is 
nonstationary at level, then it would be first differenced, second differenced, 
and so on. The differencing method will continue until the null hypothesis can 
be rejected. 
 
3.2.4 The Procedure of the ADF Test 
 
As there are three possible forms of the Augmented Dickey- Fuller test (ADF), 
those forms are based on the ordinary least square regression equations, 3.7a, 
and 3.7b and 3.7c. Unless the researcher knows the actual generating process, it 
is possible to have a question about which equation is the most appropriate 
model to test the null hypothesis of the unit root. As there is no standard criteria 
for model selection, Dolado, Jenkinson, and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990) suggest the 
strategy to select the model is by starting from estimating the most general 
model, which contains drift and linear time trend. Then, use the ADF statistic to 
test the null hypothesis of  = 0. If the null hypothesis can be rejected, there is 
no need to continue to the next step and you can conclude that the series is 
stationary. In case the null hypothesis is not rejected, the next step is to test 
whether or not there were too many determinants included in the first step 
                                                          
2
 The critical values which  were provided by MacKinnon (1991) which carucate from the 
equation are:  
 
              CV = 
N
N  
  
where CV is the critical value, N is the sample size and the parameters are provided 
by  MacKinnon for the differing models (constant with no trend, constant and trend). 
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because it may reduce the power of the test. Then, testing for significance of 
trend term by testing = = 0. If the trend term is significant, then retest for the 
presence of a unit root by using the standardized normal distribution. Step three 
is to estimate the model without time trend. If the null hypothesis is rejected, 
conclude that the model does not contain a unit root. If it not rejected, test for 
significance of the constant by testing = = 0. If it is significant, the model 
appears appropriate. 
 
The procedure of testing in this thesis is following the suggestion of Dolado, 
Jenkinson, and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990) by starting with estimating the regression  
model including intercept and trend. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 
this stage, then process another equation that includes the intercept but no trend. 
 
After testing the model above, the next step is selecting an appropriate lag 
length. According to the study of Campbell and Perron (1991), the ADF test is 
very sensitive to the lag length number in an estimated equation. If the number 
of lags is too small, it might cause the over-rejection of a null hypothesis of a 
unit root at any significant level. On the other hand, too many lag length 
numbers may reduce the power of the test due to more parameters being 
estimated and less numbers of effective observations. This can lead to falsely 
rejecting a null hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Since there is no standard method to select the appropriate lag length, Ng and 
Perron (1995) suggested that to select the appropriate lag length may start by 
setting the upper bound max for , and then estimate the ADF test regression 
with =max. If the absolute values of the t-statistic of the last lag included is 
significant, then =max. If not, reduce the lag length by one and repeat the 
process until the coefficient on the last included lag is significant. 
 
Therefore, this thesis follows Ng and Perron (1995) procedure by starting from 
max = 5. The lag length selection of this paper was chosen by the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) where:  
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           AIC = T log  + 2k       (3.8) 
 
 where T is the number of usable observations:  
 
k is the total number of parameters estimated in all equations of the system, and  
 is the matrix of cross product of residuals.  
 
The selection of lag length is given by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
However, since the assumption of the ADF test is that the series are non auto-
correlative residual, it would seem more essential to include a residual 
autocorrelation in the test. Therefore, instead of using only the AIC criteria to 
select the lag length of ADF, this research includes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic to 
check any autocorrelation in the ADF regression model up to the fifth lag length 
order. The null hypothesis is that the Ljung-Box Q-statistic is that and there is 
no serial autocorrelation up to the lag order . 
 
The Ljung-Box Q-statistic are given by Equation 3.9: 
                    
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            where jr  is the j
th   
autocorrelation and 
           T is the number of observations.  
The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is that the first k autocorrelation is 
zero (1=2=…. =k = 0). The Q-statistic is distributed as chi-squared with a 
degree of freedom equal to the number of autocorrelations or k. If the result of 
Q-statistic shows that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is not rejected, it 
indicates that there is no evidence of autocorrelation in the series up to k lags.  
 
Overall, the optimum lag length selection in this thesis was chosen by the 
smallest AIC criteria, and the Ljung-Box Q-statistic is not significant (no 
autocorrelation).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  78 
3.2.5 The Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test (PP test)  
 
An important assumption of the standard DF test is that the error terms are 
independent and identically distributed and the ADF test had already adjust the 
DF test by adding the lagged different terms of regression. However, when 
using the ADF test method, we need to make sure that the error terms are 
uncorrelated and they really are constant variance; if not, the test may be biased.  
 
An alternative approach to reduce the problem was tested by Phillips and Perron 
(1988). This method differs from the ADF method in which they use a non-
parametric statistic method to take care of serial correlation in the error terms 
without adding the lagged difference. They also make a non-parametric 
correction to the standard deviation, which provides a consistent estimator of 
the variance by using the equation:  
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where l  is the lag truncation parameter which is used to ensure that the 
autocorrelation of the residuals is fully captured.  
The regression of the PP test is the AR (1) process, which can be written as 
Equation 3.12: 
ttt eyy   11. )1(                                     (3.12) 
where te
~ 
 ),0( 2iid . 
While the ADF test corrects higher order serial correlation by adding lagged 
different terms on the right-hand side, the PP test makes a correlation to the t-
statistic of coefficient δ in the ADF test  from AR(1) regression to account for 
serial correction. Therefore, the PP method is just a modification of the ADF t-
statistic that takes into account the less restrictive of nature process. However, 
both the ADF and PP tests will be tested by comparing the t-statistic of δ with 
MacKinnon‘s (1991) critical value. The hypothesis of the unit root will be 
rejected if the t-statistic is greater than the critical value. 
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3.2.6 The KPSS test  
 
One of the most popular alternative models to test a unit root is the KPSS test, 
proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1990). While the ADF test was created for the 
null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in the series, the KPSS test aims to 
test for the null hypothesis of stationary around a deterministic trend (trend 
stationary). 
 
The test of KPSS starts from the linear regression model:  
 
                                   ttt rty    (3.13) 
 
where          rt  is a random walk, i.e., rt = rt-1 + ut, and ut is iid N (0, ζu
2
) 
                    βt is a deterministic trend, and 
                    εt is a stationary error. 
 
To test the KPSS model, if yt is a trend stationary process or the series is 
stationary around a deterministic trend, the null hypothesis of stationary will be 
ζu
2
 = 0, which means the intercept is a fixed element, the alternative of  ζu
2 
>0. 
 
Another stationary is the level stationary. If the series is stationary around a 
fixed level, the null hypothesis will be β = 0.  
 
Therefore, under the null hypothesis, in the case of a trend stationary, the 
residuals et (t = 1, 2, …,T) are from the regression of y on an intercept and time 
trend, et = εt, while  in the case of a level stationary, the residuals et are from a 
regression of y on intercept only, that is et = yt – y . 
 
The residual from the regression of yt on the intercept is et = 1, 2, 3…,T. Then, 
the partial sum process of the residual (et) can be defined as: 
                                                                  
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The long run variance of et is defined as: 
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The consistent estimator of 2 is constructed from the residual et   by Newey and 
West (1987): 
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where (s,l) represents an optional lag window which corresponds to the choice 
of a spectral window. 
 
The KPSS test adapted the Bartlett window, w(s,l)=1-s(l+1), created by Newey 
and West (1987), which ensures the non-negatively of )(2 lS . The lag l is 
correct for residual serial correlation. The choice of l is appropriate if the 
residual series are independent and identically distributed. 
 
Therefore, the KPSS test for null hypothesis is given as: 
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3.3 Preliminary Data Analysis and Empirical Results of the Unit Root Test  
 
This section presents the empirical results of the preliminary data analysis of 
each variable that will be used in this thesis. The preliminary data analysis in 
this thesis was first detected by the plotting graph to see whether there was any 
obvious trend in the series or not. After that, the formal method of the unit root 
was applied. Two major formal approaches were used to test stationary data in 
this section, the ADF and KPSS approaches. The estimations of a unit root in 
this thesis were generated by the RATS program with the DFUNIT procedure 
written by Dickey-Fuller (1976) and were applied to estimate the ADF test. The 
procedure of KPSS by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, and Schmidt (1990) is adopted 
for the KPSS test. 
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3.3.1 The Stationary of the log of real narrow money aggregate 
 (LnRealM1) 
 
 Figure 3.1 shows the plots and data description of narrow money holding in 
Thailand. As can be seen, the log of real money aggregate for M1 (LnRealM1) 
seems to be stable for the period between 1981 and 1986. After that, it appeared 
to be nonstationary with an upward trend over the sample period. As the Jarque-
Bera is the statistic for the normal distribution, and the probability of Jarque-
Bera is lower than 0.05, this indicates that the hypothesis of normal distribution 
is rejected at 5% but cannot be rejected at 1% significant. 
 
Figure 3.1 Plot of the log of real narrow money aggregate (LnRealM1) 
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The result of the ADF for the data set from 1993-2007 in Table 3.1  shows that 
the ADF statistics for both with and without trend do not rejected the hypothesis 
of a unit root since the ADF statistic is smaller than the critical value. Similarly, 
in the unit root test for the series from 1980-2007 (see Table 3.2), the hypothesis 
of a unit root is not rejected for both the series with and without trend. This 
implies that the variable LnRealM1 is nonstationary without differencing. 
 
Consider the variable LnRealM1 with the first differencing of the ADF test. The 
null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at 1% significant for the lag length 
of zero to the lag length of two as the ADF statistic is greater than the critical 
value for the data set from 1993-2007. If one considers only the AIC criteria, 
among the zero to the second lag length, LnRealM1 (2) seems to be the most 
appropriate due to having the smallest AIC. However, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic 
result of LnRealM1 (2) indicates that there is autocorrelation in the series 
 Mean  1.16 
 Median  1.24 
 Maximum  1.99 
 Minimum  0.10 
 Std. Dev.  0.54 
 Skewness -0.15 
 Kurtosis  1.84 
  
 Jarque-Bera  6.51 
 Probability  0.03 
  82 
LnRealM1 using two lags, as the hypothesis of no autocorrelation is rejected at 
1% significant. Therefore, the lag length selection for the series LnRealM1 is 
the first lag, which is the second smallest AIC and there is no evidence of 
autocorrelation.  
  
The first differencing of the ADF test for LnRealM1, using the data set from 
1980-2007 in Table 3.2, indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be 
rejected for every lag length included up to the lag of five. Given a smallest AIC 
criteria and the series free from serial autocorrelation, LnRealM1 (3) is selected 
for the series LnRealM1. 
       
Table 3.1 The Results of the ADF test for LnRealM1 (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
 ADF test 
Ljung-Box 
 Q-statistic Variables  
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend first difference 
LnRealM1 (0) -1.15 -2.95 -8.28* -5.28  
LnRealM1 (1) -1.25 -2.79 -9.65* -5.55 0.92 
LnRealM1 (2) -1.06 -1.6 -6.52* -5.58 16.27* 
LnRrealM1 (3) -0.58 -1.3 -3.08 -5.74 16.60* 
LnRealM1 (4) -0.57 -2.08 -2.07 -5.75 37.32* 
LnRealM1 (5) -0.85 -2.91 -2.33 -5.72 37.34* 
Note:         1.   Note that * and ** indicate the significance level at 1% and 5%. 
                  2.  The critical value is presented in Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.2 The Results of the ADF test for LnRealM1 (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
 ADF test 
Ljung-Box Q-
statistic Variables  
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend First difference 
LnRealM1 (0) -0.89 -3.26 -11.67* -5.58  
LnRealM1 (1) -1.20 -3.10 -9.79* -5.61 5.76 
LnRealM1 (2) -1.39 -2.63 -8.99* -5.98 2.35 
LnRealM1 (3) -0.36 -1.87 -6.14* -5.99 2.96 
LnRealM1 (4) -0.13 -2.29 -4.45* -5.98 1.61 
LnRealM1 (5) -0.27 -2.61 -4.30* -5.98 2.10 
Note:         1.   Note that * and ** indicate the significance level at 1% and 5%. 
                  2.  The critical value is presented in Table 3.15. 
 
3.3.2 The Stationary of the log of real broad money aggregate 
  (LnRealM2) 
Figure 3.2 presents the log of real broad money demand (LnRealM2). The graph 
illustrates that the series LnRealM2 seems to be nonstationary with a positive 
slope over the sample period.  
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 Figure 3.2   Plot of the log of real broad money aggregate (LnRealM2) 
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The ADF statistics at level with intercept and trend up to five lags are 
insignificant for both short and longer data sets. This evidence clearly indicates 
that the series LnRealM2 with intercept and trend is nonstationary. However, 
the ADF statistic of LnRealM2 without time trend shows evidence of stationary 
as the test statistics are greater than the given critical value. 
 
After first differencing, the results of both of the two data sets show that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at 1% significance level for the lag of zero 
to the second lag length, while the lag length of the third to the fifth are not 
significant. For the data set from 1993-2007, the AIC statistic of LnRealM2 (2) 
is smallest (AIC is –5.58). In addition, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic result of 
LnRealM2 (2) shows that there is no evidence of autocorrelation (Ljung-Box Q-
statistic is 0.24, not significant). Thus, the second lag length is selected for 
LnRealM2. In the case of the longer data sets, the first lag is selected, as the 
AIC appeared to be smallest and the Ljung-Box Q-Statistics is insignificant. 
 
Table 3.3 The Results of the ADF test for LnRealM2 (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables 
ADF test 
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend first difference 
LnRealM2 (0) -3.49** -2.1 -7.33* -5.28  
LnRealM2 (1) -3.59* -2.12 -5.43* -5.55 0.011 
LnRealM2 (2) -3.99* -2.23 -5.26* -5.58 0.24 
LnRealM2 (3) -4.31* -1.85 -2.00 -5.74 0.76 
LnRealM2 (4) -3.6* -2.36 -1.78 -5.75 12.70** 
LnRealM2 (5) -4.15* -3 -1.56 -5.72 12.77** 
Note:    1.     Note that * and ** indicate the significance level at 1% and 5%. 
2. The critical value is presented in Table 3.14. 
 
 Mean  3.19 
 Median  3.46 
 Maximum  4.07 
 Minimum  1.67 
 Std. Dev.  0.78 
 Skewness -0.57 
 Kurtosis  1.89 
  
 Jarque-Bera  11.62 
 Probability  0.002 
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Table 3.4 The Results of ADF test for LnRealM2 (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables 
ADF test 
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend first difference 
LnRealM2 (0) -2.83 0.18 -11.83* -6.46  
LnRealM2(1) -3.79* 0.41 -7.79* -6.62 0.07 
LnRealM2 (2) -4.14* 0.64 -6.08* -6.59 0.03 
LnRealM2 (3) -4.30* 0.92 -3.42 -6.69 12.78* 
LnRealM2 (4) -3.54 0.50 -2.50 -6.72 5.47 
LnRealM2 (5) -3.53 0.11 -2.32 -6.70 0.30 
Note:         1.     Note that * and ** indicate the significance level at 1% and 5%. 
                  2.    The critical value is presented in Table 3.15. 
 
3.3.3 The Stationary of log GDP (LnGDP) 
 
Figure 3.3 plots the series LnGDP over the sample period. It seems that the 
series is nonstationary with an evidence of trend break around the third quarter 
of 1997.  
 
Figure 3.3 Plot of the log of LnGDP 
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The ADF statistic for the shorter data set in Table 3.5 indicates that the series 
LnGDP with zero lag is nonstationary for both the test including and excluding 
trend, with the ADF statistic being -0.67 for the model with drift but no time 
trends, and the ADF statistic being -1.26 for the model including trend. Both 
statistics are smaller than the critical value. Moreover, the result of the ADF at 
level up to a lag of five strongly supports that the series LnGDP contains a unit 
root due to the null hypothesis of unit root not being rejected with any lag 
length order. The unit root for LnGDP at level for the longer data set in table 3.6 
also suggests that LnGDP is not a stationary variable since the null hypothesis 
of a unit root is not rejected. 
 Mean  6.27 
 Median  6.44 
 Maximum  6.94 
 Minimum  5.40 
 Std. Dev.  0.47 
 Skewness -0.41 
 Kurtosis  1.71 
  
 Jarque-Bera  10.53 
 Probability  0.00 
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The first differencing of the ADF test for the series LnGDP in Table 3.5 shows 
that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at 1% significance level for the 
lag of zero to the second and the fourth lag length. Given the smallest AIC 
criteria, the second lag length is most appropriate with the AIC equal to -8.15. 
However, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic indicates that the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation is rejected at 1% significance for every lag included up to the 
fifth lag. This means there is autocorrelation in the series LnGDP when lagged 
variables are included. Therefore, the lag length selected for LnGDP is the zero 
lag. The first differencing of the ADF for the LnGDP from 1980-2007 suggests 
that the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at 1% significance. This confirms 
that the data LnGDP is I (1). 
 
Table 3.5 The results of the ADF test for LnGDP (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables 
ADF test 
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend first difference 
LnGDP (0) -0.67 -1.26 -4.84* -7.970  
LnGDP (1) -0.85 -1.83 -3.89* -8.150 8.80* 
LnGDP (2) -0.58 -1.74 -3.58* -8.200 13.453* 
LnGDP (3) -0.46 -1.63 -2.63*** -8.210 13.454* 
LnGDP (4) -0.37 -1.99 -3.62* -8.172 14.99* 
LnGDP (5) -0.62 -2.54 -2.48 -8.174 17.21* 
Note:       1.     Note that *, **, and *** indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
2. The critical value is presented in Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.6 The results of the ADF test for LnGDP (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables 
ADF test 
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend first difference 
LnGDP (0) -1.56 -2.18 -10.03 -0.41  
LnGDP (1) -1.55 -2.26 -7.87 -0.42 1.55 
LnGDP (2) -1.48 -2.28 -5.88 -0.44 10.70 
LnGDP (3) -1.51 -2.14 -5.78 -0.42 0.39 
LnGDP (4) -1.41 -1.83 -4.82 -0.39 0.006 
LnGDP (5) -1.45 -1.58 -4.86 -0.42 0.02 
Note       1.  Note that *, **, and *** indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
               2.  The critical value is presented in Table 3.15. 
 
3.3.4 The Stationary of Log of Exchange Rate (LnEXC) 
 
Figure 3.4 clearly presents that the log of exchange rate (LnEXC) looked 
stationary during the period 1985 to 1997 due to the fixed exchange rate system 
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in Thailand. In addition, it looked like there was a structural change around 
1997 quarter 3. This may be because of the change in the exchange rate system 
from a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating exchange rate in 1997.  
Figure 3.4 Plot of the log of LnEXC 
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Although the plot above shows some stability in the series, the ADF statistics 
show that the series is nonstationary over the sample period because the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected at level, both with and without trend. 
 
In the case of the data set from 1993Q1-2007Q1, the series LnEXC after first 
differencing is 1% significant for the zero to second lag length order, and 5% 
significant for the third and fourth lag. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation 
is rejected at every lag length up to the fifth. This means there is an evidence of 
autocorrelation in the regression of the ADF test when lags are included. 
Therefore, the lag length selection for LnEXC is LnExc (0). However, the 
longer data set from 1980Q1-2007Q1 indicates that the ADF statistics after first 
differencing are 1% significant for most lags included except LnGDP(5). The 
Ljung-Box Q-statistic is significant for every lag included. Given a smallest 
AIC criteria, LnGDP (1) is selected. 
 
Table 3.7 The Results of the ADF test for LnEXC (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables  
ADF test  
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level   ADF  at  
AIC No trend  With trend  first difference 
LnEXC (0) -1.45 -0.79 -5.13* -5.69   
LnEXC (1) -1.76 -1.47 -4.04* -5.64 5.7** 
LnEXC (2) -1.79 -1.53 -4.91* -5.7 6.38** 
LnEXC (3) -1.53 -0.69 -3.22** -5.67 10.9** 
LnEXC (4) -1.68 -1.01 -3.23** -5.62 11.02** 
LnEXC (5) -1.66 -0.75 -2.98* -5.56 12.12** 
Note:   1.   Note that * and ** indicate the significance level at 1% and 5%. 
2. The critical value is presented in Table 3.14 
 Mean  3.38 
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Table 3.8 The Results of the ADF test for LnEXC (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables  
ADF test  
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level   ADF  at  
AIC No trend  With trend  first difference 
LnEXC (0) -1.55 -2.18 -10.03* -5.68  
LnEXC (1) -1.56 -2.26 -7.78* -5.66 1.24 
LnEXC (2) -1.48 -2.01 -5.87* -5.64 0.15 
LnEXC (3) -1.51 -2.14 -5.78* -5.63 2.16 
LnEXC (4) -1.41 -1.83 -4.82* -5.60 0.02 
LnEXC (5)) -1.45 -1.72 -2.48 5.39 1.72 
Note:     1.    Note that * and ** indicate the significance level at 1% and 5%. 
              2.    The critical value is presented in Table 3.15. 
 
3.3.5 The Stationary of the Domestic interest rate (R) 
 
The plot of the domestic interest (R) is presented in Figure 3.5. It seems that 
there is a break in the series.  
 
 Figure 3.5 Plot of the domestic interest rate 
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It is not surprising that at level in the ADF test, the null hypothesis of a unit root 
is not rejected and the series is nonstationary for both short and longer data. 
The results of the first difference in Table 3.9 shows that the null hypotheses of 
a unit root are rejected at 1% significance for zero and the first lag length, 5% 
significance for the second and third lag length, and 10% significance for the 
fourth and fifth lag included. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation is 
rejected for every lag length. Given the smallest AIC criteria and no 
autocorrelation, the lag length selection for series R is zero. The results are 
confirmed by the first difference of the longer data set from 1980-2007 in Table 
3.10. The ADF statistics at first difference are 1% significant. It can be said that 
the R is I(1).  
 
 Mean  8.81 
 Median  9.50 
 Maximum  14.50 
 Minimum  2.75 
 Std. Dev.  3.57 
 Skewness -0.31 
 Kurtosis  1.82 
  
 Jarque-Bera  8.11 
 Probability  0.017 
  88 
Table 3.9 The results of the ADF test for R (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables 
ADF test 
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend first difference 
R   (0) -1.25 -1.36 -5.45* -0.19  
R   (1) -1.34 -1.99 -3.76* -0.16 4.95** 
R   (2) -1.42 -2.55 -3.53** -0.12 7.471** 
R   (3) -1.38 -2.36 -3.22** -0.06 7.474** 
R   (4) -1.37 -2.34 -2.88*** -0.002 7.59** 
R   (5) -1.39 -2.48 -3.52*** -0.05 7.77** 
Note:      1.    Note that *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
               2.    The critical value is presented in Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.10 The results of the ADF test for R (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables 
ADF test 
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level ADF  at 
AIC No trend With trend first difference 
R   (0) -1.30 -1.36 -8.40* -0.41  
R   (1) -1.33 -2.40 -5.23* -0.43 3.91 
R   (2) -1.62 -3.00 -5.11* -0.44 1.84 
R   (3) -1.71 -2.74 -4.91* -0.42 0.73 
R   (4) -1.55 -2.56 -4.56* -0.39 0.19 
R   (5) -1.45 -2.50 -4.91* -0.42 3.64 
Note:      1.    Note that *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
               2.    The critical value is presented in Table 3.15. 
 
3.3.6 The Stationary of LIBOR 
 
Figure 3.6 clearly shows that the LIBOR is not stationary; the series looks 
fluctuated over the sample period. This evidence is supported by the ADF 
statistic at level; the null hypothesis of a unit root is not significant for both the 
data set from 1993Q1-2007Q1 and the data set from 1980Q1-2007Q1. It can be 
said that the series LIBOR is not stationary at any level. 
Figure 3.6 Plot of LIBOR 
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 Mean  6.61 
 Median  5.69 
 Maximum  18.35 
 Minimum  2.06 
 Std. Dev.  3.67 
 Skewness  1.25 
 Kurtosis  4.31 
  
 Jarque-Bera  36.34 
 Probability  0.000 
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However, after taking the first differencing, the variable appeared to be 
stationary with every lag length order, meaning the series LIBOR is integrated 
of order 1 (I(1)). The appropriate lag length is the lag of zero due to the smallest 
AIC and there is no evidence of autocorrelation. 
 
Table 3.11 The results of the ADF test for LIBOR (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables  
ADF test  
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level   ADF  at  
AIC No trend  With trend  first difference 
LIBOR  (0) -4.42 -1.6 -5.73* -1.263   
LIBOR  (1) -1.97 -2.19 -3.94* -1.216 3.22 
LIBOR  (2) -2.33 -2.55 -3.24** -1.160 4.56*** 
LIBOR  (3) -2.03 -3.11 -3.26** -1.132 5.12** 
LIBOR  (4) -2.09 -2.76 -3.62* -1.129 5.36** 
LIBOR  (5) -1.57 -2.23 -3.44** -1.132 8.13** 
Note:     1.    Note that *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
2. The critical value is presented in Table 3.14. 
  
Table 3.12 The results of the ADF test for LIBOR (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables  
ADF test  
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
ADF at level   ADF  at  
AIC No trend  With trend  first difference 
LIBOR  (0) -2.62 -2.88 -10.66 0.03  
LIBOR  (1) -1.67 -2.62 -8.79 -0.03 8.02 
LIBOR  (2) -1.74 -2.44 -5.36 -0.34 11.57 
LIBOR  (3) -3.34 -3.79 -6.36 -0.39 8.52 
LIBOR  (4) -3.55 -3.41 -4.93 -0.37 0.37 
LIBOR  (5) -3.71 -3.89 -4.16 -0.34 0.19 
Note:     1.     Note that *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
2. The critical value is presented in Table 3.15. 
 
3.3.7 Summary of the ADF Unit Root Test  
 
This section provides the summaries of the ADF test. As can be seen in Table 
3.13, the results of the ADF, both data sets at level indicate that all variables 
appeared to be nonstationary when trend is included. The results without trend 
are also nonstationary except LnRealM2. However, the null hypothesis of a unit 
roots are rejected after the first differencing for all variables. Therefore, it can 
be said that all variables are integrated of orders one (I (1)) and these can be 
used in the next step of time series analyzing. 
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 Table 3.13 Summary of the Result of the Unit root test. 
 ADF Test (1993Q1-2007Q1) ADF Test (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
 
Variables 
At Level  
First 
different 
At level  
First 
different 
No 
 trend 
With  
trend 
No  
Trend 
With 
trend 
 
LnRealM1 
LnRealM2 
LnGDP 
LnEXC 
R 
LIBOR 
 
-1.15 
-3.99* 
-0.67 
-1.45 
-1.25 
-1.42 
 
-2.95 
-2.23 
-1.26 
-0.7 
-1.36 
-1.60 
 
-9.65*(1) 
-5.26*(2) 
-4.48*(0) 
-4.91*(2) 
-5.45*(0) 
-5.73*(0) 
 
 
-0.86 
-2.38 
-0.67 
-1.55 
-1.30 
-2.62 
 
-3.26 
0.41 
-1.26 
-2.18 
-1.36 
-2.88 
 
-6.14*(3) 
-7.79*(1) 
-4.84*(0) 
-5.6*(1) 
-8.40*(0) 
-10.66*(0) 
Note:  Note that *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
               
  The numbers in parentheses indicates the optimum lag length of the ADF. 
 
Table 3.14  The MacKinnon
3
 Critical Value for the data set from 1993Q1-2007Q1 
 
Number 
of lags 
  At Level  
First difference With trend Without trend 
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
-4.125 
-4.128 
-4.131 
-4.135 
-4.138 
-4.142 
 
 
-3.489 
-3.490 
-3.492 
-3.494 
-3.495 
-3.497 
 
-3.548 
-3.550 
-3.552 
-3.555 
-3.557 
-3.560 
 
-2.913 
-2.914 
-2.915 
-2.916 
-2.917 
-2.918 
 
 
-3.50 
-3.552 
-3.555 
-3.557 
-3.560 
-3.562 
 
 
-2.914 
-2.915 
-2.916 
-2.917 
-2..918 
-2.919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 MacKinnon, ‘Critical Values for Cointegration Tests‘, in Long-Run Economic Relationships, 
R.F. Engle and C.W.J. Granger, eds,   London, Oxford, 1991, pp 267-276 
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Table 3.15 The MacKinnon Critical Value for the data set from 1980Q1-2007Q 
 
 
3.3.8 The result of the KPSS  
 
The KPSS stationary test results are given in Table 3.16. The result of the KPSS 
level stationary shows that most of the variables appear to be significantly 
nonstationary in both the short and longer data set since the null hypothesis of 
stationary are rejected at 1% significance. In addition, the result of trend 
stationary is similar to level stationary in that the hypothesis of stationary is 
rejected at 1%. This clearly indicates that the all series are nonstationary in the 
tests, both with and without trend.  
 
However, after the first differencing, most variables appeared to be stationary as 
the null hypothesis is not rejected at any significant level, except LnRealM2. 
The tests show that LnRealM2 is 1% significant after differencing. This 
evidence indicates that there are weak trend components inside the series 
LnRealM2 and LnP. 
  
The results of the KPSS test confirm that all variables are I(1) and this can be 
processed in the next step. 
 
 
 
 
Number 
of lags 
At Level  
First difference With trend Without trend 
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
-3.491 
-3.492 
-3.492 
-3.493 
-3.493 
-3.494 
 
-3.888 
-2.888 
-2.888 
-2.889 
-2.889 
-2.889 
 
-4.12 
-4.12 
-4.13 
-4.13 
-4.08 
-4.04 
 
-3.48 
-4.49 
-3.49 
-3.49 
-3.45 
-3.45 
 
-3.495 
-3.492 
-3.493 
-3.493 
-3.494 
-3.494 
 
-2.888 
-2.888 
-2.889 
-2.889 
-2.889 
-2.889 
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Table 3.16 The results of the KPSS test (1993-2007) 
Variables 
KPSS Level  Stationary 
l = 0 l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 
LnRealM1 5.02* 2.62* 1.8* 1.39* 1.14* 0.97* 
LnRealM2 5.1* 2.64* 1.81* 1.39* 1.14* 0.97* 
LnGDP 4.54* 2.37* 1.63* 1.27* 1.05* 0.9* 
LnEXC 3.96* 2.03* 1.38* 1.07* 0.87* 0.75* 
LnP 5.22* 2.69* 1.84* 1.42* 1.16* 0.99* 
R 3.18* 1.96* 1.33* 1.02* 0.84* 0.72** 
LIBOR 1.73* 0.9* 0.63** 0.5** 0.42 0.37 
       
 KPSS Trend  Stationary 
LnRealM1 0.57* 0.33* 0.25* 0.2** 0.16** 0.14 
LnRealM2 1.21* 0.64* 0.44* 0.35* 0.29* 0.25* 
LnGDP 0.75* 0.38* 0.26* 0.21** 0.17** 0.15** 
LnEXC 0.93* 0.49* 0.34* 0.27* 0.23* 0.21** 
LnP 1.09* 0.56* 0.38* 0.29* 0.24* 0.21** 
R 0.54* 0.28* 0.19** 0.15** 0.13 0.11 
LIBOR 0.39* 0.21** 0.15** 0.12 0.11 0.1 
       
 KPSS test with first differencing 
LnRealM1 0.033 0.038 0.066 0.095 0.07 0.062 
LnRealM2 0.8* 0.811* 0.849* 0.91* 0.811* 0.738** 
LnGDP 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 
LnEXC 0.26 0.205 0.181 0.187 0.194 0.205 
LnP 0.78* 0.52** 0.43 0.38 0.34 0.32 
R 0.152 0.119 0.101 0.094 0.091 0.089 
LIBOR 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.115 0.117 
Note:       
Critical Value   1% 5% 10%  
KPSS Level  Stationary 0.739 0.463 0.347  
KPSS Trend   Stationary 0.216 0.146 0.119  
KPSS with first differencing 0.739 0.463 0.347  
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Table 3.17 The results of the KPSS test (19980-2007) 
Variables  
KPSS Level  Stationary 
l = 0 l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 
LnRealM1 10.56* 5.36* 3.62* 2.75* 2.22* 1.87* 
LnRealM2 10.43* 5.28* 3.55* 2.69* 2.17* 1.82* 
LnGDP 10.48* 5.30* 3.57* 2.70* 2.18* 1.83* 
LnEXC 8.71* 4.44* 3.00* 2.28* 1.85* 1.56* 
LnP 10.89* 5.53* 3.73* 2.82* 2.28* 1.87* 
R 6.64* 3.39* 2.30* 1.76* 1.43* 1.22* 
LIBOR 7.27* 3.78* 2.58* 1.98* 6.61* 1.38* 
             
  KPSS Trend  Stationary 
LnRealM1 0.21** 0.38* 0.27* 0.21* 0.18* 0.15** 
LnRealM2 2.62* 1.33* 0.68* 0.55* 0.56* 0.47* 
LnGDP 2.21* 1.11* 0.75* 0.56* 0.45* 0.38* 
LnEXC 0.83* 0.44* 0.31* 0.24* 0.20* 0.17** 
LnP 1.21* 0.61* 0.42* 0.32* 0.26* 0.22* 
R 0.69* 0.35* 0.24* 0.19** 0.16** 0.14* 
LIBOR 0.89* 0.48* 0.34* 0.23* 0.23* 0.20* 
              
  KPSS test with first differencing  
LnRealM1 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 
LnRealM2 1.03* 1.19* 1.26 1.31 1.14 1.01 
LnGDP 0.57 0.44* 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.27 
LnEXC 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 
LnP 0.39 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.10 
R 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 
LIBOR 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.17 
Note:        
Critical Value     1% 5% 10%  
       KPSS Level  Stationary  0.739 0.463 0.347  
       KPSS Trend   Stationary  0.216 0.146 0.119  
      KPSS with first differencing     0.739 0.463 0.347  
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3.4 Testing for the Unit Root and Structural Break 
3.4.1 Overview of the Concept of the Unit Root Test with Structural 
 Break 
 
This section overviews the concept of the unit root test with structural break. 
There are two procedures concerned in this thesis, Perron‘s 1997 approach and 
Zivot-Andrews‘ (1992) procedure. 
 
3.4.1.1 Perron’s 1997 approach to the Unit Root with Structural Break   
 
Generally, an assumption of a standard ADF test is that there is no structural 
break during the sample period and the parameter is stable. This assumption 
might not correctly describe the integration property of data if there is a 
structural change in the time series. In some cases stationary time series may 
look like nonstationary when there is a structural break in the intercept and/or 
trend function. This may lead to the false conclusion that the null hypothesis of 
a unit root cannot be rejected and that the series contains a unit root, when in 
fact it does not. 
 
 A major criticism of the standard ADF test started with the study of Nelson  
and Plosser (1982) which showed that most macroeconomic and financial time 
series can be affected by a current shock. After that the issue of structural 
change on the level of macroeconomics and financial time series was of more 
concern to economists. One of the most popular pieces of literature about the 
unit root test in time series data is provided by Perron (1989). He claims that the 
standard ADF tests are biased towards the non-rejection of the null hypothesis 
of a unit root when there is a structural break during the sample period. Indeed, 
macroeconomic fluctuations are stationary if one allows for structural change to 
affect the time trend. 
 
Perron (1989) created a formal procedure testing for the unit root which 
contained a structure break. This theory was based on the general ADF model 
with shift in mean and trend. He incorporated a dummy variable into the ADF 
test to allow for a single break in a slope and/or intercept of the trend function. 
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This structural break is allowed at a known break date Tb (1< Tb <T), where Tb 
is the time of the structural break. Perron proposed three possible models which 
will be considered when modelling the structural break. The first model is a 
crash model where the traditional ADF model is augmented by adding the 
dummy variable which presents shift on the intercept only. The second model 
called changing in growth allows for a change in slope of the trend function 
without any sudden change in the level at the time break. Another model is 
called the combine effect which allows for a change in both slope and intercept. 
Each of those three models contains a unit root with break under the null 
hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is a broken trend stationary process 
which also incorporates the same dummy variables. 
 
The hypothesis of three models by Perron (1989) can be written as: 
 
 Null hypothesis  
            Model 1:   tttt eyTbdDy  1)(                       (3.15) 
            Model 2:   tttt eDUyy   )( 121    (3.16) 
            Model 3:   ttttt eDUTbdDyy   )()( 121   (3.17) 
where 1)( tTbD   if  ,1 Tbt  and zero otherwise  
              1tDU   if  ,Tbt   and zero otherwise.  
In addition, Perron (1989) also introduced three alternative hypothesis models; 
those three alternatives can be written as the following equation: 
 
           Alternative hypothesis  
 
Model 1:   ttt eDUty  )( 12     (3.18)             
Model 2:   ttt eDTty  )( 12     (3.19) 
             Model 3:   ttt eDTDUty  )()( 1212   (3.20) 
where TbtDT   and  tDT   if Tbt   , and zero otherwise.  
 
The first model is referred to as a crash model. Under the null hypothesis of a 
unit root, the model allows for an exogenous one time change at Tb in the level 
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of a series, while the alternative of trend stationary allows for a one time change 
in intercept of trend function only. Model 2 permits an exogenous change in the 
rate of growth and it is referred to as the change growth model. Under the null 
hypothesis of a unit root, a drift parameter μ changes from μ1 to μ2 at the time 
breaks (Tb). The alternative hypothesis of Model 2 allows for a change in slope 
of the trend function without any sudden change in the level of the time break. 
The last model (Model 3) allows both exogenous change in rate of growth and 
time break. 
  
Since Perron (1989) introduced a single point break into the regression model, 
many researchers have been more aware of structural change during the sample 
period. Perron and Vogelsang (1992) developed the Perron (1989) structural 
break approach by proposing two different classes of test statistics which allow 
for different forms of structural break, namely the Additive Outlines model 
(AO), and the Innovation Outlines model (IO). The AO model is more relevant 
for the series exhibiting a sudden break in the mean (the crash model), while the 
purpose of the IO model is to capture the changes in a more gradual manner 
over the sample period.  After that, Perron (1994) extended the IO model by 
dividing the IO model into two versions, called the IO1 and IO2 models. While 
the IO1 version allows for gradual change in the intercept only, the IO2 version 
allows for gradual change in both intercept and the slope of trend function.  
  
Those three models of a unit root test with structural break can be written as: 
AO:         

 
k
i
tttt eyciyDTty
1
11)(               (3.21)  
IO1:          

 
k
i
tttbt eyciyTDDUty
1
11)()(     (3.22) 
 IO2        

 
k
i
tttbt eyciyTDDTDUty
1
11)()()(      (3.23) 
where Tb represents the break time, 
DU denotes the intercept dummy, where DU = 1 if t > Tb   and zero otherwise. 
DT is a slope dummy where DT = 1 if t > Tb   and zero otherwise. 
D(Tb) is a crash dummy where D( Tb ) = 1 if t > Tb  +1  and zero otherwise. 
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The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected if the absolute value of the t-
statistic for testing 1  is greater than the critical value. 
 
3.4.1.2 Zivot and Andrews’ Model of the Unit Root with Structural   
  Break 
 
Perron‘s approach to the structural break is conditional on a known break point, 
where the choice of break point is based on prior observation of the series. The 
dummy variable is set at the point where structural break is believed to occur. 
This means Perron‘s procedure takes a break time as being exogenous. In 
addition, the pre-determined period for the dummy variable requires full 
information about the structural break point, which raised the risk associated 
with the wrong period selection. Therefore, this model could not be used when 
such breaks date are unknown. 
  
To process the unit root test when the break date is unknown, Zivot  and 
Andrews (1992) introduced another version based on Perron‘s (1989) original 
test, namely the ZA model. They improved Perron‘s approach by providing a 
structural break without pre-determining the break point time. While the 
structural break point in Perron‘s approach is exogenous data, the ZA model 
endogens the break point into the model through the estimation of a break point 
using a sequential method. Under the null hypothesis of the ZA approach, the 
series yt is integrated without an exogenous structural break against the 
alternative hypothesis that the series is a trend stationary process with a one 
time break occurring at an unknown break point. The break point of the series is 
chosen as a minimum t-statistic on α = 1 for a sequential test of the break point 
occurring at time 1<Tb<T. 
  
In practice, the hypothesis of the unit root in the ZA approach is tested by 
comparing the smallest t-value with a set of critical values which were 
estimated by Zivot  and Andrews (1992). If the smallest t-value is greater than 
the critical value at a given significant level, the null hypothesis of the unit root 
is rejected and the series is stationary. In contrast, the series is nonstationary if 
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the minimum t-statistic is smaller than the critical value. It should be noted that 
the critical values of the ZA approach are different from Perron‘s 1997 
approach. As the ZA method is not conditional on prior selection of a break 
point, the critical value of ZA are greater than Perron‘s critical value. 
Consequently, the ZA model is more difficult to use to reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root than Perron‘s 1997 approach.  
   
In addition, Zivot and Andrews (1992) presented three equations in order to 
apply their testing procedure, called Model A, B and C. The Model A variables 
include an intercept (DU), where DU is a dummy variable which assumes the 
value of 1 when the break is present and zero before the break time, a linear 
time trend, the endogenous variable lagged one period, and a lag term of first 
difference of the endogenous variable. Model B allows a jump in the trend 
function. The dummy variable is called DT and consists of a new linear trend 
which is activated by the break. Model C contains elements from both models A 
and B and allows for a jump in the intercept and trend functions when a break 
occurrs. However, the most important part of the ZA model is the endogenous 
variable lagged one period )( . 
 
The ZA model can be written in regression equations as: 
Model A: 

 
k
j
tttbt eycjyTDUty
1
11)(                     (3.24) 
Model B: 

 
k
j
tttbt eycjyTDTty
1
11)(                      (3.25) 
Model C: 

 
k
j
tttbbt eycjyTDTTDUty
1
11)()(    (3.26) 
where Tb is time break, DT is a dummy variable of a break in the trend 
occurring at the time break (Tb).DT =1 if t > t-Tb, and zero otherwise. DU 
denote a dummy variable capturing a shift in intercept, 1DU  if t > Tb, and 
zero otherwise. The null hypothesis is rejected if the coefficient of    is 
statistically significant. 
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 3.4.2 The Testing Procedure of the Unit Root with Structural Break 
 
According to Perron‘s (1997) procedure, there are three models to test the unit 
root with structural break, AO, IO1 and IO2. Since there is no standard criteria 
to  decide which model is the most relevant model for each series, this research 
follows Shrestha and Chowdhury‘s (2005) general-to-specific procedure. This 
procedure starts by running the Innovation Model 2 (IO2), which includes time 
trend (t) and time of structure break (DTb), and the model allows for the break 
in both intercept and trend. Then a check is made of the statistics of t and DTb. 
In case both t and DTb are not significant, then a check is made of the statistic 
of DU and DT. If all statistics are not significant, this implies that there is no 
statistically significant time trend and/or structural break in the time series. 
 
 In case the statistics of t and DTb are significant, then checks the statistic of 
DU and DT. If both DU and DT are significant, then selects this model (IO2) 
for that series. However, if only DU is significant, go to IO1 model which 
includes time trend (t) and time of structure break (Tb), and the model allows 
for the break in intercept only (DU). If only DT is significant, then check the 
Additive Outline model (AO). This model consists of time trend (t), time of 
structure break (Tb), and the break in slope only (DT). 
 
It should be noted that there are two meanings of significance in this section. 
The first meaning is the case of t (=1) where the series is significant and 
considered to be a stationary series if the absolute of the t-statistic for =1 is 
greater than the absolute of the critical value at a given significance. Another 
significant meaning is in the case where the coefficients of t, DTb, DU and DT 
are close to zero and their t-statistics are significant, since the null hypothesis is 
that the value equals zero. However, there is no meaning if the coefficients are 
close to zero but their t-statistics are not significant. Similarly, if only the t-
statistics are significant but the coefficients are not close zero. In other words, 
the conditions for t, D(Tb), DU and DT to be significant are that the coefficients 
are close zero and their t-statistics are significant at a given level at the same 
time. 
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 3.4.3 Empirical Results of the Unit Root test with Structural Break:  
 (Perron’s 1997 approach) 
 
This section reports the empirical results of the unit root test with structural 
break for each series. The results are generated by the RATS program based on 
Perron‘s 1997 procedure. 
3.4.3.1.1 The Empirical Results of Perron’s 1997 approach 
Model IO2 
  
The result of Perron‘s 1997 model (IO2) is presented in Table 3.18. The result 
clearly shows that there are four variables that reject the null hypothesis of the 
unit root as the absolute value of the t-statistic for  = 1 of those variables are 
greater than the critical value at a given level of significance. Series LnGDP and 
R are significant at 1 % level, LnEXC is 5% significant, and LnRealM2 is 
significant at 10% level. 
 
Consider the statistic of t and DTb. There only the series LnGDP appeared to be 
significant in both the statistics of t and DTb. However, the statistic of DT is not 
significant due to the coefficient value not being close to zero (the coefficient 
equals 2.81). As a condition of model selection is that all statistics must be 
significant, model IO2 is not relevant for any series.  
 
It is interesting that the statistic of time trend (t) is significant for all variables 
except LnEXC (t-statistic = 0.46) while the statistics of time break (DTb) are 
significant for only LnEXC, LnGDP, and R. In this case, we might have to 
apply either the AO and IO1 models or another alternative testing for structural 
break such as Zivot and Andrew‘s (1992) model to test the unit root with a 
structural break. 
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Table 3.18 The Results of the IO2 model (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
 
Note: 1.    The numbers inside parentheses are the t-ratios. 
2. Note that *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
3. The critical values of 1%, 5% and 10% are -6.32, -5.59, and -5.29. 
4.     The exogenous break point Tb is selected by minimizing the value of the t-statistic 
for testing α = 1. 
3.4.3.1.2 The Empirical Results of Perron’s 1997 approach       
Model I01 
 
Table 3.19 presents the results of Perron‘s 1997 IO1 model. The results indicate 
that out of seven series, there are three series can reject the null hypothesis of 
the unit root at 1%, as an absolute t-statistic for =1 is greater than the critical 
value 1% (-5.92). These included LnEXC, LnGDP, and R. The table also 
clearly shows that the IO1 model could be selected for four series, LnEXC, 
LnGDP, LnRealM1, and LnRealM2 due to the statistic of time trend (t) and 
time break (DTb) appearing to be significant at 1%. Additionally, the statistic of 
DU (dummy variable capturing a shift in intercept) is significant for all four 
series. 
Variables Time 
break 
k  
(t) 
 
(DTb) 
 
(DU) 
 
(DT) 
 
 
t(=1) Result 
LnEXC 1997:1 
 
3 0.001 
(0.46) 
-0.22 
(-4.43)* 
0.26 
(5.38)* 
-0.01 
(-0.81) 
0.56 
(7.6)* 
-5.93** Reject 
LnP 1997:1 
 
3 0.002 
(2.86)* 
-0.01 
(-1.19) 
0.03 
(2.76)* 
-0.01 
(-
2.17)** 
0.077 
(13.2)* 
-3.77 Not 
Reject 
LnGDP 1997:2 
 
3 0.003 
(3.34)* 
0.03 
(2.62)* 
-0.077 
(-5.46)* 
2.28 
(0.02) 
0.69 
(14.1)* 
6.24* Reject 
LnRealM1 2001:1 
 
5 0.003 
(2.23)** 
0.06 
(1.09) 
-0.166 
(-1.62) 
0.007 
(2.34)* 
0.42 
(2.99)* 
-4.08 Not 
Reject 
LnRealM2 1997:1 0 
 
0.0163 
(5.07)* 
-0.01 
(-0.96) 
0.226 
(4.91)* 
-0.011 
(-4.93)* 
0.271 
(2.0)** 
-
5.41*** 
Reject 
R 1998:3 
 
0 0.093 
(4.99)* 
4.51 
(6.82)* 
-3.223 
(-6.54)* 
-0.063 
(-2.93)* 
0.538 
(11.2)* 
-9.60* 
 
Reject 
LIBOR 2006:1 
 
2 -0.015 
(-.21)** 
-2.07 
(-1.90) 
-45.23 
(-20.2)* 
0.816 
(2.04)** 
0.750 
(-9.9)* 
-3.30 Not 
Reject 
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Table 3.19 The Results of the IO1 model (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Note: 1.   The numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios. 
   2.   Note that *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
   3.   The critical values of 1%, 5% and 10% are -5.92, -5.23, and -4.92. 
4.   The exogenous break point Tb is selected by minimizing the value of the t-statistic for 
testing α = 1. 
3.4.3.1.3 The Empirical Result of Perron’s 1997 approach 
Model AO 
 
The AO model of Perron‘s 1997 approach is presented in Table 3.20. The 
results show that under a null hypothesis of the unit root, only the time series 
LnRealM2 can be rejected and this series is found to be stationary, as an 
absolute t-statistic for =1 equals 4.86, which is greater than the 5% critical 
value (-4.83). It can be concluded that under the AO model, all variables are 
nonstationary, except LnRealM2. 
Another interesting point is that under the AO model, the coefficients of DT are 
statistically significant for all variables as the coefficients are close to zero, 
together with the t-value of all variables being strongly significant at 1% for all 
variables except R, which is significant at 5%. In addition, with the statistic of 
Variable Time 
break 
k  
(t) 
 
(DTb) 
 
(DU) 
 
 
t(=1) Result 
LnEXC 1997:1 3 -0.66 
(-4.17)* 
-0.22 
(4.43)* 
0.23 
(6.87)* 
0.55 
(7.68)* 
-6.04* Reject 
LnP 1997:1 3 7.32 
(2.70)* 
-0.01 
(-0.53) 
0.01 
(1.94) 
0.86 
(20.12)* 
-3.04 Not 
Reject 
LnGDP 1997:2 3 
 
0.003 
(7.20)* 
0.04 
(2.71)* 
-0.07 
(-7.14)* 
0.69 
(15.07)* 
-6.76* Reject 
LnRealM1 199-:4 5 0.01 
(4.30)* 
-0.19 
(-3.74)* 
-0.06 
(-2.30)** 
0.63 
(8.03)* 
-4.55 Not 
Reject 
LnRealM2 1994:4 3 
 
0.00 
(2.64)* 
-0.04 
(-2.57)* 
0.04 
(3.79)* 
0.73 
(11.96)* 
-4.37 Not 
Reject 
R 1998:3 0 0.04 
(4.94)* 
4.32 
(6.12)* 
-4.08 
(-9.66)* 
0.59 
(12.44)* 
-8.56* Reject 
LIBOR 2005:3 1 -0.01 
(-2.26)* 
-1.11 
(-2.12)** 
0.85 
(2.84)* 
0.78 
(11.96)* 
-3.35 Not 
Reject 
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time trend (t), both coefficients and t-statistics are significant for all series. It 
can be said that Perron‘s 1997 approach model AO could be applied for all 
variables. 
Table 3.20 The Results of the AO model (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variable Time 
break 
K  
(t) 
 
(DT) 
 
 
t(=1) Result 
LnEXC 2001:2 4 0.02 
(15.16)* 
-0.02 
(-8.99)* 
0.63 
(6.04)* 
-3.49 Not 
Rejected 
LnP 1997:1 3 0.015 
(22.52)* 
-0.009 
(11.35)* 
0.844 
(15.23)* 
-2.80 Not 
Rejected 
LnGDP 2001:2 5 0.004 
(5.81)* 
0.009 
(5.52)* 
0.789 
(14.7)* 
-3.92 Not 
Rejected 
LnRealM1 2002:2 5 0.008 
(6.39)* 
0.011 
(4.34)* 
0.532 
(4.20)* 
-3.69 Not 
Rejected 
LnRealM2 1997:1 4 0.022 
(52.14)* 
-0.016 
(-
28.75)* 
-0.215 
(-0.86)* 
-4.864** Reject 
R 2006:1 2 -0.173 
(-8.64)* 
0.20 
(2.18)** 
0.828 
(14.68)* 
-3.033 Not 
Rejected 
LIBOR 2005:4 2 -0.050 
(-5.26)* 
0.661 
(3.92)* 
0.750 
(11.16)* 
-3.71 Not 
Rejected 
Note: 1. The numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios. 
2.  Note that *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
3. The critical values of 1%, 5% and 10% are -5.45, -4.83, and -4.48. 
4. The exogenous break point Tb is selected by minimizing the value of the t-statistic 
for testing α = 1  
3.4.3.1.4 The Model Selection of Perron’s 1997 approach and  
 
The model selection of Perron‘s 1997 approach is presented in Table 3.21. It 
clearly shows that Model IO2 is not suitable for any variable due to some of the 
statistics of t; Tb, DU and DT are not significant at any given level. Overall, the 
null hypothesis of the unit root can be rejected for LnEXC and LnGDP at 1% 
significant level and rejected at 5% significant for LnRealM2. It can be said that 
the series LnEXC, LnGDP and LnRealM2 are stationary when structural change 
is allowed, while the other variables are not stationary. 
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Table 3.21 Model Selection of Perron’s 1997 Procedure (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variable Selected 
model 
K Time Break t(=1) Result 
LnEXC IO1 3 1997:1 -6.04*  Rejected 
LnP AO 3 1997:1 -2.80 Not Rejected 
LnGDP IO1 3 1997:2 -6.76* Rejected 
LnRealM1 AO 5 2002:2 -3.69 Not Rejected 
LnRealM2 AO 4 1997:1 -4.864** Rejected 
R AO 2 2006:1 -3.033 Not Rejected 
LIBOR AO 2 2005:4 -3.71 Not Rejected 
Note: 1.  Note that * and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%.  
2.  The critical values of the IO2 model at 1%, 5% and 10% are -5.57, -5.08, and -4.82. 
3.  The critical values of the AO model at 1%, 5% and 10% are -5.28, -4.65, and -4.38. 
 
3.4.3.2 The Empirical Results of Perron’s 1997 approach (1980Q1  
 2007Q1) 
3.4.3.2.1 The Empirical Result of Perron’s 1997 approach 
Model IO2 (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
 
Table 3.22 presents the results of Perron‘s 1997 model (IO2), using the data set 
from 1980Q1 to 2007Q1. The results clearly show that there are four variables 
that reject the null hypothesis of the unit root as the absolute value of t-statistic 
for  = 1 of those variables is greater than the critical value at the given 
significant level. Series LnGDP is significant at 1%, LnEXC is 5% significant, 
and there is 10% significance for the series LnRealM2 and LIBOR. 
 
As a condition of model selection for IO2 is that all statistics must be 
significant, model IO2 may be selected for the series LnEXC since all statistics 
are significant while others variables are not.  
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Table 3.22 The Results of the IO2 model (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variables Time 
break 
k  
(t) 
 
(DTb) 
 
(DU) 
 
(DT) 
 
 
t(=1) Result 
LnEXC 1997:1 5 0.007 
(3.82)* 
-1.16 
(-4.29)* 
32.28 
(4.14)* 
-0.016 
(-4.13)* 
2.38 
(5.62)* 
-5.59** Reject  
LnP 1994:4 4 0.00 
(3.61)* 
-0.01 
(-1.23) 
0.03 
(3.07)* 
0.00 
(3.50)* 
0.36 
(3.50)* 
-3.47 Not  
Reject 
LnGDP 200.:1 5 0.01 
(6.50)* 
0.007 
(0.48) 
-8.31 
(-1.33) 
0.004 
(1.33) 
6.418 
(6.39) 
-6.39* Reject 
LnRealM
1 
1996:2 5 0.006 
(4.49)* 
0.05 
(1.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.00 
(-1.26) 
0.02 
(1.95) 
-4.32 Not 
Reject 
LnRealM
2 
2001:1 5 0.04 
(5.14)* 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
18.41 
(0.87) 
-0.00 
(-0.87) 
1.60 
(5.58)* 
-5.43*** Reject 
R 1999:1 3 -0.11 
(-2.86)* 
-0.68 
(-0.86) 
900.48 
(3.06)* 
-0.44 
(-3.06) 
13.55 
(3.96)* 
-3.97 Not 
Reject 
LIBOR 1989:1 5 
 
-0.31 
(-0.57) 
4.61 
(3.13)* 
344.15 
(3.93)* 
-0.17 
(-0.31) 
26.03 
(3.98) 
-5.40*** Reject 
Note:  1. The numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios. 
2. Note that *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
3. The critical values of 1%, 5% and 10% are -6.21, -5.55, and -5.25. 
4.    The Eexogenous break point Tb is selected by minimizing the value of the t-statistic 
for testing α = 1. 
3.4.3.2.2 The Empirical Results of Perron’s 1997 approach 
Model IO1 
 
Table 3.23 presents the results of Perron‘s 1997 IO1 model. The results indicate 
that out of seven series, there are three series that reject the null hypothesis of 
the unit root; LnGDP is 1% significant and there is 5% significance for series 
LnRealM2 and LIBOR. 
 
The table also clearly shows that the IO1 model could be able selected for three 
series, including LnRealM2, R, and LIBOR due to the statistics of time trend (t) 
and time break (DTb) appearing to be significant at 1%. Additionally, the 
statistic of DU (dummy variable capturing a shift in intercept) is significant for 
all three series. 
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Table 3.23 The Results of the IO1 model (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variable Time 
Break 
k  
(t) 
 
(DTb) 
 
(DU) 
 
 
t(=1) Result 
LnEXC 1997:2 5 0.02 
(2.76)* 
-0.12 
(-2.92) 
0.06 
(1.96) 
6.05 
(4.12) 
-4.03 Not 
rejected 
LnP 2001:1 4 0.00 
(3.29)* 
0.01 
(1.43) 
0.01 
(2.60)* 
0.29 
(3.28)* 
-3.24 Not 
rejected 
LnGDP 2000:1 5 0.01 
(6.29)* 
-0.01 
(-0.61) 
-0.02 
(-2.93) 
5.97 
(6.20)* 
-6.19 rejected 
LnRealM1 1997:1 5 0.006 
(4.28)* 
0.03 
(0.73) 
-0.07 
(-3.34)* 
0.04 
(0.75) 
-4.22 Not 
rejected 
LnRealM2 2001:1 5 0.04 
(4.47)* 
-0.15 
(-5.05)* 
-0.08** 
(-2.47) 
1.65 
(5.94)* 
-5.76 rejected 
R 2004:1 3 -0.11 
(-3.58)* 
1.61 
(2.25)** 
-1.93 
(3.24)* 
12.60 
(3.94)* 
-3.92 Not 
rejected 
LIBOR 1989:1 5 -0.48 
(-4.71) 
4.60 
(3.25)* 
-2.54 
(-2.54) 
27.31 
(5.44) 
-
5.62*** 
rejected 
Note:   1. The numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios. 
2.  Note that *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
3. The critical values of 1%, 5% and 10% are -5.92, -5.23, and -4.92. 
4. The exogenous break point Tb is selected by minimizing the value of the t-statistic 
for testing α = 1.  
                
3.4.3.2.3 The Empirical Results of Perron’s 1997 approach 
      Model AO 
 
The AO model of Perron‘s 1997 approach is presented in Table 3.24. The 
results show that under the null hypothesis of the unit root, only time series 
LnGDP can be rejected and this series is found to be stationary, as an absolute t-
statistic for =1 equals 5.69, which is greater than the 1% critical value (-5.45). 
It can be concluded that under the AO model all variables are nonstationary, 
except LnGDP. Another interesting point is that under the AO model, the 
coefficients of DT are statistically significant for all variables as the t-value of 
all variables are strongly significant at 1% for all variables except LnRealM2. In 
addition, with the statistic of time trend (t), both the coefficient and the t-
statistic are significant for all series. It can be said that Perron‘s 1997 approach 
model AO could be applied for all variables. 
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Table 3.24The Results of the AO model (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variable Time 
break 
K  
(t) 
 
(DT) 
 
 
t(=1) Result 
LnEXC 2000:1 0 -0.01 
(10.480* 
-0.01 
-1.94)*** 
2.96 
(16.6)* 
-3.17 Not 
rejected 
LnP 2002:4 4 0.01 
(76.38)* 
-0.01 
(-6.26)* 
3.74 
(506.4)* 
-2.68 Not 
rejected 
LnGDP 1998:1 5 0.01 
(30.98)* 
-0.001 
(-1.87)** 
5.40 
(1.09) 
-5.69* rejected 
LnRealM1 1992:1 5 0.02 
(27.16)* 
-0.004 
(-4.20)* 
0.16 
(6.48)* 
-3.45 Not 
rejected 
LnRealM2 1999:1 5 0.03 
(17.84)* 
-0.006 
(-0.96) 
1.57 
(63.68)* 
-4.19 Not 
rejected 
R 2004:1 2 -0.11 
(-4.70)* 
-1.16 
(-3.93)* 
14.21 
(38.24)* 
-4.01 Not 
rejected 
LIBOR 1983:1 1 -1.69 
(-2.64)* 
-1.27 
(2.06)** 
10.88 
(4.97)* 
-3.83 Not 
rejected 
   Note:  1. The numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios. 
   2.  Note that *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
              3. The critical values of 1%, 5% and 10% are -5.45, -4.83, and -4.48. 
4. The exogenous break point Tb is selected by minimizing the value of the t-statistic 
for testing α = 1  
3.4.3.2.4 The Model Selection of Perron’s 1997 approach  
 
The model selection of Perron‘s 1997 approach is presented in Table 3.25. It is 
clearly shown that Model IO2 is suitable for the variable LnEXC due to all of 
statistics, including t, Tb, DU and DT being  significant at any given level. 
Model AO is clearly selected for the series LnGDP, LnP, and LnRealM2. The 
IO1 model is selected for LnRealM1, R and LIBOR. 
 
 Overall, the null hypothesis of the unit root can be rejected for LnGDP at 1% 
significant level and rejected at 5% significant for LnRealM2 and LnEXC. It 
can be said that the series LnEXC, LnGDP and LnRealM2 are stationary when 
structural change is allowed, while other variables are not. 
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Table 3.25 Model Selection of Perron’s 1997 Procedure (1980Q1-2007Q1) 
Variable Selected 
model 
k Time Break t(=1) Result 
LnEXC IO2 0 1992:2 -5.59** Rejected 
LnP AO 4 2002:4 -2.68 Not Rejected 
LnGDP AO 5 1998:1 -5.69* Rejected 
LnRealM1 AO 5 1992:1 -3.45 Not Rejected 
LnRealM2 IO1 5 2001:1 -5.76** Rejected 
R IO1 3 2004;1 -3.92 Not Rejected 
LIBOR IO1 5 1989:1 -5.62** Rejected 
Note:             1. Note that * and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%.  
 
 3.4.4 Empirical Result of the Unit Root test with Structural Break: 
(Zivot and Andrews’ approach) 
 
The ZA procedure provides three possible models for testing the unit root in the 
presence of structural break and there is no standard test for selecting the 
appropriate model. This thesis follows the method of Chaudhuri and Wu (2003) 
which selected the model by estimating all three equations for each series and 
computing the t-statistic for α = 1. Then the selection of the model is chosen 
from the strongest evidence against a random walk hypothesis (chosen from the 
most significant of the t-statistics in α = 1). Table 3.26 presents the results of the 
unit root test with structural break based on Zivot and Andrews‘s procedure, 
using the data set from 1993Q1 to 2007Q1. Given the strongest of t-statistics, 
the results illustrate that Model A is selected for the series LnRealM1 and GDP, 
Model B is chosen for LnRealM2 and LIBOR, and Model C seems appropriate 
for the series LnP and R. There are three variables out of seven variables that 
reject the null hypothesis of the unit root. LnEXC, LnGDP, and R are 1% 
significance level, while the variable LIBOR is 5% significant. 
 
It seems to be that the results of the unit root test with structural break based on 
Zivot and Andrews‘ procedure using the longer data sets in Table 3.27 is similar 
to the test for the shorter data set. As can be seen, the t-statistics of LnEXC, R, 
and LIBOR are significant, while the other variables are not.  
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Table 3.26  The Results of Zivot and Andrews’ model (1993Q1-2007Q1) 
Variable Model  Tb  
No. of 
Lag T-Statistic 
Critical Value  
Result  1% 5% 
LnEXC  A 1997:3 3 -6.01 -5.34 -4.8 Rejected  
  B 2001:1 3 -3.07 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1997:3 3 -6.1 -5.57 -5.08 Rejected  
LnP A 2001:3 1 -2.69 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected 
  B 1997:4 1 -3.17 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1997:3 1 -3.29 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
LnGDP A 1997:4 5 -6.34 -5.34 -4.8 Rejected 
  B 2001:1 5 -4.6 -4.93 -4.42 Rejected 
  C 1997:4 5 -6.21 -5.57 -5.08 Rejected 
LnRealM1 A 1997:2 5 -4.21 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected 
  B 1998:2 5 -3.9 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1997:2 5 -4.08 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
LnRealM2 A 1995:2 3 -2.94 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected 
  B 1996:2 3 -5.2 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1997:2 3 -4.46 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
R  A 1999:1 2 -8.58 -5.34 -4.8 Rejected 
  B 1999:2 2 -3.12 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C  2003:1 2 -9.17 -5.57 -5.08 Rejected 
LIBOR A 2005:1 3 -4.03 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected  
  B 2004:4 3 -4.63 -4.93 -4.42 Rejected 
  C 2003:1. 3 -4.45 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
Note: Note that * and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%. 
Table 3.27The Results of Zivot and Andrews’ model (1980Q1-2007Q1)  
Variable Model  Tb  
No. of 
Lag T-Statistic 
Critical Value  
Result  1% 5% 
LnEXC  A 1997:3 0 -6.45 -5.34 -4.8 Rejected  
  B 2003:1 0 -2.42 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1997:3 0 -7.13 -5.57 -5.08 Rejected 
LnP A 2003:2 2 -3.19 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected 
  B 2003:3 2 -4.22 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 2003:4 2 -4.23 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
LnGDP A 1997:3 5 -4.19 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected 
  B 1993:4 5 -3.69 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1997:3 5 -4.68 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
LnRealM1 A 1997:2 5 -4.18 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected 
  B 1997:3 5 -3.63 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1996:4 5 -4.35 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
LnRealM2 A 1985:4 4 -1.06 -5.34 -4.8 Not rejected 
  B 1995:1 4 -3.38 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1994:4 4 -3.36 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
R  A 1999:1 2 -5.04 -5.34 -4.8 Rejected 
  B 1993:3 2 -3.25 -4.93 -4.42 Not rejected 
  C 1999:2 2 -4.93 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
LIBOR A 1984:4 3 -4.86 -5.34 -4.8 Rejected 
  B 1985:3 3 -4.49 -4.93 -4.42 Rejected 
  C 1984:4 3 -4.58 -5.57 -5.08 Not rejected 
Note:  that * and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%.  
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 3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the brief concepts and the results of unit root testing. The 
chapter started by testing the unit root without the evidence of structural break 
by using a standard ADF and KPSS test. These results suggest that the null 
hypothesis of the unit root cannot be rejected in levels but can be rejected in the 
first difference for all variables. This implies that all variables are I(1) and are 
eligible for testing with the next step for both the short data set (1993Q1-
2007Q1) and longer data set (1980Q1-2007Q1). However, as Thailand‘s 
financial crisis in 1997 may cause breaks in the data, the second part of the 
chapter retested the unit root with structural break by using Perron‘s approach. 
The results of the unit root with structural break show that the break date 
selected is 1997Q3 for the exchange rate and price level, 1997Q4 for GDP, 
1997Q2 for LnRealM1, 1996Q2 for LnRealM2, 2003Q1 for domestic interest 
rates, and 2005Q1 for LIBOR. The null hypothesis of the unit root with 
structural break failed to reject most variables except LnEXC, R, and LIBOR. 
Overall, most of unit root tests suggested that the data are I(1).  Although some 
of the breaking trend results suggest the possibility of trend stationary, we are 
going to assume (1) in the subsequent analysis chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE COINTEGRATION AND ERROR CORRECTION MODEL: 
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF MONEY DEMAND IN THAILAND 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The major objective of this chapter is to adopt the cointegration approach and 
the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to empirically test whether there 
exists a stable long-run and short-run equilibrium of the money demand 
function in Thailand. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section 
overviews the concept of cointegration and the concept of the Vector Error 
Correction approach. The second section is the empirical results of 
cointegration and the VECM for money demand in Thailand. There are two data 
sets used in the chapter, the full data set from 1980Q1-2007Q1 and the shorter 
data set from 1993Q1-2007Q1. The third section provides the comparison and 
policy implication of the chapter.  
 
 4.2 The Cointegration and Error Correction Model  
 4.2.1 The Cointegration concept 
 
Generally, nonstationary time series data should not be used in regression 
models because it brings about the problem of spurious regression. However, 
there is an exception. For example, if 
ty and tx  are nonstationary I(1) variables, 
then the difference or linear combination of them, such as  
ttt xye 10     
should be I(1) as well. However, in case 
ttt xye 10    is stationary I(0), 
ty  and tx  are said to be cointegrated. This implies that ty  and tx  share similar 
stochastic trends and they will diverge too far from each other because their 
difference 
te  is stationary. Therefore, the cointegrated ty  and tx  exhibit a long-
run equilibrium relationship between 
ty  and tx , which represents the short-run 
deviations from the long-run relationship. As a survey of Campbell and Perron 
(1991) found, a formal cointegration concept can be defined in a simple case of 
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two time series 
ty  and tx , where both are integrated of order one I(1). The two 
series can be said to have cointegration if there exists a parameter 
1  such that 
ttt xye 10    is a stationary process. 
 
In many cases of time series economic analysis, the regression equation may 
have to include more variables. Engle and Granger (1987) introduced the 
alternative concept of cointegration by considering a set of economic variables 
in the long-run equilibrium when: 
                                    0...332211  ntnttt xxxx   
where   and tx  represent the vector )...,( 21 n  and )...,( 321 ttt xxx . The 
system is in long-run equilibrium when 0tx . Then the equilibrium error 
)( te is that:  
     tt xe   
Engle and Granger (1987) defined the cointegration concept as: 
 
The components of the vector )...,( 321 tttt xxxx   are considered to be 
cointegrated of order d, b denoted by b)CI(d,~tx  if: 
1. All components of tx  are integrated of order d. 
2. There exists a vector ),...,,( 21 n   such that the linear combination 
ntnttt xxxx  ,...,, 2211 ‘xt is integrated of order (d-b) where b> 0. 
It is interesting to note that although the original Engle and Granger‘s definition 
of cointegration refers to the set of variables that are integrated in the same 
order, this does not imply that all integrated variables are cointegrated; a set of I 
(d) is usually not cointegrated. However, if two variables are integrated in a 
different order, they cannot be cointegrated. Another interesting aspect of the 
cointegration concept is that if tx  contains n nonstationary component, there 
may be as many as n-1 linear independent cointegration vectors. For example, if 
tx  contains three variables, there can be at most two independent cointegration 
vectors. The number of cointegration vectors is called cointegration rank of 
tx (Enders, 2004,p323) 
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4.2.2 Cointegration testing 
   
Assume that two time series variables are believed to be cointegrated of order 
one and the researcher wants to test whether there exists the equilibrium 
relationship between the two. Engle and Granger (1987) proposed the process of 
cointegration testing which involves three steps: 
 
Step 1: Examine the variables for their order of integration  
A basic requirement of the cointegration test is that the variables must be 
integrated of same order. Thus, the first step of cointegration analysis is to pre-
test each variable to determine their order of integration. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests can be applied in order to indicate the number of unit roots 
(if any) in each of the variables. There are three different possibilities that can 
happen in this step: 
1. If the results show that both variables are stationary (I(0)), it is not 
necessary to proceed since a standard time series method applies to 
stationary variables. The classical regression analysis can be applied. 
2. If the variables appeared to be integrated of different orders, then it 
can be concluded that the variables are not cointegrated. 
3. In case both variables are integrated of the same order, then proceed 
to the second step of cointegration. 
 
Step 2: Cointegration testing 
In case the results of step 1 shows that xt and yt are integrated of the same order, 
usually where economic time series are I(1), then the second step is to estimate 
the long-run equilibrium relationship of Equation 4.1: 
 
                                      yt =0+1 xt + et                                                        (4.1) 
 
In case, ty and tx  are cointegrated, then OLS regression yields a ‗super-
consistent‘ estimator of the cointegration parameter 0 and 1 (Ender, 2003). 
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To test where ty  and tx   are cointegrated, we can test whether the errors et = yt 
-β1- β2xt are stationary as et series are the estimated value of the deviation from 
the long-run relationship. If this deviation appeared to be stationary, series ty  
and tx  are cointegrated. However, if the et cannot be observed, we simply use 
the residual from the cointegrating regression instead of an observed 
equilibrium error. Therefore, the null hypothesis of absence of cointegration can 
be tested by performing a Dickey-Fuller test on the residual series to determine 
their order of integration. The form of residual auto regression is shown in 
Equation 4.2: 
 
 
    where   etˆ   is residual from a regression equation and                    
                    is parameter.  
 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is that:  
                                          0: Ho  , 
 
 
If 0 , the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected, the residual 
series contain a unit root test. Hence, we conclude that series ty  and tx  are not 
cointegrated. If 0 , the residual series does not contain a unit root test and 
we can reject a null hypothesis of no cointegration and the series ty  and tx  are 
cointegrated. 
 
However, if the residual etˆ  in Equation 4.2 does not appear as the white noise, 
the ADF test can be used instead of Equation 4.2. Assume  t  sequence in 
Equation 4.2 exhibits serial correlation. Estimate the autoregression:  
 
 
   (4.2) 
0: Ha
 ttt ee  ˆˆ 1
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If 02   , the residual series is stationary and the variables xt and yt are 
integrated. 
 
It is noticed that the regression in both Equations 4.2 and 4.3 are estimated 
without intercept because the least square residuals ( etˆ ) have zero mean by 
construction (Stewart 2005,814) 
 
Step 3: Estimate the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) 
It seems that cointegration concerns only long-run relationships between the set 
of variables. If the series ty  and tx  are integrated, it means variables have a 
long-term equilibrium relationship but it might have short-run fluctuation in the 
variables. Therefore, the third step is to estimate both the short-run and long-run 
affect of the time series model by estimating the error correction model. 
  
If the result of step 2 shows that the variables are cointegrated, we can use the 
residuals from the equilibrium regression to estimate the error correction model 
and analyze the long-run and short-run effects. 
 
If xt and yt are integrated, the error correction form is that:  
tttt
m
j
iti
n
i
itit exyxyay  



  1
00
1 )(        (4.4) 
Where the lagged terms of the x variable presents the short-run relationship, 
the 0 coefficient indicates the current impact of x to y, whereas the long-run 
disequilibrium deviations are captured by the one period lagged error term of 
the cointegrating equation, with  being the adjustment factor to equilibrium. 
The value of    is between zero to one, while it is obvious that the closer to one 
the larger is the adjustment to equilibrium. 
 
 
         (4.3) 
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4.2.3 The Johansen methodology 
 
Although the Engle-Granger cointegration approach is useful for testing the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between two variables and it seems to be easy 
to implement, there are a number of disadvantages of this approach. Firstly, the 
Engle-Granger method cannot be tested for a number of cointegrations when 
there are more than two variables. The second problem is that the method does 
not allow straightforward testing of a hypothesis regarding a cointegrating 
vector. The last problem is related to the estimation side of the Engle-Granger 
approach as the test approach relies on three steps (generating the error term and 
estimating the regression). Then, any error that is introduced in step one will 
carry on to the estimate regression equation in step two. 
 
To avoid the problems of the Engle-Granger approach, Johansen (1988, 1991), 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed an alternative model for testing 
cointegration. The major aspect of this model is that it is allow for various 
restrictions on the cointegration vector as well as being based on the error 
correction of the VAR(p) model. 
 
The Johansen multivariate cointegration approach is based on the p order vector 
autoregression (VAR) model. It can be generalized to allow for a higher-order 
autoregression process. Consider the equation:  
 
                      tptpttt yAyAyAy   2211                       (4.5) 
 
Where )...,( ,21 ntt yyyy   is a (n-1) vector of I(1) 
             ),...,,( 21 ntttt    is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed normal with zero mean and variance matrix is t  
 
 
 
 
  117 
Subtracting 1ty   from both sides of Equation 4.5 we obtain: 
                 tptptttt yAyAyAyAy   332211      (4.6) 
Adding and Subtracting   2tyA   to the right-hand side of Equation 6.6 we 
obtain:  
    tptp3t32t121t1t yAyAyAAyAy                 (4.7) 
Next, adding and Subtracting   3t12 yAA  to the right-hand side we obtain:  
      tptptttt yAyAAAyAAyAy    312321211
    
Continuing in this process we obtain: 
                     tptj
p
i
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1
                                              (4.8) 
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The importance of Equation 4.8 is that the rank of matrix   represents the 
independent cointegrating vector. There are four interesting possible cases: 
1) In case the rank ( ) is zero, the matrix is null and Equation 4.8 is 
the usual VAR model in the first differences. 
2) If the matrix appeared to be full rank (  = n), the vector process is 
stationary. 
3) If the rank is equal one ( =1), there is a single cointegrating vector 
and pty  is the error collection term. 
4) For the case where 1 < rank ( ) < n, it can be said that there are 
multiple cointegrating vectors (Ender 2003, p. 352)  
 
Johansen (1991) also proposed two likelihood ratio statistics to test the 
hypothesis of cointegration vectors, called trace statistic and maximal 
eigenvalue statistic. Those two equations can be expressed as:  
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Trr                                            
(4.10) 
                 where iˆ  is the estimated value of the characteristic roots obtained 
from the estimated   metric. T is the number of usable observations. 
 
The aim of the trace statistic is to test the null hypothesis that the number of 
cointegrating vectors is less or equal r, 0rr   against the alternative hypothesis 
0rr    for  ),...,2,1,0(0 nr  , while the maximal eigenvalue statistic test is for the 
hypothesis that at least r cointegrating , 0rr  , against the alternative 10  rr . 
  
In practice, there are four steps to illustrate the Johansen method: 
  
Step 1: Pre-test the order of integration of the variable. 
 
The most common test for choosing an appropriate lag length is to estimate a 
traditional VAR model including all variables in levels or non-differenced 
variables. This model can start with the longest length deemed reasonable, after 
that reducing down by re-estimating the model for one lag less until we zero 
lag. For example, if the test will be whether lags 2 through to 5 are important, 
the estimated equation will be:  
 
                 ty  =  tttttt uyAyAyAyAyAA 155443322110             (4.11) 
                 ty  =   tt uyAA 2110                 (4.12) 
where       ty  is the 1n  vector 
                  0A  is the 1n  matrix  of intercept term 
                   iA  is the nn  matrix of coefficients 
                   t1u  and t2u   are 1n  vector of (error terms). 
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In this step, we estimate the first system with the longest lags (five lags) of each 
equation and call variance/covariance matrix residuals 5. Then we estimate the 
second equation by using one lag of each variable in each equation and we can 
call variance/covariance matrix residuals 1. In this case, we can perform lag 
length order by using Sims‘ (1980) likelihood ratio statistic that is shown in 
Equation  4.13: 
                                 )log)(log(
51   cT                                         (4.13) 
where     T is the number of observations, 
                c is the number of parameters in an unrestricted system, and 
     log i  is a natural logarithm of the determinant of i  
 
To test this statistic, we can use the 2x distribution with a degree of freedom 
equal to the number of coefficient restrictions. Since each iA  has 
2n coefficient, 
so constraining 05432  AAAA  entails 
24n  restriction (Enders, 
2004,363). However, another alternative way to select lag length order for 
multivariate generalization is using AIC or SBC criteria. 
 
Step 2: Estimate the model and determine the rank of  . 
In this step, the OLS method seems to be not appropriate due to it being 
necessary to add cross-equation restrictions on the   matrix. Enders (2004) 
suggests that there are three alternative equation forms to estimate the model: 
(a) the model with all elements of 0A  is set equal to zero, (b) model with drift, 
or (c) model with a constant term in the cointegration vectors. Then, estimate 
the model by using the step one method.  
 
 Step 3: Analyze the normalized cointegration vector and speed adjustment.  
There are three possible cases to test in this step. 
 1. To test that 00  entails one restriction on one cointegrating vector, thus 
the likelihood ratio test contains a 2x distribution with one degree of 
freedom. If the null hypothesis of 00  is not rejected, then retest the 
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model by using the form of model in which there is neither a drift nor 
intercept in the cointegration vector. 
2. To restrict the normalized cointegration vector, where 12   and 
13  entails two restrictions in one cointegrating vector. In this case, the 
likelihood ratio test contains a 2x distribution with two degrees of freedom. 
3. The test that the joint restriction )1,1,,1,0(   entails three 
restrictions:  
,1,0 20    and 13  . 
 
Step 4: Innovation accounting and test on the Error Correction Model 
 4.2.4 The Vector Error Correction Model  
 
A cointegration method is more concerned about the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between two variables but it is not concerned about the short-run 
relationship between the two variables. To capture the short-run dynamic 
between the two variables, Engle and Granger (1987) and Granger (1988) 
proposed an alternative method to describe the short-run dynamic relationship 
between variables, known as the Error Correction Model (ECM). The major 
idea of the ECM is that a proportion of disequilibrium from any change in one 
of these variables is related to change in past equilibrium error (Engle & 
Granger, 1987,p254). Since Granger introduced the concept of ECM, it became 
more popular among economists due to the ECM method being formulated in 
terms of first difference, which can eliminate trend from the equation. In 
addition, ECM can capture short-run and long-run equilibrium relationships of 
the set of variables. 
 
A suggestion of Engle and Granger (1987) was that if the two time series ty and 
tx  are cointegrated in the same order (both ty and tx are I (d)), any linear 
combination of the two series should be the same and the residual that obtains 
from the regression ty on tx  should be I (d). Therefore, the simple way to 
derive the Error Correction Model is to show if ty and tx are linear functions of 
  121 
the latent integrated progress, the residual of ty  regressed on tx  should be 
stationary (Keele & De Boef 2004 ,p7). 
 
Assume that both ty and tx are integrated order one ( ty and tx  are I (1)). 
Consider the long-run equilibrium relationship between ty and tx  from 
Equation 4.14:         
                                  ttt xy                                           (4.14) 
Equation 4.14 means that in the long-run equilibrium ty  is a function of tx  and 
the error terms t : 
 
To capture the short-run equilibrium between the two variables, Engle and 
Granger suggest the simple dynamic of short-run adjustment in Equation 4.15: 
                            ttttt xxyy    110110                               (4.15) 
Rearrange Equation 4.15 by taking first difference we obtain:  
     ttttt xxyy    110110 )1(                                (4.16) 
Subtracting 10 tx  from the right-hand side of Equation 6.16 we obtain: 
     ttttt xxyy    1100110 )()1(                   (4.17)  
Add and subtract 11 )1(  tx  from the right-hand side: 
 tttttt xxxyy    121110 )(                               (4.18) 
where  )1( 1    , 01   , and 11012    
 
 
The   or )1( 1   in Equation 4.18 represents the speed at which ty  adjusts to 
any discrepancy between ty and tx  in the previous period, while )( 111   txy  is 
equal to zero when ty and tx  are in equilibrium and it measures the extent to 
which the long-run relationship is not satisfied. The 1  represents the short-run 
relationship between the two variables. However, instead of explicitly including 
an error correction term in the form of )( 111   txy , Keele and De Boef (2004) 
suggest the convenient model for estimating the error correction model is: 
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                ttttt xxyy    1210 1                     (4.19) 
where  )1( 1    , 011   , and 012    
Equation 6.19 can be re-written in the form of an Error Correction Model as: 
ttttt xxyy    111210 )(                                           (4.20) 
 
 4.2.5 The Vector Error Correction Model 
 
The ECM presents the single error correction equation to capture the short-run 
relationship between the two variables but it cannot analyze the error correction 
of multiple equations. Engle and Granger (1987) offered the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) to estimate multiple regressions. While the ECM is 
used to capture the short-run relationship when series ty  and tx  are 
cointegrated in the same order, the VECM is similar to the ECM but it 
considered all variables as endogenous variables and each variable in the model 
is determined by other variables. The VECM is actually the combination of the 
Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) and the Error Correction Model (ECM). In 
order to derive the VECM we need to start with the VAR model. 
Consider the non-structural auto regressive VAR model in Equation 4.21: 
                          

 
k
i
ttit uyy
1
10                                     (4.21) 
where ty  is a  x 1 vector of variables that include all variable as endogenous. 
It is determined by k lags of all   variables in the system.  
     0  is a  x 1 vector of constant term coefficient.  
    i is the   x   metrics of coefficients on the i lag of ty   
    tu  is a  x 1 vector of the error term. 
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The VAR model can be generated by first differencing variables. If the first 
differenced variables are I (1), the VAR equation can be expressed as: 


 
k
i
ttit uyy
1
10                                             (4.22) 
 
According to Engle and Granger (1987), the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) is simply restricted VAR which required accommodating with the 
Error Correction Model (ECM). Therefore, the VECM can be expressed as: 



 
1
1
10


i
titiitt yyy                                   (4.23) 
 
Another alternative form of the VECM without constant suggested by Johansen 
can be written as: 

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where t ~ TtN ,...,2,1),,0(  , 
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It should be noted that at equilibrium the reduced form of Johansen‘s VECM 
can be written as 11   tt yy . The term of   



1
1

i
itii y would not exist in 
equilibrium; all ity . will be zero and setting the error term t  to their expected 
value of zero will leave 01  ty  (Brooks, 2002). 
 
The VECM is also often presented in the form of a change in dependent 
variables being a function of the explanatory variables and the error correction 
term, as expressed in Equation 4.25: 



 
1
1
10


i
ttitiit ECTyy                         (4.25) 
       where ECT represents an Error Correction Term. 
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The ECT derives from the cointegration vectors and  records the response of 
the dependent variable in each period t. 
 
However, the initial relationship for ty  after the cointegrating vector has been 
normalized can be written as:  
itittt yyyy    ...2211               (4.26) 
The error correction term is that: 
ititttt yyyyECT    ...2211                (4.27) 
 
 4.3 The Empirical Results of Stability of Money Demand in Thailand 
 
This section provides results of the stability of money demand function in 
Thailand. The section starts by providing the model of money demand 
functions. Then, the empirical results of money demand functions in Thailand 
are presented. Two data sets used for analyzing the money demand function. 
These are the data set from 1980Q–2007Q1 and the data set from 1993Q1–
2007Q1. In both data sets, we will test both M1 and M2 money demand 
function in Thailand. In each test, we will start by testing a simple money 
demand function, where money demand is dependent on real income and 
domestic interest rates. After that, we will add the variable exchange rate and 
LIBOR in order to test the role of the exchange rate on money demand in 
Thailand.  
  
4.3.1 Modeling of the money demand function in Thailand 
 
The most general form of the money demand function is usually defined as 
money demand being dependent on real income and the opportunity cost of 
holding money that usually proxy by domestic interest rate and the money 
demand equation will be: 
                                  
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 where 





P
M
 is real money balance 
                         





P
Y
 is real income 
                           R     is the domestic interest rate.  
 
The estimation in this chapter will start by testing money demand in Thailand 
by using a simple model of the money demand function. The variables included 
in the simple model are real money holding (M1 or M2), real income (GDP), 
and domestic interest rates (R). The simple model estimate is written in 
equation as: 
                    
                                 tttt RGDPalM  Re          (4.29) 
 
However, in an open economy, where the international trade and capital 
movement have greater importance in the economy, the external factors become 
major concerns in monetary analysis. As suggested by Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Techaratanachai (2001), the fluctuation in the exchange rate has resulted in a 
change in the money demand function. Since the depreciation of the domestic 
currency caused an increase in the domestic currency value of foreign assets, 
those who were holding foreign assets considerably increased their wealth and 
had higher demand on domestic currency (Arango & Nadiri, 1981). In this case, 
the domestic money demand should increase. However, in the case of currency 
substitution, the depreciation of domestic currency may also cause a decrease in 
money demand. When the exchange rate is expected to depreciate, the expected 
return from foreign assets will increase. This causes more demand on foreign 
currency and less demand on domestic currency and so domestic money 
demand may decline. To examine the relationship between money demand and 
the exchange rate fluctuation, the equation will add the exchange rate variable 
(EXC) into the simple model. In addition, in an open economy where the 
international trade and capital movement have greater importance in the 
economy, domestic investors can also choose to hold foreign assets. Therefore, 
the choices of holding assets for investors include domestic money, foreign 
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money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds. For this reason, many economists 
take into account the foreign factors in the money demand function. For 
example, Bahmani-Oskooee (1991) claimed that the foreign sector has a 
significant affect on money aggregate in an open economy. This, together with 
the study of Sriram (1999), found that foreign assets can also be represented as 
an opportunity cost of holding money. Then, the foreign interest rate is included 
in the money demand function. Therefore, the second equation used to estimate 
the demand for money in the section is that:  
 
          tttttt EXCLIBORRGDPalM  Re            (4.30) 
 
where RealMt  represents real money demand. The variable RealMt is generated 
by (Mt/Pt), where Mt is money aggregate and Pt is the consumer price index. 
Two money aggregate variables are employed in this research–narrow money 
(M1) and broad money (M2). R is the domestic interest rate, proxied by 
discount interest rates, Discount rate, which is the rate of interest, set by the 
central bank that member banks are charged when they borrow money through 
the central bank. It also can be referred to the  interest on an annual basis 
deducted in advance on a loan. The reason to use discount interest rates is that 
the Bank of Thailand usually applied the discount interest rate as a monetary 
instrument and sometimes it appears as an intermediate target in monetary 
policy. In addition, the Bank of Thailand can control the discount interest rate 
directly. P is referring to the price level represented by the consumer price index 
(1988=100). The real income variable is proxied by GDP or Gross Domestic 
Produce at the 1988 constant price. LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered 
Rates, which presents foreign interest rates. The reason to use LOBOR as a 
proxy of foreign interest rate is that the LIBOR is the most famous barometer 
for short-term interest rates in the world. In addition, LIBOR is also the interest 
rate that the most credit-worthy banks around the world charge each other for 
loans and EXC is the exchange rate (baht to US$). 
 
The demand for money in this thesis is estimated by using two quarterly data 
sets, the full data set from 1980Q1-2007Q1 and the data set from 1993:1-
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2007:1. The rationale for the use of two data sets is that there is limited 
quarterly GDP data in Thailand, as the official database provides consistent data 
from only 1993Q to 2007Q1. However, estimates of Thai GDP data by 
Abeysinghe & Gulasekaran (2004), which closely match official data are also 
available. Therefore, this thesis utilizes both data sets for testing the stability of 
the money demand function in order to compare the results between the short 
and longer data set. The chapter focuses on the estimation of both short-run and 
long-run relationship of money demand in Thailand, using both the narrow 
money demand (M1) function and the broad money demand (M2) function. The 
result of this estimation also allows the calculation of the so-called money 
overhang from the long-run money demand function and allow the test of 
whether this can help to predict  inflation in Thailand  
 All variables are estimated in form of logarithms except Rt and LIBORt. 
Therefore, the equation estimated in this section is that: 
 
tttt RLnGDPalMLn  Re  
and  
                   tttttt LnEXCLIBORRLnGDPalMLn  Re  
 
Many studies applied the cointegration technique to examine the demand for 
money function in developed countries. For example, Hoffman and Rasche 
(1991) and Hafer and Jansen (1991) used cointegration to estimate demand for 
money in the US. Bahmani-Oskooee (2001) used this technique for Japan. 
Sriram (2002) also applied the same technique for money demand in Malaysia. 
They were followed by Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005) who used the 
same method to estimate the stability of money demand in Asian developing 
countries. Oomes and Ohnsorge (2005) applied this technique to Russia, and 
James (2005) to Indonesia.  
 
 
 
To achieve the result of testing the relationship between the stability of the 
money demand function in Thailand, this thesis first applies the Augmented 
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Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) to test the stationary of each variable and establish the 
order of integration of variables used in model. Many economists claim that 
there might be cointegration in a set of two or more variables. Then, the second 
step is cointegration testing. The pair-wise cointegration is applied as a pre-test 
in this section in order to test whether there is pair-wise cointegrating between 
the real money demand (RealM1 or RealM2), and its determinants. After that, 
the multivariate cointegration approach and the Vector Error Correction Model 
are applied to examine the long-run and the short-run relationship of the money 
demand function in Thailand. 
 
After testing the long-run and the short-run relationship of the money demand 
function, we will test whether the estimate of the money demand equation is 
helping forecast inflation at different lags. According to the study of Polleit and 
Gerdesmeier (2005), the money overhang can be defined as a difference 
between the actual money stock and the equilibrium stock of money. The 
money overhang in this thesis will follow the idea of Polleit and Gerdesmeier 
by using the long-run money demand equation to estimate the money overhang. 
Therefore, money overhang in this section is: 
                            
                        OM = LnRealM1 – LnRealM1e                                                 (4.31)  
 
where LnRealM
e 
is money demand that is calculated from the long-run money 
demand function and LnRealMt refers to actual money holdings. The money 
overhang for the simple model of money demand is: 
 
)( RLnGDPLnrealMOM t                        (4.32) 
 
The money overhang for the money demand function that includes the exchange 
rate and R can be calculated from: 
 
)( RLnEXCRLnGDPLnrealMOM t      (4.33) 
To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we start the 
estimation by testing the correlation of the current measure of money overhang 
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with current inflation, one-quarter-ahead inflation, four-quarter-ahead inflation, 
and eight-quarter-ahead inflation. After that, the simple forecasting equation of 
inflation and money overhang will be tested in order to examine whether money 
overhang helps in forecasting inflation in Thailand. 
 4.3.2 The result of money demand function in Thailand (1980Q1 - 
2007Q1) 
 4.3.2.1The result of the M1 Money demand function (a simple model)  
 
A major objective of this section is to examine the long-run and the short-run 
relationship of the M1 money demand function in Thailand, using the longer 
data set from 1980Q1 to 2007Q1. The estimation in this chapter starts by testing 
the pair-wise cointegration as a pretest of multivariate cointegration for the M1 
money demand function in Thailand. Then, the cointegration approach and the 
Vector Error Correction Model are applied. In each model, we will start by 
testing a simple model where money demand is dependent on real income and 
interest rates. Then, the variable exchange rate and LIBOR will be added to 
examine whether external factors have an affect on money demand in Thailand. 
 
The pair-wise cointegration between M1 money demand (LnRealM1), real 
income (LnGDP) and interest rates (R) is estimated by using Saikkonen and 
Lutkepohl‘s approach with the JMulTi program. The number of lags in the table 
are selected by the smallest AIC criteria. There are three determinants in this 
section: the test with intercept and shift dummy that also allows time trend in 
the series; the test including intercept and trend but excluding the shift dummy; 
and the test with only intercept. Since there is evidence of a break date during 
the financial crisis iThailand during middle of 1997 to the beginning of 1999 
and there is a degree of uncertainly about the break date in the series, therefore, 
we set the date of 1998Q2 as a sample shift dummy variable.  
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Table 4. 1 The pair-wise cointegration results for the M1 money demand function (1980:1 
– 2007:1) 
 
 
Variables: LnRealM1, LnGDP, R 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance. 
          The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
 
Table 4.1 presents a pair-wise cointegration between LnRealM1, LnGDP, and 
R. In the case of the equation including the shift dummy and trend, there is 
evidence of pair-wise cointegration between M1 money demand and R, 
suggested by the test statistic of pair-wise cointegration being greater than 10% 
critical value. The test without the shift dummy variable but including trend 
states that M1 money demand and real income (LnRealM1 and LnGDP), and 
M1 money demand and interest rates (LnRealM1 and R) have pair-wise 
Variables  Deterministic  No. H0: Test   Critical Value  
      
of 
lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and  LnGDP 
Trend, 
intercept, 5 ro=0 10.81 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    
and shift 
dummy  ro=1 1.29 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  
Trend, 
intercept, 5 ro=0 14.77*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   
and shift 
dummy  ro=1 0.01 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  
Trend, 
intercept, 4 ro=0 12.80 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   
and shift 
dummy  ro=1 0.38 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnGDP Trend, intercept 5 ro=0 14.21*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=1 1.33 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  Trend,  5 ro=0 14.55*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   intercept   ro=1 0.34 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  Trend,  4 ro=0 16.72** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   intercept   ro=1 0.56 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnGDP Intercept  4 ro=0 5.84 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 2.34 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  R  Intercept  1 ro=0 12.13*** 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 0.45 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and  R  Intercept  4 ro=0 9.45 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 2.84 2.98 4.13 6.93 
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relationships of 10% significant level. The test with intercept but no trend and 
shift dummy variable also suggests that the null hypothesis of no pair-wise 
relationship between two variables is rejected at 10% significant for LnRealM1 
and R, meaning that there is a pair-wise relationship between LnRealM1 and R 
at 10 % significance. However, given 5% significance, there is no pair-wise 
relationship between two variables. 
 
 
Table 4.2 The cointegration results for M1 money demand (1980:1–2007:1) 
Variables: LnRealM1, LnGDP, R 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the multivariate cointegration of the M1 money demand 
function in Thailand using the simple model of money demand with the data set 
from 1980Q1-2007Q1. The results suggest that in the case where the shift 
dummy and time trend are included, the null hypothesis of r0 = 0 is rejected at 1 
% significant level, as the test statistic is 36.46, greater than 1% critical value. 
However, the null hypothesis of r0 =1 is not rejected at any given significant 
level, suggesting that there is a single cointegrating vector between LnRealM1, 
LnGDP, and R when shift dummy and trend are included. Similarly, the test 
with intercept but excluding time trend and the shift dummy variable rejects the 
null hypothesis of r0 =1 at 1% significance. However, the cointegration result of 
the model without dummy shift but allowing time trend in the series indicates 
Variables  Deterministic  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      
of 
lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1,LnGDP, and 
R  Trend, 4 ro=0 36.46* 26.07 28.5 33.5 
    intercept, and  ro=1 6.23 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   shift dummy   ro=2 0.04 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1,LnGDP, and 
R  Trend and  1 ro=0 60.79* 26.07 28.5 33.5 
   intercept   ro=1 23.46* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=2 1.51 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1,LnGDP, and 
R  Intercept  3 ro=0 29.32* 21.76 24.2 29.1 
     ro=1 6.57 10.47 12.26 16.1 
     ro=2 2.13 2.98 4.13 6.93 
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that there are at least two combinations where all variables are cointegrated in 
the M1 money demand function in Thailand since the null hypothesis of r0 =1 is 
rejected at 1% significant level. Therefore, it could be said that exits a stable 
long-run relationship among the M1 money demand, domestic income (GDP) 
and domestic interest rates (R) in the Thai economy. 
 
 
A result of the cointegration above strongly suggests that there is a single 
cointegration vector among M1 money demand (LnRealM1), real income 
(GDP), and interest rates (R) when the test excludes trend and the shift dummy. 
It may not be necessary to include a shift dummy and time trend in the analysis. 
The next step will be to estimate the normalized cointegration vector by setting 
the coefficient on LnRealM1 at -1 and then the vector equation will represent 
the long-run money demand function in Thailand. In addition, the coefficient of 
each variable shows the elasticity of each variable on the M1 money demand in 
Thailand. 
 
Table 4.3 presents the normalized cointegrating vector of the M1 money 
demand function in Thailand by using the data from 1980Q1 to 2007 Q1. The 
coefficient of both LnGDP and R are significant at 1% level, suggesting that 
real income and the interest rate has an affect on money holding in Thailand in 
the long run. The income elasticity of M1 money demand is 0.65, meaning that 
a 1% increase in real GDP in Thailand leads to a 0.65% increase in the M1 
money demand in Thailand. The estimate of interest rate (R) elasticity is -0.06%, 
indicating that in the long run if domestic interest rates increase by 1%, M1 
money demand will drop by 0.06%. 
 
Table 4.3 The normalizing of the M1money demand function in Thailand (1980:1–2007:1) 
LnRealM1 LnGDP R C 
-1 0.65* -0.06* 2.06** 
 [-5.66] [4.47] [2.45] 
           Note:  The numbers in parenthesis show the t-statistics. 
               Note that * and **  indicate 1% and  5%  level of significance. 
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Table 4.4 shows the result of weak exogeneity of variables in the cointegration. 
The results show that LnRealM1 and GDP are 1% significant. This means that 
LnRealM1, and GDP are not a long-run weak exogeneity with respect to the 
cointegration vector. However, the variable R appeared to be a weak exogeneity 
as the test statistic is insignificant.  Therefore, we can continue the VECM in the 
next step by using LnRealM1 and LnGDP as endogenous variables, and R as an 
exogenous variable. 
 
Table 4.4 The test for Cointegration Restrictions for weak exogeneity (1980:1–2007:1) 
 
As the initial focus of this thesis was to test the stability of the money demand 
function in Thailand, we continue the test by analyzing the parameter stability 
of money demand. Hansen and Johansen (1999) proposed a formal test for 
parameter stability in the context of recursive estimation of the eigenvalue 
associated with the test for cointegration. In the context of a single cointegrating 
vector in the M1 money demand in Thailand, the largest eigenvalue, the one 
associated with the cointegration test suggesting a single cointegrating vector, 
can be estimated for the full sample and then recursively for sub-samples. The 
test is then based on the difference between the two eigenvalues, rejecting the 
null of stability if this difference exceeds some critical value. Limiting 
distributions for the test statistic have been calculated by Ploberger, Kramer and 
Kontrus (1989). Denoting that the eigenvalue associated with the full sample of 
data is Ti and the eigenvalue estimated  data used up to observation  is i
 . 
Hansen and Johansen (1999) used the maximum value of the constructed test 
statistics over the recursive estimation range to carry out the test
4
. The tests  
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Variable Restricted LR Degrees of   
 Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
Restrictions:   
LnRealM1 334.94 10.50 1.00 0.00 
Restrictions:   
LnGDP 335.86 8.73 1.00 0.00 
Restrictions:   
R 340.17 0.09 1.00 0.75 
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were carried out using JMulTi
5
. There are 2 options available for implementing 
the test. In calculating the recursive eigenvalues it is possible to either a) 
concentrate out the short-run parameters (assuming they are stable) using their 
full sample estimates or b) to estimate all parameters recursively. Option a) 
really allows us to focus on the parameters of the long-run part which is what 
we are interested in at the moment. However, given the instability of the late 
90‘s we would be surprised if the short run dynamics had remained stable. As a 
result, we calculated the test statistic using both options, but we chose to use the 
tests based on option a) to carry our decision on the merit or otherwise of 
keeping the shift dummy in the cointegration analysis.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the results of the M1 money demand function without a shift 
dummy and the estimates including the shift dummy are presented in Figure 4.2. 
Figure (A) on both figures show the recursive estimates of all parameters, while 
Figure (B) uses full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters. 
As can be seen when full re-estimation of all parameters is carried out at each 
point in the recursion, the test statistic shows a sharp drop around 1998. 
However, when we concentrate out the short-run dynamics using the full sample 
estimates both models show no sign of instability. Based on the results, we 
focus in the final section on a VECM model where we estimate the 
cointegration excluding the shift dummy. 
 
Figure 4.1 Recursive Tau statistic for the M1 money demand function without shift 
dummy 
            Figure (A): The recursive estimate of all parameters 
            Figure (B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
    
                        (Figure A)     (Figure B) 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Lutkepohl and Kratzig (2004) 
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Figure 4.2  Recursive Tau statistic for the M1 money demand function including shift 
dummy 
            Figure (A): The recursively estimates of all parameters 
            Figure (B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
   
                     (Figure A)     (Figure B) 
Next, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is adopted to capture the 
short-run relationship in money the demand function in Thailand. Table 4.5 
presents the result of the VECM for the M1 money demand in Thailand 
between 1980Q1-2007Q1. As can be seen, the coefficient on the error 
correction term in D(LnRealM1) and D(LnGDP) are 1% significant, meaning 
that M1 money demand and real income have adjusted to the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. 
 
Taking D(LnRealM1) as dependent variables, the coefficient of ECT (-1) is -
0.19. As error correction terms indicate the speed adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium, it can be said that the disequilibrium of the M1 money demand 
function in Thailand will be corrected approximately 19% within a quarter. The 
coefficient in the second column presents the change of lag variable on the 
current change of the M1 money demand in Thailand. Only the coefficient of 
D(LnRealM1 (-1)) appeared to be insignificant while other variables are 
significant. The coefficient of D(LnRealM1(-2)) is -0.23, indicating  that a 1% 
increase in M1 money demand in the last quarter caused a decrease of around 
0.23% of the current M1 money demand. The coefficient of D(LNGDP (-1)) is 
1, suggesting that if income of the prior quarter increased by 1%, M1 money 
demand in the current quarter is increased by 1%. The coefficient of R equals -
0.01, meaning that a 1% decrease in interest rates in the quarter leads to an 
increase in the current M1 money demand of around 0.01% 
. 
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              Table 4.5 The result of the VECM for the M1 money demand (1980:1– 2007:1) 
Error Correction: D(LnRealM1) D(LnGDP) 
      
CointEq1 -0.191 -0.034 
  [-5.38] [-2.83] 
D(LnRealM1(-1)) -0.122 0.054 
  [-1.463] [ 1.91] 
D(LnRealM1(-2)) -0.232 0.017 
  [-2.84] [ 0.62] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) 1.004 0.222 
  [ 3.38] [ 2.21] 
D(LnGDP(-2)) -0.954 0.071 
  [-3.36] [ 0.74] 
R -0.011 -0.001 
  [-4.72] [-1.83] 
   
 
Taking only the significant variables and eliminating insignificant variables, the 
VECM equations for the M1 money demand in Thailand can be written as: 
 
)72.4()36.3()38.3()84.2()38.5(
01.098.000.11Re23.019.01Re 2121

  RLnGDPLnGDPalMLnECTalMLn tttt
R-squared =   0.39         F-statistic    = 10.71        Akaike AIC = -3.13                       
  AR 1-4 test: F (4-96)    = 1.83 (0.12)    ARCH 1-4 test:  F (5, 95) = 1.73 (0.13) 
Hetero test: F (12, 93)  = 1.88 (0.06)    RESET test F (1, 99)        = 17.36(0.00)  
 
The stability of parameters in the simple M1 money demand function  
 
To test a stability of the money demand function in this section, the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ proposed by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) are employed. 
The test of CUSUM is based on the cumulative sum of recursive residuals, 
while CUSUMSQ is based on the squared recursive residuals. If the plot of 
CUSUM and/or CUSUMSQ stays within given significant levels, it can be said 
that the coefficient estimates are stable. As can be seen in Figure 4.3(A), the 
estimate of CUSUM seems to be stable over the sample periods as the demand 
equation stays within 5% critical. However, the CUSUMSQ in Figure 4.3(B) 
shows that there is an evidence of instability around Thailand‘s financial crisis 
period (1988-2001).  
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      Figure 4.3 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
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The recursive coefficient is presented in Figure 4.4. It is not surprising that the 
results show the estimated coefficient seems to be constant after 1997. 
  
Figure 4.4  Plot of the recursive coefficient 
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 Money overhang and inflation  
 
In this step, we will test whether the estimate of money demand equation is 
helping forecast inflation at different lags. The money overhang in this section 
is: 
 
         )(11 RLnGDPLnrealMOM    
 
where OM1 is money overhang calculated from the M1 long-run money 
demand function. To analyze the relationship between inflation and money 
overhang, we estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead 
(inflation is regressed on one-quarter-ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-
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ahead inflation is regressed on one to four–quarter-ahead and money overhang), 
and eight-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead 
and money overhang).   
 
The results of money overhang and inflation are that: 
        One-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
      
)81.0()24.4()31.0(
1005.044.002.0 11   tt OMINFINF
 
 
R-squared =   0.18        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.81                       
AR test: F (12-92)    = 0.59 (0.89)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 82) = 0.60(0.83) 
Hetero test: F (12, 93)  = 2.40 (0.05)       RESET test F (1, 99)     = 0.34 (0.56)  
  Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)87.0()54.1()80.0()96.0()03.3()33.0(
1005.014.009.011.035.028.0 14321   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
 
R-squared =   0.25         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.81                       
AR test: F (12-86)    = 0.21 (0.99)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 79) = 0.48 (0.91) 
Hetero test: F (10, 93)  = 6.13 (0.00)       RESET test F (1, 97)         = 0.85 
(0.35)  
       Eight-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)79.1()88.0()25.0()24.0()19.0()99.1(
101.011.003.003.003.006.0 58765   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
 
R-squared =   0.06         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.05       DW   = 1.06                       
AR test: F (12-82)    = 1.73 (0.08)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 77) = 0.68 (0.72) 
Hetero test: F (10, 89)  = 0.44 (0.91)       RESET test F (1, 93)         =1.46 (0.22)  
 
Overall, money overhang that is calculated from the M1 money demand 
function in this model might not help in forecasting one and four-quarter-ahead 
forecasts due to the coefficient of money overhang not being significant for the 
one and four-quarter-ahead forecasting. However, it might help in forecasting 
the eight-quarter-ahead inflation. 
  139 
 4.3.2.2 The result of the M1 money demand function (include LnEXC 
and LIBOR) 
 
To estimate the cointegration between the M1 money demand (LnRealM1), real 
income (LnGDP), domestic interest rates (R), the exchange rate (EXC), and 
LIBOR, we start by testing pair-wise cointegration between the set of variables. 
Table 4.6(A) presents the pair-wise with shift dummy (sdum). The results 
suggest that the null hypothesis pair-wise cointegration rejects at 10% 
significant for LnRealM1 and R, and it is 1% significant for the pair-wise 
relationship between LnGDP and R, and between R and LnEXC. It can be said 
that there is a long-run relationship between real income and interest rates, and 
between the exchange rate and interest rates. The result of pair-wise 
cointegration including intercept and trend but excluding the shift dummy 
variable in Table 4.6(B) suggests that the LnRealM1 has a pair-wise 
relationship with LnGDP at 10% significance. In addition, there is a pair-wise 
relationship between LnGDP and R at 5% significant level. The test without the 
shift dummy and trend in Table 4.6(C) shows that there is pair-wise relationship 
between LnGDP and LnEXC at 10% significant level. However, given 5% 
significance, there is no pair-wise cointegrating with all variables included in 
the equations. 
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Table 4.6 The result of pair-wise cointegration of the M1 money demand in Thailand 
4.6(A) Determinants: Trend, intercept, and shift dummy 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and LnGDP 5 ro=0 10.81 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.29 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  5 ro=0 14.77*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.00 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnEXC 1 ro=0 12.06 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 3.97 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LIBOR 5 ro=0 9.12 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.00 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 4 ro=0 23.27* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.63 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 4 ro=0 8.39 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.15 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 4 ro=0 8.96 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.13 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 5 ro=0 23.43* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 2.74 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 4 ro=0 7.39 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 4.74 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 8.10 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.23 5.47 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
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Table 4.6(B) Determinants: Trend, intercept 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and LnGDP 5 ro=0 14.21*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.33 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  5 ro=0 10.35 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.67 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnEXC 1 ro=0 1.74 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 3.62 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LIBOR 5 ro=0 10.65 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.67 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 3 ro=0 15.27** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.43 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 5 ro=0 6.96 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.72 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 4 ro=0 8.48 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.36 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 4 ro=0 13.78 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.79 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 4 ro=0 7.60 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.68 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 6.74 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.89 5.47 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
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Table 4.6(C) Determinants: Intercept 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and LnGDP 4 ro=0 5.84 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 2.34 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  R  1 ro=0 9.56 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 2.23 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  LnEXC 1 ro=0 8.32 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 2.23 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  LIBOR 4 ro=0 10.36 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 1.14 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and R 5 ro=0 9.45 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.84 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LnEXC 5 ro=0 11.60*** 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.94 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LIBOR 5 ro=0 12.11 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 1.80 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LnEXC 1 ro=0 10.37 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.01 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LIBOR 5 ro=0 4.60 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.04 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 4.89 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.04 2.98 4.13 6.93 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
       The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
The results for cointegration among LnRealM1, LnGDP, R, LnEXC, and 
LIBOR are presented in Table 4.7. The results of the model that included 
intercept, trend, and the shift dummy variable indicates that the null hypothesis 
of 10 r  is rejected at 5% significance level, since the test statistic (50.26) is 
greater than 5% critical value (45.32). This indicates that there are two 
cointegrating equations in the long-run between LnRealM1, LnGDP, R, 
LnEXC, and LIBOR. However, the results from the model that included 
intercept and trend suggests that there is a single cointegration vector between 
five variables. This result is similar to the test with only intercept, as the result 
suggests that there is one combination of variables where all variables are 
integrated since the null hypothesis of r=0 is rejected at 1% significant level. 
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Table 4.7 Cointegration of the M1 money demand function when LnEXC and LIBOR are 
included (1980:1–2007:1) 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
 
Overall, it can be said that there exists a single cointegration between the five 
variables in the M1 money demand when the equation excludes the shift 
dummy variable. Next, we will use the normalized cointegration vector by 
setting the coefficient of LnRealM1 as -1 and divide the other variables with -1. 
The equation presents the long run elasticity of each variable on the M1 money 
demand.  
 
Table 4.8 presents the normalized cointegrating vector of the M1 money 
demand function in Thailand when the exchange rate (LnEXC) and LIBOR 
variables are included. The coefficient of LnGDP, R and EXC is significant at 
1% while  the coefficient of LIBOR is not, suggesting that real income, interest 
rates and the exchange rate have an affect on M1 money holding in Thailand in 
the long run while LIBOR has not. Income elasticity is 1.14, suggesting that an 
increase of 1% real income leads to an increase of 1.14% in M1 money demand. 
Interest rate elasticity for M1 money demand is -0.49, suggesting that M1 
Variables  Deterministic  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      of lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1, LnGDP,  Trend,  1 ro=0 88.21* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnEXC, R, LIBOR intercept,   ro=1 50.26** 42.25 45.32 51.45 
 and shift   ro=2 18.79 26.07 28.52 33.50 
  dummy   ro=3 3.64 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    ro=4 0.69 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1, LnGDP,  Trend and  3 ro=0 88.72* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnEXC, R, LIBOR intercept  ro=1 29.89 42.25 45.32 51.45 
    ro=2 13.13 26.07 28.52 33.50 
    ro=3 5.21 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    ro=4 0.36 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1, LnGDP,  Intercept  3 ro=0 96.37* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnEXC, R, LIBOR    ro=1 37.03 42.25 45.32 51.45 
     ro=2 13.86 26.07 28.52 33.50 
     ro=3 5.17 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=4 0.80 5.48 6.79 9.73 
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money holding will drop by 0.49% if domestic interest rates (R) increase by 
1%. In case of the exchange rate elasticity, there is a negative coefficient of the 
exchange rate on M1 money holding. This implies there is a currency 
substitution in Thailand when the exchange rate is expected to depreciate. The 
expected return from foreign assets increases and this causes more demand on 
foreign currency and less demand on domestic currency, and so money demand 
declines.  
 
Table 4.8 The normalizing of the M1 money demand function in Thailand when LnEXC 
and LIBOR are included (1980:1–2007:1) 
LnRealM1  LnGDP  R LnEXC LIBOR C 
-1 1.14 -0.49 6.97 0.02 -22.91 
  [-2.69] [8.40] [7.62] [-0.49] [ -5.80] 
Note :  The number in parentheses shows the t-statistics.  
 
The results of weak exogeneity of variables in the cointegration in Table 4.9 
shows that only LnEXC is insignificant, indicating that the exchange rate 
(LnEXC) is a long-run weak exogeneity with respect to the cointegration vector. 
However, other variables are exogenous variables since they rejected the null 
hypothesis at 1% significant level. The vector error correction in the next step 
will be tested by using LnEXC as an exogenous variable while the others are 
endogenous. 
 
Table 4.9 Weak exogenous test 
Variable Restricted LR Degrees of  
 Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
 
LnRealM1 322.76 7.83 1.00 0.01 
 
LnGDP 395.27 13.71 1.00 0.00 
 
R 396 12 1 0.00 
 
LnEXC 332.72 0.19 1.00 0.66 
 
LIBOR 331.4 3.1 1.0 0.01 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the results of the M1 money demand function without a shift 
dummy and the estimates including the shift dummy are presented in Figure 4.6. 
Figure (A) on both figures shows the recursive estimate of all parameters, while 
Figure (B) uses full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters. 
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As can be seen, when the full sample of all parameters is carried out at each 
point in the recursion, the test statistic shows there is a sharp drop around 1998. 
However, the results show that there is no sign of instability when we 
concentrate out the short-run dynamics using the full sample estimates.  
 
Figure 4.5 Recursive Tau statistics for the M1 money demand function without a 
shift dummy 
            Figure(A ): The  recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure (B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters        
                                                    
 
              Figure (A)     (Figure(B) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Recursive Tau statistics for M1 money demand function including a 
shift dummy 
Figure(A ): The  recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
   
Figure (A)                                Figure(B) 
 
The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of M1 money demand is presented 
in Table 4.10. The coefficient on the error correction term in D(LmRealM1), 
D(LnGDP), D(R) and D(LIBOR) appear to be 1% significant. It can be 
concluded that all variables have adjusted to the long-run equilibrium 
relationship. 
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Taking D(LnRealM1) as dependent variables, the coefficient of ECT (-1) is 
0.03, meaning that disequilibrium of the M1 money demand function in 
Thailand will be corrected by about 3% within a quarter. The coefficient of 
D(LnNRealM1(-1)) and D(LnRealM1(-2)) are significant at 1% and 5%. This 
implies that changes in M1 money demand in the past led to a change in current 
M1 money demand. The coefficient of D(LNGDP (-1)) is 0.9 (1% significant), 
suggesting that if income of the prior quarter increased by 1%, M1 money 
demand in the current quarter is increased by 0.92%. The coefficient of D(R(-
2)) is -0.02, implying that M1 money demand will increase by 0.02% if the 
interest rate in last two quarters drops by 1%. 
 
Table 4.10   The result of VECM for M1 money demand  
Error Correction: D(LnRealM1) D(LnGDP) D(R) D(LIBOR) 
         
CointEq1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.51 -0.50 
  [-2.72371] [-4.77070] [-3.52451] [-2.74967] 
D(LnRealM1(-1)) -0.18 0.04 0.36 0.76 
  [-1.92647] [ 1.28755] [ 0.24775] [ 0.42268] 
D(LnRealM1(-2)) -0.24 0.00 -0.86 1.92 
  [-2.67236] [ 0.16210] [-0.61206] [ 1.09388] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) 0.92 0.05 -4.29 -7.01 
  [ 2.73999] [ 0.46423] [-0.83287] [-1.08296] 
D(LnGDP(-2)) -1.16 -0.10 -7.92 -11.93 
  [-3.52108] [-1.01972] [-1.57804] [-1.89340] 
D(R(-1)) 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.13 
  [ 0.65415] [ 1.69870] [ 2.17317] [ 0.96502] 
D(R(-2)) -0.02 0.00 0.25 0.15 
  [-2.78153] [-2.05662] [ 2.42068] [ 1.16687] 
D(LIBOR(-1)) 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 
  [-0.48184] [-0.00983] [ 0.58944] [ 0.92700] 
D(LIBOR(-2)) 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.28 
  [-0.96548] [-0.56603] [-0.40100] [-2.79246] 
LnEXC -0.10 -0.05 -2.11 -2.06 
  [-2.61794] [-4.57786] [-3.57739] [-2.77605] 
 
 
Taking only the significant variables and eliminating insignificant variables, the 
VECM equations for the M1 demand in Thailand in this can be written as:     
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   R-squared =   0.39         F-statistic    = 6.88        Akaike AIC = -3.07                       
  AR 1-4 test: F (12,80)    = 1.26 (0.25)      ARCH 1-4 test:  F (12, 83) = 1.27 
(0.24) 
  Hetero test: F (20, 84)  = 1.88 (0.06)        RESET test F (1, 99)         = 4.86 
(0.00)  
The stability of parameters in the simple M1 money demand function  
 
To test the stability of the money demand function in this section, the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ are employed. If the plot of CUSUM and/or CUSUMSQ stay 
within a given significant level, it can be said that the coefficient estimates are 
stable. As can be seen in Figure 4.7(A), the estimate of CUSUM appeared to be 
stable over the sample periods as the demand equation stayed within 5% 
critical. However, the CUSUMSQ in Figure 4.7(B) shows that there is an 
evidence of instability during 1999-2001. 
 
  Figure 4.7 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
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The recursive coefficient is presented in Figure 4.8. It is not surprising that the 
results show the estimated coefficient seems to be constant after 1999. 
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Figure 4.8 Plot of recursive coefficient 
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Money overhang and inflation 
 
In the next step, we will test whether the estimate of the money demand 
equation is helping forecast inflation at differing lags. As the variable LnEXC 
and LIBOR are added in this section, the money overhang in this model is:  
 
)(11 LIBORLnEXcRLnGDPLnrealMEXOM    
 
To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we 
estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed 
on one-quarter ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-ahead (inflation is 
regressed on one to four-quarter- ahead and money overhang), and eight-
quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead and money 
overhang).  The results of money overhang and inflation are the following 
equations. 
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One-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
      
)75.2()84.3()06.5(
10007.039.0007.0 11   tt EXOMINFINF
 
 R-squared =   0.23        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.81                       
AR test: F (12-92)    = 0.37 (0.97)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 82) = 0.50 (0.90) 
Hetero test: F (5, 101)  = 2.34 (0.05)       RESET test F (1, 103)         = 0.78 
(0.37)  
 
       Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)79.0()36.1()56.0()93.0()98.2()48.2(
1005.015.006.011.033.004.0 14321   ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.27         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.81                       
AR test: F (12-86)    = 0.16 (0.99)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 79)   = 0.49 (0.91) 
Hetero test: F (20, 83)  = 4.59 (0.00)       RESET test F (1, 97)         = 2.70 
(0.10)  
 
       Eight-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)93.2()86.0()80.0()22.0()56.0()16.5(
1007.009.009.002.006.0008.0 58765   ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.11         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.04       DW   = 1.33                      
AR test: F (12-82)    = 1.27 (0.24)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 75) = 0.76 (0.68) 
Hetero test: F (10, 89) = 0.44 (0.91)       RESET test F (1, 94)         =1.15 (0.28)  
 
Overall, money overhang that is calculated from the M1 money demand 
function that includes the variable exchange rate and LIBOR can help in 
forecasting the inflation rate in Thailand since the coefficient of money 
overhang appeared to be a positive sign as expected and it appeared to be 
significant. In addition, there is no evidence of serial correlation for those three 
forecasting equations. 
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 4.3.2.3 The result of the M2 Money demand function: simple model testing  
 
This section presents the empirical result of the stable long-run and short-run 
relationship of the M2 money demand function in Thailand using the longer 
data set from 1980Q1-2007Q1. The estimation is started by pair-wise 
cointegration. The result of pair-wise cointegration in Table 4.11 indicates that 
there is no pair-wise cointegration between LnRealM2, LnGDP and R for the 
test allowing time trend in the series, both including and excluding the shift 
dummy variable. However, there is an evidence of pair-wise cointegration 
between M2 money demand and real income for the test excluding trend and the 
shift dummy variable as suggested by the test statistic of pair-wise cointegration 
greater than 5% critical value. 
 
Table 4.11 The pair-wise cointegration results for the M1 money demand function 
Variables: LnRealM2, LnGDP, R 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
 
Variables  Determinants  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      
of 
lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and  LnGDP Trend, intercept, 2 ro=0 2.75 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    and shift dummy  ro=1 0.29 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  R  Trend, intercept, 3 ro=0 8.46 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   and shift dummy  ro=1 1.08 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  Trend, intercept, 3 ro=0 13.19 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   and shift dummy  ro=1 0.57 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  LnGDP Trend, intercept 5 ro=0 5.57 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=1 0.49 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  R  Trend, intercept 5 ro=0 9.95 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=1 1.50 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  Trend, intercept 5 ro=0 11.39 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=1 0.58 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  LnGDP Intercept  2 ro=0 14.63** 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 0.39 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and  R  Intercept  5 ro=0 6.76 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 0.22 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and  R  Intercept  5 ro=0 9.45 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 2.84 2.98 4.13 6.93 
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The result of multivariate cointegration for the M2 money demand function in 
Thailand is presented in Table 4.12 The results suggest that in the case where 
the shift dummy and time trend are included, the null hypothesis of  r0 = 0 is 
rejected at 1% significant level. This suggests that there is a single cointegrating 
vector between LnRealM1, LnGDP, and R. Similarly, the test with intercept but 
no trend and shift dummy also suggests that there is a single cointegrating 
vector in the M2 money demand function since it rejected the null hypothesis of 
r0 = 0 at 1% significance. The cointegration result of the model with intercept 
and trend indicates that there is at least one combination where all variables are 
cointegrated in the M2 money demand function in Thailand since the null 
hypothesis of r0 =0 is rejected at 1% significant level. Overall, there exists a 
stable long-run relationship among M2 money demand, domestic income (GDP) 
and domestic interest rates (R) in the Thai economy.  
 
Table 4.12 The cointegration results for M2 money demand (1980:1-2007:1) 
LnRealM2, LnGDP, R 
Variables  Determinants  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      
of 
lags  r=r0 statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2,LnGDP and R  Trend, intercept, 4 ro=0 36.46* 26.07 28.5 33.5 
   and shift dummy  ro=1 6.23 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=2 0.04 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2,LnGDP and R  Trend and intercept 4 ro=0 60.79* 26.07 28.5 33.5 
      ro=1 13.46 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=2 1.51 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2,LnGDP and R  Intercept  3 ro=0 29.32* 21.76 24.2 29.1 
     ro=1 6.57 10.47 12.26 16.1 
     ro=2 2.13 2.98 4.13 6.93 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
 
Since the results of cointegration above strongly suggest that there is a single 
cointegration vector among M2 money demand, real income (GDP) and interest 
rates (R) when the test included trend, both with and without the shift dummy 
variable, then it may not be necessary to include a shift dummy in the 
normalized cointegration analysis in the next step. Table 4.13 presents the 
normalized cointegrating vector of the M2 money demand function in Thailand 
by using the data from 1980Q1-2007Q1. As can be seen, the coefficients of 
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both LnGDP and R are strongly significant at a 1% level, suggesting that real 
income and interest rates affect the M2 money holding in Thailand in the long 
run. The income elasticity of M2 money demand is 3.26, meaning that a 1% 
increase in real GDP in Thailand leads to a 3.26% increase in the M2 money 
demand in Thailand. The domestic interest rate (R) elasticity is -0.12, indicate 
that in the long run if domestic interest rates increase by 1%, the M1 money 
demand will drop by around 0.12%. 
 
Table 4.13 The Normalized cointegration for M2 money demand function (1980:1-2007:1) 
LnrealM2 LnGDP  R Trend  C 
-1 3.265 -0.127 0.039 14.011 
  [-11.20] [ 7.06] [ 6.761]   
Note: The number in parentheses show the t-statistic. 
 
Table 4.14 shows the result of weak exogeneity of variables in the 
cointegration. The results show that LnRealM2 and R are 1% significant and 
LnGDP is 5% significant. It can be said that LnRealM2, R and GDP are not a 
long-run weak exogeneity with respect to the cointegration vector.  Therefore, 
we can continue the VECM in the next step by using LnRealM2, LnGDP and R 
as endogenous. 
 
Table 4.14 Test for Cointegration Restriction for weak exogeneity (1980:1-2007:1) 
Variable  Restricted LR Degrees of   
No. of CE(s) Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
 
LnRealM2 398.3074 7.55231 1 0.01 
 
LnGDP 399.61 4.96 1.00 0.03 
 
R 392.93 18.31 1.00 0.00 
NA indicates restriction not binding. 
CE represents the cointegration equation. 
 
 
Next, we will test the stability of the M2 money demand function in Thailand 
by using a formal test for parameter stability in the context of recursive 
estimation of the eigenvalue associated with the test for cointegration. Figure 
4.9 shows the results of the M2 money demand function without a shift dummy 
and the estimates including the shift dummy are presented in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure(A) shows the recursive estimates of all parameters, while Figure(B) uses 
full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters. As can be seen 
when full re-estimation of all parameters is carried out at each point in the 
recursion, the test statistic shows a sharp drop around 1998. However, when we 
concentrate out the short-run dynamics using the full sample estimates, both 
models show no sign of instability. Based on the results, we focus in the final 
section on a VECM model where we estimate the cointegration excluding the 
shift dummy; it appears to contribute neither to the cointegration result nor to 
the stability. 
 
Figure 4.9  Recursive Tau statistics for the M2 money demand function without a 
shift dummy 
            Figure(A): The recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
  
Figure(A)    Figure(B) 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Recursive Tau statistics for M2 money demand function including a 
shift dummy 
            Figure(A): The recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
 
Figure(A)    Figure(B) 
 
To achieve the result of a short-run stable relationship in the M2 money demand 
function, the Vector Error Correction Model will be used in the next step. As 
can be seen in Table 4.15, the coefficient on the error correction term in 
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D(LnRealM2) and D(R) are 1% significant while 5% significant for D(LnGDP). 
It can be concluded that M2 money demand, real income, and interest rates have 
adjusted to the long-run equilibrium relationship rather than interest rates. 
Considering D(LnRealM2) as a dependent variable, the results found that the 
error correction term is 1% significant, suggested by the t-statistic being -3.60, 
greater than 1% critical value for the t-statistic (2.57).  The coefficient of ECT (-
1) for M2 money demand is -0.07, meaning that the disequilibrium of the M2 
money demand function in Thailand will be corrected approximately 7% within 
a quarter. It interesting that changes of lag for LnRealM2 are insignificant for 
every lag included, suggesting that the changes of lag for LnRealM2 have no 
affect on current M2 money holding in the short run. However, the coefficient 
of D(LnGDP (-3)) is 5% significant with the positive coefficient. The variable 
(( (R (-3)) is significant at a 5% level. This means that real income and 
domestic interest rates in the past have an affect on current M2 money demand. 
 
Table 4. 15 The result of the VECM for M1 money demand  
Error Correction: D(LnRealM2) D(LnGDP) D(R) 
        
CointEq1 -0.07 -0.02 -2.22 
  [-3.60] [-2.25] [-5.60] 
D(LnRealM2(-1)) -0.15 0.05 -1.36 
  [-1.50] [ 1.15] [-0.67] 
D(LnRealM2(-2)) -0.06 0.03 -0.30 
  [-0.56] [ 0.56] [-0.14] 
D(LnRealM2(-3)) -0.02 -0.03 -2.48 
  [-0.24] [-0.67] [-1.23] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) -0.28 0.19 -9.39 
  [-1.11] [ 1.69] [-1.89] 
D(LnGDP(-2)) -0.24 -0.04 -13.30 
  [-0.98] [-0.37] [-2.70] 
D(LnGDP(-3)) 0.50 -0.06 -6.05 
  [-2.06] [-0.50] [-1.26] 
D(R(-1)) 0.00 0.00 0.18 
  [-0.34] [ 0.34] [ 2.05] 
D(R(-2)) 0.00 -0.01 0.26 
  [ 0.13] [-3.22] [ 2.94] 
D(R(-3)) -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
  [ 1.98] [ 2.34] [-0.07] 
C 0.04 0.01 0.44 
  [ 5.41] [ 3.28] [ 2.87] 
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Taking only the significant variables and eliminating insignificant variables, the 
VECM equations for M2 demand in Thailand can be written as: 
  )98.1()06.2()60.3(
01.050.007.01Re 331

  ttt RLnGDPECTalMLn
 
    R-squared =   0.16         F-statistic    = 1.80        Akaike AIC = -3.78                      
  AR 1-4 test: F (24,70)    = 1.24 (0.23)      ARCH 1-20 test:  F (20, 64) = 
0.80(0.69) 
  Hetero test: F (20, 84)  = 1.89 (0.06)        RESET test F (1, 93)         = 18.18 
(0.00) 
 
 
The stability of parameters in the simple M2 money demand function  
 
This section presents the results of the stability of parameters for the M2 money 
demand function in Thailand by using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ approach. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.11, the estimate of CUSUM seems to be stable over 
the sample periods as the demand equation stays within 5% critical. However, 
the CUSUMSQ shows that there is an evidence of instability around 1984-1998. 
The recursive residual also shows that the function is unstable around 1985.  
 
Figure 4.11 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
CUSUM 5% Significance
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
CUSUM of Squares
5% Significance  
           (a) Plot of CUSUM                                 (B) Plot of CUSUMSQ 
 
Although CUSUMSQ and the recursive in the last section show the evidence of 
instability, in the recursive coefficient presented in Figure 4.12 the estimated 
coefficient seems to be stable after the financial crisis in 1998. 
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Figure 4.12 Plot of the recursive coefficient 
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Money overhang and inflation 
 
In this section, we will examine whether the estimate of the M2 money demand 
equation in the previous section is helping forecast inflation at different lags. 
The equation of money overhang is:  
)(22 RLnGDPLnrealMOM    
To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we 
estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed 
on one-quarter-ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-ahead (inflation is 
regressed on one to four–quarter-ahead and money overhang), and eight-
quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead and money 
overhang). The results of money overhang and inflation are the following 
equations. 
 
One-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
                   
)01.2()49.4()24.2(
2001.044.0053.0 11   tt OMINFINF
 
 R-squared =   0.20        Prob (F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.85                       
AR test: F (12,92)    = 0.48 (0.91)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 82) = 0.52 (0.87) 
Hetero test: F (4, 102)  = 3.17 (0.03)       RESET test F (1, 103)   = 0.91 (0.34)  
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Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)79.0()65.1()68.0()99.0()10.3()04.2(
2001.018.008.011.034.005.0 14321   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
 
R-squared =   0.25        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.82                       
AR test: F (12-86)    = 0.19 (0.99)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 79)   = 0.57 (0.85) 
Hetero test: F (10, 93)  = 5.26 (0.00)       RESET test F (1, 97)         = 3.17 
(0.08)  
 
       Eight-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)54.3()30.1()33.0()47.0()48.0()79.3(
2003.016.004.006.006.010.0 58765   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
 
R-squared =   0.14         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.16                       
AR test: F (12-82)    = 0.57 (0.11)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 75) = 1.12 (0.33) 
Hetero test: F (10, 89) = 1.60 (0.11)       RESET test F (1, 93)         =2.00 (0.16)  
As can be seen in the equations above, the coefficient money overhang (OM2) 
is significant at 5% for the one-quarter-ahead model and it is 1% significant for 
the four-quarter-ahead and the eight-quarter-ahead models. In addition, the 
coefficient of MO2 for those three equations is a positive sign as expected, 
indicating that an increase in money overhang in the last quarter leads to an 
increase in the current inflation rate.  
4.3.2.4  The result of the M2 money demand function (include LnEXC 
and LIBOR) 
This section presents the results of the stable long-run relationship of the money 
demand function by using the money demand model that included the exchange 
rate (LnEXC) and LIBOR variables. The pair-wise cointegration tests for M2 
money demand and each variable are presented in Table 4.16. Table(A) presents 
the pair-wise with shift dummy (sdum), constant, and trend. Table(B) reports 
the pair-wise without shift dummy (sdum) and the results allow for time trends 
in the series and constant, and Table(C) shows the pair-wise cointegration result 
with intercept only. The results of pair-wise cointegration including the shift 
dummy (sdum) suggest that the null hypothesis pair-wise cointegration is 
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rejected at 1% significant for LnGDP and R, LnGDP and LIBOR, and R and 
LnEXC. The results of pair-wise cointegration when intercept and trend are 
included but excluding the shift dummy variable in Table 4.16(B) suggests that 
there is only a pair-wise relationship between domestic and international interest 
rates (R and LIBOR ) since the test statistic is 5% significant. The test without 
the shift dummy and trend in Table 4.16(C) shows that there is a pair-wise 
cointegration between LnRealM2 andLnEXC, LnGDP and LIBOR, and R and 
LIBOR at 1% significance. 
 
Table 4. 16The result of pair-wise cointegration of the M2 money demand in Thailand  
4.16(A) Determinants: Trend, intercept, and shift dummy 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and LnGDP 4 ro=0 3.79 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.46 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and R  4 ro=0 8.46 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.08 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LnEXC 4 ro=0 7.03 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.64 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LIBOR 4 ro=0 10.46 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.16 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 4 ro=0 23.27* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.63 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 4 ro=0 8.39 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.15 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 4 ro=0 23.27* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.63 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 4 ro=0 28.43* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.32 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 4 ro=0 7.39 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 4.74 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 8.53 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.23 5.47 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
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4.16(B) Determinants: Trend, intercept 
 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and LnGDP 5 ro=0 5.57 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.49 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and R  5 ro=0 9.95 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.50 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LnEXC 1 ro=0 8.05 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.22 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LIBOR 4 ro=0 11.10 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.02 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 5 ro=0 11.39 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 5.58 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 5 ro=0 6.96 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.72 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 4 ro=0 8.48 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.36 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 4 ro=0 13.78 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.79 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 1 ro=0 17.25** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.89 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 6.74 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.89 5.47 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
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Table 4.16(C) Determinants: Intercept 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and LnGDP 2 ro=0 14.63** 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.39 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and R  5 ro=0 6.76 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.22 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and LnEXC 1 ro=0 20.57* 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.65 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and LIBOR 5 ro=0 15.71** 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 1.67 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and R 5 ro=0 9.45 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.84 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LnEXC 5 ro=0 11.60*** 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.94 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LIBOR 4 ro=0 19.37* 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.23 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LnEXC 4 ro=0 19.37* 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.23 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LIBOR 3 ro=0 29.53* 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 4.36 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 4.89 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.04 2.98 4.13 6.93 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
 
The results for cointegration among LnRealM2, LnGDP, R, LnEXC, and 
LIBOR are presented in Table 4.17. The results of the model that included 
intercept, trend, and the shift dummy variable indicate that the null hypothesis 
of 10 r  is rejected at 10% significant level, since the test statistic is greater 
than a 10% critical value. This indicates that there are two cointegrating 
equations in the long run between five variables. However, the results of the 
model that included intercept and trend suggest that there is a single 
cointegration vector between five variables as the null hypothesis of 00 r is 
rejected at 1% significant. The test with only intercept also shows that there are 
two cointegrating vectors in the model. 
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Table 4.17 Cointegration of the M1 money demand function 
Variables  Deterministic  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      
of 
lags  r=r0 statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2, LnGDP,  Trend,  1 ro=0 90.51* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR  intercept,   ro=1 42.67*** 42.25 45.32 51.45 
 and shift   ro=2 16.09 26.07 28.52 33.50 
  dummy   ro=3 4.41 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    ro=4 0.61 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2, LnGDP  Trend and   ro=0 90.67* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR  intercept 5 ro=1 37.54 42.25 45.32 51.45 
    ro=2 26.34 26.07 28.52 33.50 
 
   ro=3 5.44 13.88 15.76 19.71 
 
   ro=4 0.06 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2, LnGDP  Intercept  5 ro=0 102.71* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR     ro=1 47.08** 42.25 45.32 51.45 
     ro=2 24.67 26.07 28.52 33.50 
     ro=3 9.96 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=4 3.39 5.48 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
Table 4.18 presents the normalized cointegrating vector of the M2 money 
demand function in Thailand when the exchange rate (LnExc) and LIBOR 
variables are included. It should be noted that the coefficient of all variables is 
significant at 1%, suggesting that real income, interest rates, exchange rates, and 
LIBOR have an affect on M2 money holding in Thailand. Income elasticity is 
2.27%, suggesting that an increase ofs 1% in real income led to an increase of 
2.27% in M2 money demand. Interest rate elasticity for M2 money demand 
appeared as -0.06, suggesting that M2 money holding will drop by 0.06% if 
domestic interest rates (R) increase by 1%. In the case of exchange rate 
elasticity, there are negative coefficients of the exchange rate in M2 money 
holdings. This implied that there is a currency substitution in Thailand when the 
exchange rate is expected to depreciate. The expected return from foreign assets 
will increase and it causes more demand on foreign currency and less demand 
on domestic currency; then domestic money demand may decline. LIBOR has a 
negative relationship with M2 money holding in Thailand, meaning that a 
decrease in LIBOR leads to an increase in M2 money holding in Thailand. 
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Table 4.18 The normalized M1 money demand function in Thailand when LnEXC 
and LIBOR are included  
LnRealM2 LnGDP  R LnEXC LIBOR Trend C 
-1 2.27 -0.06 -2.23 -0.02 0.02 17.92 
  [-13.07] [-6.48] [-11.49] [ 3.38] [ 5.62]   
Note: The numbers in parentheses show the t-statistics.   
 
 
The results of weak exogeneity of variables in the cointegration in Table 4.19 
show that only LnRealM2 and LnGDP are significant at 5%. This indicates that 
M2 money holding (LnRealM2) and real income (LnGDP) is not a long-run 
weak exogeneity with respect to the cointegration vector. However, other 
variables are weakly exogenous variables since they do not reject the null 
hypothesis at any significant level. The vector error correction in the next step 
will be tested by using LnRealM2 and LnGDP as an endogenous variable while 
others are exogenous. 
 
Table 4.19 Weak Exogenous 
Variable  Restricted LR Degrees of   
No. of CE(s) 
Log-
likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
 
LnRealM2 521.7 3.8 1.0 0.05 
 
LnGDP 521.3 4.52 1.00 0.03 
 
R 522.7 1.8 1.0 0.17 
 
LnEXC 519.3 8.6 1.0 0.3 
 
LIBOR 514.25 18.68 1.00 0.15 
 
 
Next, we will adopt a recursive estimation in order to analyze the parameter 
stability of the money demand function. There are two recursive tests in this 
section. The first option is to concentrate out the short-run parameters 
(assuming they are stable) using their full sample estimates and the second 
option is to estimate all parameters recursively. Figure 4.13 shows the results of 
the M2 money demand function without a shift dummy and the estimates 
including the shift dummy are presented in Figure 4.14.  Figure(A) on both 
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figures show the recursive estimates of all parameters, while Figure(B) uses full 
sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters. As can be seen, 
when the full sample of all parameters is carried out at each point in the 
recursion, the test statistic shows there is a sharp drop around 1998. However, 
when we concentrate out the short-run dynamics using the full sample 
estimates, the results show that there is no sign of instability.  
 
Figure 4.13 Recursive Tau statistics for the M2 money demand function without a 
shift dummy 
            Figure(A): The  recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
  
             Figure(A)     Figure(B)                                         
 
Figure 4.14 Recursive Tau statistics for the M1 money demand function including 
a shift dummy 
            Figure(A): The  recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
 
                    Figure(A)                                        Figure(B)                                          
The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of the M2 money demand is 
presented in Table 4.20. The coefficient of the error correction term in 
D(LnRealM1), and D(LnGDP) are 1% significant. It can be concluded that all 
variables have adjusted to the long-run equilibrium relationship rather than 
interest rates. Taking D(LnRealM2) as dependent variables, the coefficient of 
ECT (-1) for M2 money demand is -0.11, suggesting that the disequilibrium of 
the M2 money demand function in Thailand will be corrected approximately 
11% within a quarter.  
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Table 4.20 The result of the Error Correction Model  
Error Correction: D(LnRealM2) D(LnGDP) 
      
CointEq1 -0.115 0.037 
  [-2.50359] [ 1.78567] 
D(LnRealM2(-1)) -0.239 0.045 
  [-2.30261] [ 0.96803] 
D(LnRealM2(-2)) -0.173 0.012 
  [-1.58670] [ 0.24789] 
D(LnRealM2(-3)) -0.113 -0.017 
  [-1.05122] [-0.36112] 
D(LnRealM2(-4)) 0.217 -0.002 
  [ 2.15518] [-0.04585] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) -0.205 0.008 
  [-0.88239] [ 0.07860] 
D(LnGDP(-2)) -0.127 -0.024 
  [-0.54339] [-0.22774] 
D(LnGDP(-3)) -0.495 -0.203 
  [-2.22744] [-2.02509] 
D(LnGDP(-4)) -0.022 0.032 
  [-0.10923] [ 0.35844] 
C 0.095 0.405 
  [ 0.64020] [ 6.07495] 
R -0.004 -0.004 
  [-1.69572] [-3.45966] 
LIBOR -0.002 0.001 
  [-1.40936] [ 1.42557] 
LnEXC 0.000 -0.106 
  [-0.00300] [-5.47718] 
 
 
Taking only the significant variables and eliminating insignificant variables, the 
VECM equations for the M2 money demand in Thailand can be written as:       
)69.1(
004.0
)22.2()15.2()30.2()50.2(
49.02Re24.02Re23.001.02Re 3411



 
R
LnGDPalMLnalMLnECTalMLn tttt
  R-squared =   0.31         F-statistic    = 3.53        Akaike AIC = -3.98                              
AR 1-4 test: F (12,79)    = 1.48 (0.14)   ARCH 1-20 test:  F (4, 95) = 0.98(0.42) 
  Hetero test: F (24, 79)  = 0.75 (0.78)   RESET test F (1, 90)          = 16.83 (0.00) 
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The stability of parameters in the M2 money demand function  
To test the stability of money demand function in this section, the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ proposed by Brown et al. (1975) is employed. If the plot of 
CUSUM and/or/and CUSUMSQ stays within a given significant level, it can be 
said that the coefficient estimates are stable. As can be seen, the estimates of 
CUSUM are stable over the sample periods as the demand equation stays within 
5% critical. However, the CUSUMSQ shows that there is evidence of instability 
during 1992-1997.  
 
Figure 4.15 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
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The recursive coefficient is presented in Figure 4.16. It is not surprising that the 
results show the estimated coefficient seems to be constant after 1998. 
 
Figure 4.16 Plot of recursive coefficient 
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Money overhang and inflation 
 
In this step, we will test whether the estimate of money demand equation is 
helping forecast inflation at differing lags. The money overhang in this model 
is:  
)(22 LIBORLnEXcRLnGDPLnrealMEXOM  
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To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we 
estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed 
on one-quarter-ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-ahead (inflation is 
regressed on one to four-quarter-ahead and money overhang), and eight-quarter-
ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead and money 
overhang). The results of money overhang and inflation are the following 
equations. 
 
One -quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
                   
)26.2()44.4()88.1(
2004.044.002.0 11

  tt EXOMINFINF
 
 R-squared =   0.21        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.86                       
AR test: F (12,92)    = 0.58 (0.85)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 82) = 0.61 (0.82) 
Hetero test: F (4, 102)  = 2.33 (0.06)       RESET test F (1, 103)   = 0.94 (0.33)  
 
 Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)90.1()73.1()71.0()01.1()12.3()70.1(
2003.019.008.012.035.002.0 14321

  ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.27       Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.83                        
AR test: F (12-86)    = 0.21 (0.99)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 79)   = 0.61 (0.82) 
Hetero test: F (10, 93)  = 5.22 (0.00)       RESET test F (1, 97)         = 2.90 
(0.09)  
 
Eight -quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)56.3()46.1()40.0()53.0()53.0()13.3(
2007.019.005.007.007.005.0 58765

  ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.14         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.17                       
AR test: F (12-82)    = 1.56 (0.09)           ARCH  test:  F (12, 75) = 1.09 (0.36) 
Hetero test: F (10, 89) = 1.72 (0.09)       RESET test F (1, 93)         =5.89 (0.02) 
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4.3.3  The result of money demand function in Thailand (1993Q1 - 2007Q1) 
 
4.3.3.1 The result of the M1 Money demand function: simple model testing  
 
Table 4.21 shows a pair-wise cointegration for the M1 money demand function. 
There are three determinants of the tests: the test with intercept, shift dummy, 
and time trend in the series; the test including intercept and trend; and the test 
with only intercept. The test including the shift dummy and time trend indicates 
that there is an evidence of pair-wise cointegration between M1 money demand 
and domestic interest rates (LnRealM1 and R), suggested by the test statistic 
being 1% significant. The test with intercept and trend shows that M1 money 
holding and interest rates (LnRealM1 and R) have a pair-wise relationship at 
1% significance. However, the test with only intercept suggests that a null 
hypothesis of no pair-wise relationship between two variables is not rejected at 
any given significant level. 
 
Table 4.21 The pair-wise cointegration results for the M1 money demand function 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
Variables  Deterministic  No H0 Test   Critical Value  
      of lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and  LnGDP Trend, intercept, 2 ro=0 11.29 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    and shift dummy  ro=1 3.10 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  Trend, intercept, 5 ro=0 24.58* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   and shift dummy  ro=1 0.39 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  Trend, intercept, 4 ro=0 9.64 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   and shift dummy  ro=1 1.39 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnGDP Trend, intercept 2 ro=0 12.56 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=1 3.28 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  Trend, intercept 5 ro=0 23.49* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=1 9.53 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  Trend, intercept 4 ro=0 8.66 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=1 0.41 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnGDP Intercept  2 ro=0 4.66 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 0.00 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  R  Intercept  1 ro=0 10.53 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 0.08 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and  R  Intercept  5 ro=0 7.11 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 2.31 2.98 4.13 6.93 
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Table 4.22 shows the multivariate cointegration of the M1 money demand 
function in Thailand. The estimate of demand function is tested both with and 
without dummy shift variables. The results of the M1 money demand function 
in Thailand suggest that the hypothesis of r0 =1 is rejected at 10% significant 
level when the shift dummy and time trend are included in the equation, as the 
test statistic is 14.98 while 10% critical value is 13.88. However, the null 
hypothesis of r0 =2 is not rejected at any given significant level, suggesting that 
there are two cointegrating vectors between LnRealM1, LnGDP and R in the 
M1 money demand function when the trend and the shift dummy are included. 
The cointegration results of the model without dummy shift but allowing time 
trend in the series indicates that the null hypothesis r=0 is strongly rejected at 
1% significant, as the test statistic (37.13) is greater than 1% critical value 
(33.5). Similarly, the test with intercept but excluding time trend and the shift 
dummy variable is rejected as the null hypothesis of r=0 is at 5% significant 
level (the test statistic is 28.33 while 5% critical value is 24.16). Therefore, it 
may be concluded that there is at least one combination where all variables are 
cointegrated in the M1 money demand function in Thailand when the tests 
exclude the shift dummy variable. 
 
Table 4.22 The cointegration results for M1 money demand  
LnRealM1, LnGDP, R 
Variables  Determinants  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      of lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1, LnGDP and R  Trend,  5 ro=0 35.57* 26.07 28.5 33.5 
   Intercept,and  ro=1 14.98*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   shift dummy   ro=2 3.34 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1, LnGDP and R  Trend and  3 ro=0 37.13* 26.07 28.5 33.5 
   intercept   ro=1 13.25 13.88 15.76 19.71 
      ro=2 0.01 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1, LnGDP and R  Intercept  3 ro=0 28.33** 21.76 24.2 29.1 
     ro=1 9.79 10.47 12.26 16.1 
      ro=2 0.13 2.98 4.13 6.93 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria.  
 
 
  169 
As the results of the cointegration approach above strongly suggest, there is a 
single cointegration vector LnRrealM1, GDP, and R when the test excluded 
trend and the shift dummy. Hence, it may not be necessary to include a shift 
dummy and time trend in the next analysis.  
 
Table 4.23 presents the normalized cointegration vector of the stable M1 money 
demand function. The table suggests that both GDP and R have a long-run 
relationship with the M1 money demand in Thailand, suggested by the t-
statistics being significant at 1%. The income elasticity has a positive 
relationship with M1 money demand in Thailand. The estimation of interest 
elasticity for M1 money demand appeared to be a negative sign. The coefficient 
of R is -0.02, implying that a 1% increase in domestic interest rates caused a 
0.02% decrease in M1 money demand. 
 
Table 4.23 The normalized M1 money demand function in Thailand 
LnR realM1  LnGDP  R C 
-1 1.40* -0.02* 7.61* 
  [-16.13] [7.15]  
Note: The numbers in parentheses show the t-statistics. 
          Note that *  indicates 1% level of significance. 
 
Table 4.24 shows the result of weak exogeneity of variables in the 
cointegration. The results show that LnRealM1 and R are 10% significant, but 
5% significance for LnGDP. It can be said that LnRealM1, GDP and R are not a 
long-run weak exogeneity with respect to the cointegration vector. Therefore, 
we can continue the VECM in the next step by using those three variables as 
endogenous variables. 
  
Table 4.24 Test for Cointegration Restriction for weak exogeneity 
 
Variables Restricted LR Degrees of   
 Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
Restrictions:  
LnRealM1 186.2433 3.083018 1 0.07 
Restrictions:  
LnGDP 162.06 4.86 1.00 0.03 
Restrictions:   
R 183.54 2.98 1.00 0.08 
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Figure 4.17 shows the results of the M1 money demand function without a shift 
dummy and the estimates including the shift dummy are presented in Figure 
4.18 Figure(A) shows the recursive estimates of all parameters, while Figure(B) 
uses full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters. As can be 
seen, when full re-estimation of all parameters is carried out at each point in the 
recursion the test statistics show a sharp drop around 1998. However, when we 
concentrate out the short-run dynamics using the full sample estimates, both 
models show no sign of instability. Based on the results, we focus in the final 
section on a VECM model where we estimate the cointegration excluding the 
shift dummy; it appears to contribute neither to the cointegration result nor to 
the stability. 
 
Figure 4.17 Recursive Tau statistics for the M1 money demand function without a 
shift dummy 
            Figure(A): The recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
 
Figure(A)                  Figure(B) 
 
Figure 4.18 Recursive Tau statistics for the M1 money demand function including 
a shift dummy 
Figure(A): The recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
 
Figure(A)      Figure(B) 
To capture the short-run relationship for the M1 money demand function in the 
simple model in Thailand, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is 
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applied in the next step. Table 4.25 presents the results of the VECM for the M1 
money demand function, using a simple model with the data set from 1993Q1 to 
2007Q1. The results show that the coefficient on the error correction term in 
D(LnRealM1) and D(R) are 5% significant, and 1% significant for D(LnGDP). 
This implies that M1 money demand, real income, and R have adjusted to the 
long-run equilibrium. Taking D(LnRealM1) as dependent variables, the results 
found that the error correction term is 5% significant. As error correction terms 
indicate the speed adjustment to the long-run equilibrium and the coefficient of 
ECT (-1) is -0.32, this means that the disequilibrium of the M1 money demand 
function in Thailand will be corrected approximately 32% within a quarter. The 
coefficient in the second column presents the change of lag variable on current 
change of the M1 money demand in Thailand. There, only the coefficient of 
D(LnGDP(-1)) appeared to be significant at 1% level, while the others‘ 
coefficients are insignificant.  
 
Table 4.25 The results of the VECM for M1 money demand  
Error Correction: D(LnREALealM1) D(LnGDP) D(R) 
        
CointEq1 -0.326 0.167 -6.820 
  [-2.05361] [ 2.61754] [-1.87577] 
D(LnRealM1(-1)) -0.254 -0.030 6.268 
  [-1.51989] [-0.44745] [ 1.63999] 
D(LnRealM1(-2)) -0.135 -0.051 3.670 
  [-1.02666] [-0.95645] [ 1.21643] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) 1.129 0.537 -5.057 
  [ 3.29647] [ 3.90865] [-0.64588] 
D(LnGDP(-2)) -0.465 -0.021 -5.668 
  [-1.37219] [-0.15087] [-0.73085] 
D(R(-1)) -0.004 -0.001 0.349 
  [-0.59276] [-0.47565] [ 2.25944] 
D(R(-2)) -0.010 -0.009 0.288 
  [-1.35017] [-3.15327] [ 1.78254] 
C 0.012 0.004 -0.066 
  [ 1.82293] [ 1.73168] [-0.45475] 
 
Taking only the significant variables and eliminating insignificant variables, the 
VECM equations for the M1 money demand in Thailand can be written as: 
            
)29.3()05.2(
12.132.01Re 1

 tLnGDPECTalMLn
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     R-squared =   0.45         F-statistic    = 5.49        Akaike AIC = -3.48                                   
AR 1-4 test: F (4,42)    = 1.29 (0.28)      ARCH  test:  F (4, 45) = 0.54(0.70) 
  Hetero test: F (14,39)  = 0.75 (0.78)     RESET test F (1, 45)   = 0.89 (0.34) 
 
The stability of parameters in the simple M1 money demand function  
 
This section presents the result of the stability of parameters for the M1 money 
demand function in Thailand by using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ approach. 
If the plot of CUSUM and/or CUSUMSQ stays within a given significant level, 
this means that the coefficient estimates are stable. As can be seen in Figure 
4.19, the estimates of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ seem to be stable over the 
sample periods, as the demand equation stays within 5% critical.   
 
Figure 4.19 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
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The recursive coefficient is presented in Figure 4.20. It is not surprising that the 
results show the estimated coefficient seems to be stable after the financial crisis  
 
Figure 4.20 Plot of recursive coefficient 
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Money overhang and inflation 
 
In this section, we will examine whether the estimate of the M1 money demand 
equation in the previous section is helping forecast inflation at differing lags. 
The equation of money overhang is that:  
 
)(11 RLnGDPLnrealMOM    
 
To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we 
estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed 
on one-quarter-ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-ahead (inflation is 
regressed on one to four-quarter-ahead and money overhang), and eight-quarter-
ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead and money 
overhang). The results of money overhang and inflation are following 
equations. 
 
 One-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
                   
)30.2()08.5()35.2(
101.053.018.0 11   tt OMINFINF
 
  
R-squared =   0.37        Prob (F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.67                   
    AR test: F (4,49)    = 1.05 (0.39)           ARCH  test:  F (4, 47) = 0.63 (0.64) 
Hetero test: F (3,52) =0.86 (0.46)          RESET test F (1,52)   = 0.03 (0.85)  
 
       Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)79.1()68.0()28.0()17.1()87.4()73.1(
201.009.004.020.068.015.0 14321   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
 
R-squared =   0.42        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.99                       
AR test: F (4,43)    = 0.31 (0.86)           ARCH  test:  F (4,44)   = 0.23 (0.91) 
Hetero test: F (9,43)  = 0.53 (0.83)       RESET test F (1,46)      = 0.90 (0.34)  
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 Eight-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)53.3()75.1()38.0()55.0()07.0()60.3(
202.025.007.010.001.034.0 58765   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
 
R-squared =   0.25         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.02       DW   = 1.91                       
AR test: F (12,31)    = 2.02 (0.06)           ARCH  test:  F (4, 40) = 1.98 (0.11) 
Hetero test: F (19, 29) = 1.93 (0.06)       RESET test F (1, 42)         =0.80 (0.37)  
 
Overall, the coefficient of money overhang appeared to be significant for one, 
four, and eight-quarter-ahead. We can say that money overhang estimated from 
the M1 money demand function can help in forecasting the inflation rate in 
Thailand. 
 
4.3.3.2 The result of the M1 Money demand function: simple model 
including LnEXC and LIBOR 
 
The pair-wise cointegration tests for M1 money demand and each variable are 
presented in Table 4.26. Table(A) presents the pair-wise with shift dummy 
(sdum), which include a constant in the cointegrating vector and allowed for 
trends in the series. Table(B) reports the pair-wise without shift dummy (sdum) 
and the results allow for time trends in the series and constant, and Table(C) 
shows the pair-wise cointegration result with intercept only. 
 
The results of pair-wise cointegration when the shift dummy (sdum) is included 
suggest that the null hypothesis pair-wise cointegration is rejected at 1% 
significant for LnRealM1 and R, and 5% significant for LnGDP and R. It can be 
said that there is a long-run relationship between real M1 money holding and 
interest rates, and between real income and interest rates. The results of pair-
wise cointegration when intercept and trend are included, but excluding the shift 
dummy variable, in Table 4.26(B) suggests that the LnRealM1 has a pair-wise 
relationship with R at 1% significant. However, the test without the shift 
dummy and trend in Table 4.26(C) shows that there is no pair-wise 
cointegrating with all variables included in the equations at any given 
significance. 
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Table 4.26 The results of bivariate (pair-wise) cointegration of M1 money demand 
         4.26(A) Determinants: Trend, intercept, and shift dummy 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and LnGDP 2 ro=0 5.46 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.02 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  5 ro=0 24.58* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.39 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnEXC 1 ro=0 6.37 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 2.18 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LIBOR 2 ro=0 9.61 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 2.02 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 3 ro=0 16.42** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 2.28 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 2 ro=0 4.19 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.73 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 2 ro=0 12.49 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.15 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 2 ro=0 8.18 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.14 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 1 ro=0 5.03 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 2.38 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 5.47 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.04 5.47 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  176 
 
Table 4.26(B) Determinants: Trend, intercept 
 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and LnGDP 2 ro=0 13.27 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 3.75 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  R  5 ro=0 27.21* 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.26 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LnEXC 1 ro=0 5.91 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.93 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1 and  LIBOR 1 ro=0 12.20 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 2.43 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 2 ro=0 15.29*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.32 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 2 ro=0 5.65 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.37 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 2 ro=0 13.03 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.07 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 4 ro=0 7.89 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.01 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 1 ro=0 9.61 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.26 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR  ro=0 5.92 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.80 5.47 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
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  Table 4.26(C) Determinants: Intercept 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1 and LnGDP 2 ro=0 6.59 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.43 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  R  1 ro=0 10.33 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.08 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  LnEXC 1 ro=0 4.46 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.07 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM1 and  LIBOR 1 ro=0 4.02 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.07 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and R 5 ro=0 7.11 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.31 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LnEXC 2 ro=0 5.16 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.36 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LIBOR 4 ro=0 5.16 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.36 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LnEXC 2 ro=0 9.20 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.00 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LIBOR 4 ro=0 3.58 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.05 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 2.42 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 1.10 2.98 4.13 6.93 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
The result for cointegration among LnRealM1, LnGDP, R, LnEXC, and LIBOR 
is presented in Table 4.27. The results of the model that included intercept, 
trend, and the shift dummy variable indicate that the null hypothesis of 20 r  is 
rejected at 1% significant level, since the test statistic (36.99) is greater than 1% 
critical value (33.50). This indicates that there are three cointegrating equations 
in the long run between LnRealM1, LnGDP, R, LnEXC, and LIBOR. However, 
the results from the model with intercept and trend suggest that there is a single 
cointegration vector between the five variables, suggested by the test statistic of  
00 r  being rejected at 1% significance. This result is similar to the test with 
only intercept that also suggests that there is one combination of variables 
where all variables are integrated. 
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Table 4.27 Cointegration of the M1 money demand function 
Variables  Deterministic  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      of lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM1, LnGDP  Trend,  5 ro=0 90.98* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR  intercept,   ro=1 66.51* 42.25 45.32 51.45 
 and shift   ro=2 36.99* 26.07 28.52 33.50 
  dummy   ro=3 10.94 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    ro=4 3.39 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1, LnGDP  Trend and  1 ro=0 96.26* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR  intercept  ro=1 38.92 42.25 45.32 51.45 
    ro=2 15.04 26.07 28.52 33.50 
    ro=3 2.91 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    ro=4 1.39 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM1, LnGDP  Intercept  2 ro=0 75.84* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR     ro=1 33.83 42.25 45.32 51.45 
     ro=2 11.33 26.07 28.52 33.50 
     ro=3 4.80 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=4 0.80 5.48 6.79 9.73 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
Overall, it would be reasonable to assume the existence of a single cointegration 
between the five variables in the M1 money demand when the equation is 
excluding the shift dummy variable. Therefore, the next step of the analysis will 
be the normalized cointegration vector by setting the coefficient of LnRealM1 
as -1 and dividing the other variables with -1. The estimation of normalized 
cointegration will be performed without the dummy shift variable and time 
trend. 
 
Table 4.28 presents the normalized cointegrating vector of the M1 money 
demand function in Thailand when the exchange rate variable and LIBOR are 
included. The coefficient of all variables is significant at 1% significant level, 
suggesting that real income, interest rates, the exchange rate, and LIBOR have 
an affect on M1 money holding in Thailand in the long run. The income 
elasticity is 1.42, meaning that 1% increase in real income leads to 1.42% 
increase in M1 money holding in Thailand. The coefficient of R and LIBOR are 
-0.01 and -0.03; both are negative signs. This implies that M1 money holding 
will drop by 0.01% and approximately 0.03% if domestic interest rates (R) and 
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LIBOR increase by 1%. In case of exchange rate elasticity, there are positive 
coefficients on the exchange rate in M1 money holding. This implies that 
depreciation in the Thai baht leads to public expectation of further depreciation, 
and a demand for more foreign currency. Therefore, the demand for domestic 
holding money is decreased.  
 
  Table 4.28 Normalized Cointegration  
LnRealM1  LnGDP  R LnEXC LIBOR C 
-1 1.42 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -7.96 
  [-36.93] [3.17] [-2.85] [ 6.00] [ 29.19] 
Note: The numbers in parentheses show the t-statistics.  
 
 
Table 4.29 shows the result of weak exogeneity of variables in the 
cointegration. The results show that LnEXC, R, and LIBOR are insignificant, 
indicating that LnEXC, R, and LIBOR are weakly exogenous variables. 
However, LnRealM1 and LnGDP are not weakly exogenous since the test 
statistic can be rejected at 1% significant level. Therefore, the short-run 
relationship of the M1 money demand function in the next step can be modelled 
by using LnRealM1 and LnGDP as endogenous variables and the others as 
exogenous variables. 
 
Table 4.28 Weak Exogenous 
Variable Restricted LR Degrees of   
 Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
Restrictions:  
LnRealM1 233.72 7.79 1.00 0.01 
Restrictions:   
LnGDP 233.8 7.7 1.0 0.0 
Restrictions:  
R 237.45 0.35 1.00 0.55 
Restrictions:   
LnEXC 236.24 2.76 1.00 0.10 
Restrictions:   
LIBOR 237.01 1.21 1.00 0.27 
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The results of the Vector Error Correction Model for the M1 money demand 
function in Table 4.30 suggests that the error terms of D(LnRealM1) is 1% 
significant while they are 10% significant for D(LnGDP). This suggests that the 
M1 money holding and real income have adjusted to long-run equilibrium. 
 
Taking D(LnRealM1) as dependent variables, the coefficient of ECT (-1) is -
0.38, meaning that the disequilibrium of the M1 money demand function in 
Thailand will be corrected approximately 38% within a quarter. The coefficient 
of D(LnRealM1(-1)) and  D(LnGDP(-1) is significant at 10% level. The 
coefficient of R is 1% significant level while others‘ coefficients are 
insignificant. This implied that a change in M1 money demand in one quarter 
and the change in GDP in a quarter prior, interest rates have an affect on the 
current M1 money demand in the short run while the exchange rate and LIBOR 
do not. The coefficient of D(LnRealM1(-1)) is -0.21, indicating that a 1% 
increase in M1 money demand in the last quarter caused a decrease of around 
0.21% of the current M1 money demand. The coefficient of D(LnGDP (-1)) 
equals 0.65, suggesting that if income in the prior quarter increased 1%, M1 
money demand in the current quarter is increased by 0.65%. Similarly, the 
coefficient of R equals -0.008, indicating that money demand will increase by 
0.008% if real interest rates rise by 1%. 
 
Table 4.29 The results of the vector error correction for the M1 money demand function  
Error Correction: D(LnRealM1) D(LnGDP) 
   
CointEq1 -0.387 0.080 
 [-3.07534] [ 1.65373] 
D(LnRealM1(-1)) -0.215 0.035 
 [-1.66717] [ 0.71746] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) 0.659 0.146 
 [ 1.83620] [ 1.06560] 
C 0.166 0.205 
 [ 1.05224] [ 3.40126] 
R -0.008 -0.002 
 [-2.26918] [-1.20212] 
LnEXC -0.017 -0.052 
 [-0.42622] [-3.48412] 
LIBOR -0.009 0.000 
 [-1.41082] [-0.05035] 
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The equation for the M1 money demand in Thailand estimated by ECM can be 
written by eliminating insignificant lag from the system. Thus, the equation will 
be: 
 
)26.2()83.1()66.1()07.3(
008.065.01Re21.038.01Re 11

  RLNGDPalMLnECTalMLn tt
 
    
  R-squared =   0.39        F-statistic    = 5.25       Akaike AIC = -3.44                        
AR 1-4 test: F (4,44)    = 1.58 (0.19)      ARCH  test:  F (4, 46) = 0.68(0.60) 
  Hetero test: F (12,42)  = 1.84 (0.07)        RESET test F (1, 45)         = 1.61 
(0.20) 
 
The stability of parameters in the simple M1 money demand function  
 
To test the stability of the money demand function, the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ proposed by Brown et al. (1975) are employed. If the plot of 
CUSUM and/or CUSUMSQ stays within a given significant level, this means 
that the coefficient estimates are stable. As can be seen in Figure 4.21, the 
estimate of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ seems stable over the sample periods as 
the demand equation stays within 5% critical.  
 
Figure 4.21 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
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The recursive coefficient presented in Figure 4.22 shows that the estimated 
coefficients seem to be constant after 1999. 
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Figure 4.22 Recursive coefficient 
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Money overhang and inflation 
 
In the next step, we will test whether the estimate of money demand equation is 
helping forecast inflation at differing lags. As the variable LnEXC and LIBOR 
are added in this section, the money overhang in this model is:  
 
            
)(11 LIBORLnEXcRLnGDPLnrealMEXOM    
 
To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we 
estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed 
on one-quarter-ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-ahead (inflation is 
regressed on one to four–quarter-ahead and money overhang), and eight-
quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead and money 
overhang).  The results of money overhang and inflation are the following 
equations. 
 
One-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
      
)86.2()49.4(
10005.053.0 11   tt EXOMINFINF
 
 R-squared =   0.30        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.58                       
AR test: F (4,50)    = 0.44 (0.77)           ARCH  test:  F (4,47) = 0.18 (0.94) 
Hetero test: F (4,51)  = 0.75 (0.55)       RESET test F (1, 53)         = 1.22(0.27)  
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       Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)33.2()35.0()26.0()24.1()97.4(
1005.004.004.021.071.0 14321   ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.38         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.99                       
AR test: F (4,44)    = 0.08 (0.98)           ARCH  test:  F (4,44) = 0.07 (0.98) 
Hetero test: F (10,42)  = 0.69 (0.72)       RESET test F (1, 47)         = 0.06(0.80)  
      Eight-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)27.3()95.0()34.0()32.0()41.0(
1009.015.007.007.007.0 58765   ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.02         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.04       DW   = 0.73                      
AR test: F (12,32)    = 1.92 (0.06)           ARCH  test:  F (4, 40) = 1.23 (0.31) 
Hetero test: F (10, 38) = 1.91 (0.07)       RESET test F (1, 43)         =0.81 (0.37)  
 
Overall, money overhang can help in forecasting the inflation rate, especially 
for the four-quarter–ahead model. However, it might not help in the eight-
quarter-ahead forecasting model, since there is an evidence of serial correlation 
in the model.  
 
4.3.3.3 The Results of the M2 Money Demand Function: simple model  
 
This section presents the empirical results of the stability of the M2 money 
demand function in Thailand by using the simple model with a data set from 
1993Q1 to 2007Q1. The pair-wise cointegration results for the M2 money 
demand function in Table 4.31 suggest that in the case where the test with 
intercept, trend, and shift dummy are included, the null hypothesis of no pair-
wise cointegration between LnGDP and R is rejected at 5% significant level, 
while other pair-wise are insignificant. Similarly, the test with intercept and 
trend but without the shift dummy shows there is evidence of a pair-wise 
cointegrating between LnGDP and R since the test statistic is significant at 
10%. However, the null hypothesis of no pair-wise relationship between two 
variables when the test includes only intercept is not rejected at any given 
significant level.  
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Table 4.30 The pair-wise cointegration results for the M2 money demand function 
 
 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
Table 4.32 presents the result of the cointegration test for the M2 money 
demand function in Thailand. The results suggest that there is a single 
cointegrating vector among LnRealM2, LnGDP and R suggested by the test 
statistic being 10% significant for the model with trend and the shift dummy 
variable, and it is 1% significant for the model without the shift dummy variable 
since the test statistic is greater than 1% significant. Therefore, it could be said 
that there exists a stable long-run relationship among M2 money demand, 
domestic income (GDP) and domestic interest rates (R) in the Thai economy. 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Deterministic  No. H0: Test   Critical Value  
      
of 
lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and  LnGDP Trend, intercept, 2 ro=0 9.58 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    and shift dummy   ro=1 1.36 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  R  Trend, intercept, 1 ro=0 5.43 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    and shift dummy   ro=1 0.83 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  Trend, intercept, 3 ro=0 16.42** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    and shift dummy   ro=1 2.28 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  LnGDP Trend, intercept 2 ro=0 10.57 13.88 15.76 19.71 
        ro=1 0.96 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  R  Trend, intercept 1 ro=0 4.73 13.88 15.76 19.71 
        ro=1 2.00 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and  R  Trend, intercept 4 ro=0 15.29*** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
       ro=1 0.32 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and  LnGDP Intercept  4 ro=0 6.48 10.47 12.26 16.10 
        ro=1 1.17 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and  R  Intercept  5 ro=0 7.40 10.47 12.26 16.10 
        ro=1 0.23 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and  R  Intercept  5 ro=0 7.11 10.47 12.26 16.10 
      ro=1 2.31 2.98 4.13 6.93 
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Table 4. 31 The cointegration results for M1 money demand  
Variables  Deterministic  No H0 Test   Critical Value  
      
of 
lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2, LnGDP and R  Trend,  1 ro=0 27.24*** 26.07 28.5 33.5 
    intercept, and   ro=1 6.47 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    shift dummy    ro=2 0.01 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2, LnGDP and R  Trend and  4 ro=0 52.42* 26.07 28.5 33.5 
     intercept   ro=1 5.17 13.88 15.76 19.71 
        ro=2 0.64 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2, LnGDP and R  Intercept  4 ro=0 50.42* 21.76 24.2 29.1 
      ro=1 7.93 10.47 12.26 16.1 
      ro=2 2.32 2.98 4.13 6.93 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
        The number of lags is selected by the smallest AIC criteria. 
 
 
Table 4.33 presents the normalized cointegration of the M2 money demand 
function. The table suggests that both GDP and R have a long-run relationship 
with M2 money demands in Thailand, suggested by the t-statistics being 
significant at 1%. The income elasticity is 0.75, meaning that an increase of 1% 
in real income brings up 0.75% in M2 money demand in Thailand. The 
coefficient of R is -0.03, suggesting that a 1% increase in domestic interest rates 
leads to a 0.03% drop in M2 money holding in Thailand. 
 
Table 4.32 Normalized cointegration 
LnRealM2  LnGDP  R C 
-1 0.75* -0.03* -1.10* 
  [-9.71] [9.75] [2.00] 
Note: The numbers in parentheses show the t-statistics. 
         Note that *  indicates 1% level of significance. 
 
Table 4.34 shows the result of a weak exogeneity test. The results show that 
LnRealM2 and LnGDP are 5% significant, while R is significant at 10%. This 
indicates that all variables are not long-run weakly exogenous with respect to 
the cointegration vector.  
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             Table 4.33 Test for Cointegration Restriction for weak exogeneity 
Variable Restricted LR Degrees of   
 Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
Restrictions: 
LnRealM2 184.80 0.47 1.00 0.04 
Restrictions:  
LnGDP 182.96 4.14 1.00 0.04 
Restrictions:  
R 183.54 2.98 1.00 0.08 
 
Figure 4.23 shows the results of the M2 money demand function without a shift 
dummy and the estimates including the shift dummy are in Figure 4.24. 
Figure(A) on both figures show the recursive estimates of all parameters, while 
Figure(B) uses full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters. 
As can be seen when full re-estimation of all parameters is carried out at each 
point in the recursion, the test statistic shows a sharp drop around 1998. 
However, when we concentrate out the short-run dynamics using the full sample 
estimates, both models show no sign of instability.  
 
Figure 4.23 Recursive Tau statistics for M1 money demand function without a shift 
dummy 
Figure(A): The recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
                      Figure(A)       Figure(B) 
 
Figure 4.24 Recursive Tau statistics for M1 money demand function including a shift 
dummy 
Figure(A): The recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short- term parameters 
 
   Figure(A)       Figure(B) 
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The result of the error correction term for the M2 money demand function is 
presented in Table 4.35. The error correction term of LnRealM2 is 5% 
significant and 1% significant for the error correction term of LnGDP and R. It 
can be said that all variables included in this model have adjusted into long-run 
equilibrium. Consider D(LnRealM2) as a dependent variable. The results show 
that the coefficient of error term is -0.80, suggesting that the equilibrium of the 
M2 money demand function will be corrected around 8% in a quarter. The 
coefficient of D(LnRealM2 (1)), D(LnRealM2 (2)), and D(LnRealM2 (3)) are 
1% significant, and D(LnGDP (1)) is 5% significant. These means that M2 
money holding in the past and GDP in the last quarter affect current M2 money 
holding while the interest rate has no relationship with M2 money holding in the 
short run. 
 
Table 4.34 The results of the VECM for M2 money demand.  
Error Correction: D(LRM2) D(LnGDP) D(R) 
        
ECT(-1) -0.080** -0.133* -9.719* 
  [ -2.047] [-3.823] [-4.923] 
D(LnRealM2(-1)) -0.346* 0.301 14.787* 
  [-2.904] [ 0.016] [ 2.434] 
D(LnRealM2(-2)) -0.420* 0.108 10.163 
  [-3.435] [ 0.927] [ 1.573] 
D(LnRealM2(-3)) -0.350* -0.046 10.394 
  [-3.053] [-0.441] [ 1.800] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) 0.334** 0.275 -26.501 
  [ 2.381] [ 1.925] [-3.348] 
D(LnGDP(-2)) -0.193 -0.181 -24.179 
  [-1.385] [-1.276] [-3.074] 
D(LnGDP(-3)) 0.018 -0.431 -8.390 
  [ 0.900] [-2.916] [-1.022] 
D(R(-1)) 0.002 -0.001 0.094 
  [ 0.685] [-0.412] [ 0.786] 
D(R(-2)) -0.001 -0.009 0.071 
  [-0.223] [-3.918] [ 0.568] 
D(R(-3)) 0.003 0.003 -0.192 
  [ 0.382] [ 1.173] [-1.495] 
C 0.012* 0.010 0.060 
  [ 2.874] [ 3.254] [ 0.355] 
Note:  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
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Taking only significant variables, the short-run M2 money demand function is: 
)87.2()38.2(
012.033.0
)05.3()43.3()09.2()04.2(
2Re35.02Re42.02Re34.008.02Re
1
3211


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t
tttt
LnGDP
alMLnalMLnalMLnECTalMLn
 
 R-squared =   0.16        F-statistic    = 2.82       Akaike AIC = -4.94                        
AR 1-4 test: F (4,44)    = 1.58 (0.19)      ARCH  test:  F (4, 46) = 0.68(0.60) 
  Hetero test: F (12,42)  = 1.84 (0.07)        RESET test F (1, 45)         = 1.61 
(0.20) 
 
The stability of parameters in the simple M2 money demand function  
 
This section presents the result of the stability of parameter for the M2 money 
demand function in Thailand by using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ approach. 
If the plot of CUSUM and/or CUSUMSQ stays within a given significant level, 
it can be said that the coefficient estimates are stable. In addition, this section 
also performs the recursive residual and the recursive coefficient to confirm the 
result of the stability of parameters. As can be seen in Figure 4.25, the estimate 
of CUSUM seems to be stable over the sample periods as the demand equation 
stays within 5% critical. However, the CUSUMSQ shows that there is evidence 
of instability around 1997-1998.  
 
   Figure 4.25 Plot of CUSUM and CUCUMSQ 
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The recursive coefficient is presented in Figure 4.26. It is not surprising that the 
results show the estimated coefficient seems to be stable after the financial crisis 
in 1997. 
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Figure 4. 26 Plot of recursive coefficient 
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Money overhang and inflation 
 
In this section, we will examine whether the estimate of the M2 money demand 
equation in the previous section is helping forecast inflation at differing lags. 
The equation of money overhang is:  
 
)(22 RLnGDPLnrealMOM    
To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we 
estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed 
on one-quarter-ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-ahead (inflation is 
regressed on one to four-quarter-ahead and money overhang), and eight-quarter-
ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead and money 
overhang). The results of money overhang and inflation are the following 
equations. 
 
One-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
                   
)05.2()11.5()66.0(
201.054.0001.0 11   tt OMINFINF
 
 R-squared =   0.36        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.65                       
AR test: F (2,51)    = 0.74 (0.47)           ARCH  test:  F (4,47) = 0.60 (0.74) 
Hetero test: F (4, 51)  = 0.49 (0.74)       RESET test F (1, 52)   = 0.00 (0.98)  
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  Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)97.1()78.0()34.0()17.1()96.4()27.0(
202.010.005.020.069.00006.0 14321   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.43        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 2.03                       
AR test: F (2,45)    = 0.09 (0.91)           ARCH  test:  F (4, 44)   = 0.44 (0.77) 
Hetero test: F (10,42)  = 0.42 (0.92)       RESET test F (1, 46)         = 0.01 (0.89)  
             
Eight-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)77.1()53.0()08.0()08.0()53.0()96.1(
201.009.001.002.011.0004.0 58765   ttttt OMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.10         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.42       DW   = 0.80                       
AR test: F (16,27)    = 1.60 (0.13)           ARCH  test:  F (4, 40) = 1.95 (0.12) 
Hetero test: F (10,38) = 1.14 (0.35)       RESET test F (1, 42)         =0.78 (0.38)  
 
As can be seen, money over hang can help in forecasting the inflation rate, 
especially for the one and four-quarter-ahead models, since the F-statistic of 
both models is strongly significant at 1% and the coefficient of OM2 is 
significant. However, it might not help in the eight-quarter-ahead forecasting 
model since the F-statistic is strongly insignificant. 
 
4.3.3.4  The results of the M2 Money demand function: simple model 
testing including LnEXC and LIBOR 1993:1-2007:1 
 
The pair-wise cointegration tests the for M2 money demand and each variable 
are presented in Table 4.36. Table(A) presents the pair-wise cointegration with 
shift dummy (sdum), including a constant in the cointegrating vector and 
allowing for trends in the series. Table(B) reports the pair-wise cointegration 
without shift dummy (sdum) and the results allow for time trends in the series 
and constant, and Table(C) shows the pair-wise cointegration result with 
intercept only. 
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The results of pair-wise cointegration when the shift dummy (sdum) is included 
suggest that there is only a pair-wise relationship between LnGDP and R, as the 
null hypothesis pair-wise cointegration is rejected at 5% significance. It can be 
said that there is a long-run relationship between real income and interest rates. 
The results of pair-wise cointegration when intercept and trend are included, but 
excluding the shift dummy variable, in Table 4.36(B) suggest that the LnGDP 
has a pair-wise relationship with R at 5% significance. However, the test 
without the shift dummy and trend in Table 4.36(C) shows that LnRealM2 has a 
pair-wise relationship with LIBOR at 10% significance. However, given 5% 
significance, there is no pair-wise cointegration with all the variables included 
in the equations. 
 
Table 4.35 The result of bivariate (pair-wise) cointegration of M2 money demand in 
Thailand 
 
4.36(A) Determinants: Trend, intercept, and shift dummy 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and LnGDP 2 ro=0 9.58 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.36 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and R  1 ro=0 5.43 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.83 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LnEXC 1 ro=0 9.88 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.69 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LIBOR 1 ro=0 9.10 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 3.96 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 3 ro=0 16.42** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 2.28 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 2 ro=0 4.19 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.73 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 2 ro=0 12.49 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.15 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 2 ro=0 8.18 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 3.14 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 1 ro=0 5.03 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 2.38 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 5.47 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.04 5.47 6.79 9.73 
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4.36 (B) Determinants: Trend, intercept 
 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and LnGDP 1 ro=0 10.57 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.96 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and R  1 ro=0 4.73 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 2.50 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LnEXC 1 ro=0 9.98 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 1.32 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2 and LIBOR 5 ro=0 11.29 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=1 0.19 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and R 2 ro=0 15.29** 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.32 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LnEXC 2 ro=0 5.65 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.37 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnGDP and LIBOR 2 ro=0 13.03 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.07 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LnEXC 4 ro=0 7.89 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.01 5.47 6.79 9.73 
R and LIBOR 1 ro=0 9.61 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 1.26 5.47 6.79 9.73 
LnEXC LIBOR  ro=0 5.92 13.88 15.76 19.71 
   ro=1 0.80 5.47 6.79 9.73 
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  Table 4.36 (C) Determinants: Intercept 
Variables 
 
No. 
of  lags 
H0: 
r=r0 
Test 
 statistic  
Critical Value 
10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2 and LnGDP 4 ro=0 10.38 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.27 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and R  5 ro=0 7.40 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.23 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and LnEXC 2 ro=0 10.24 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.56 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnRealM2 and LIBOR 5 ro=0 10.51 10.47 12.26 16.10 
     ro=1 0.84 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and R 5 ro=0 7.11 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.31 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LnEXC 2 ro=0 5.16 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.36 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnGDP and LIBOR 4 ro=0 5.16 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 2.36 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LnEXC 2 ro=0 9.20 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.00 2.98 4.13 6.93 
R and LIBOR 4 ro=0 3.58 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 0.05 2.98 4.13 6.93 
LnEXC LIBOR 1 ro=0 2.42 10.47 12.26 16.10 
   ro=1 1.10 2.98 4.13 6.93 
 
Table 4.37 presents the result of cointegration between LnRealM2, LnGDP, R, 
LnEXC, and LIBOR. The results of the model that included intercept, trend, and 
the shift dummy variable indicate that the null hypothesis of 00 r  is rejected at 
5% significant level, since the test statistic (66.30) is greater than 5% critical 
value (66.13). This indicates that there is one cointegrating equation in the long-
run between LnRealM2, LnGDP, R, LnEXC, and LIBOR. The results from the 
model that excluded the shift dummy but included intercept and trend also 
suggest that there is a single cointegration vector between LnRealM1, LnGDP, 
R, LnEXC, and LIBOR since the null hypothesis of 00 r is rejected at 1% 
significant but it is not rejected for the hypothesis of 10 r . 
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Table 4.36  Cointegration of the M1 money demand function 
Variables  Deterministic  No H0: Test   Critical Value  
      of lags r=r0  statistic 10% 5% 1% 
LnRealM2, LnGDP,  Trend,  1 ro=0 66.30* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR  intercept,   ro=1 25.71 42.25 45.32 51.45 
 and shift   ro=2 13.26 26.07 28.52 33.50 
  dummy   ro=3 6.36 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    ro=4 0.81 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2, LnGDP,  Trend and  3 ro=0 86.82* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR  intercept  ro=1 42.01 42.25 45.32 51.45 
    ro=2 22.24 26.07 28.52 33.50 
    ro=3 11.26 13.88 15.76 19.71 
    ro=4 0.17 5.48 6.79 9.73 
LnRealM2, LnGDP,  Intercept  3 ro=0 73.93* 62.45 66.13 73.42 
LnExc, R, LIBOR     ro=1 35.73 42.25 45.32 51.45 
     ro=2 61.20 26.07 28.52 33.50 
     ro=3 7.73 13.88 15.76 19.71 
     ro=4 2.05 5.48 6.79 9.73 
 
The normalized cointegration vector of the stable money demand function for 
the M2 money demand in Table 4.38 is performed by setting the estimated 
coefficient on the M2 money demand to equal -1 and dividing each 
cointegrating vector by the negative of the relevant money coefficient. It is 
interesting to note that the coefficient of LnGDP and R appeared to be 1% 
significant, while other variables are not. This means that the real income and 
interest rates have a strong relationship with the M2 money demand in the long-
run while LIBOR and the exchange rate do not. The coefficient of LnGDP is 
0.79, suggesting that M2 money holding will increase by approximately 0.79% 
if real income in Thailand rose by 1%. The estimates of domestic interest rate 
(R) elasticity is -0.02, indicating that a decrease of 1% in interest rates in 
Thailand caused a 0.02% increase in M2 money demand in Thailand. 
 
Table 4.37 Normalized cointegration 
Lnreal M2 LnGDP R LnEXC LIBOR C 
-1 0.79 -0.02 -0.06 -0.001 1.00 
 [-7.42] [3.80] [-0.66] [ -0.08] [ 1.26] 
Note: The numbers in parentheses show the t-statistics.  
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This section will test the stability of the M2 money demand function in 
Thailand by using a formal test for parameter stability in the context of 
recursive estimation of the eigenvalue associated with the test for cointegration. 
There are two options available for implementing the test. In calculation of the 
recursive eigenvalues it is possible to either, a) concentrate out the short-run 
parameters (assuming they are stable) using their full sample estimates or b) to 
estimate all parameters recursively.  
Figure 4.27 shows the results of the M2 money demand function without a shift 
dummy and the estimates including the shift dummy are presented in Figure 
4.28. Figure(A) on both figures shows the recursive estimates of all parameters, 
while Figure(B) uses full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term 
parameters. As can be seen when full re-estimation of all parameters is carried 
out at each point in the recursion, the test statistic shows a sharp drop around 
2004 and 2006. However, when we concentrate out the short-run dynamics 
using the full sample estimates both models show no sign of instability. 
 
Figure 4.27 Recursive Tau statistics for M2 money demand function without a shift 
dummy 
Figure(A): The  recursive estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
                                                
                Figure(A)           Figure(B) 
 
Figure 4.28 Recursive Tau statistics for M2 money demand function including a shift 
dummy 
Figure(A): The recursive  estimates of all parameters 
            Figure(B): Full sample estimates to concentrate out short-term parameters 
 
                Figure(A)            Figure(B) 
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The result of the weak exogeneity test in Table 4.39 shows that LnRealM2 and 
LnGDP is 5% significant, and R and LIBOR are 1% significant. Therefore, we 
can analyse the vector error correction by using all variables as endogenous 
variables.  
 
Table 4.38 Weak Exogenous 
 Restricted LR Degrees of   
Variable  Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
Restrictions:   
LnRealM2 286.23 3.93 1.00 0.04 
Restrictions:   
LnGDP 2869.47 3.44 1.00 0.05 
Restrictions:  
R 288.59 7.19 1.0 0.00 
Restrictions: 
LnEXC 288.12 0.14 1.00 0.07 
Restrictions:   
LIBOR 284.88 6.62 1.00 0.01 
 
Table 4.40 presents the results of the VECM for M2 money demand. Taking 
D(LnRealM2) as dependent variables, the results found that the error correction 
term is 5% significant. As an error correction term indicates the speed 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium and the coefficient of ECT (-1) is -0.002, 
this means that the disequilibrium of the M2 money demand function in 
Thailand will be corrected approximately 2% within a quarter. 
 
The coefficient in the second column presents the change of lag variable on the 
current change of the M2 money demand in Thailand. The coefficient of 
D(LnRealM2(-4)), D(LnGDP(-4)), D(LIBOR(-1)) and D(LIBOR(-2)) are 
significant at 5%  level, and D(R(-1))  is 10% significant. The coefficient of 
income in the last four quarters is 0.34, suggesting that a 1% increase in income 
from the last four quarters caused a 0.34 % increase in current M2 money 
demand. The coefficient of interest rates in the prior quarter is -0.01, suggesting 
that an increase of 1% in domestic interest rates in the last quarter leads to a 
decrease in M2 money holding in the current quarter by 0.01%. The exchange 
rate (EXC) has not affected M2 money demand in Thailand in the short run 
since the coefficient of the lag of LnEXC is not significant at any given 
significant level. 
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Table 4.39 The results of the VECM 
Error Correction: D(LnRealM2) D(LnGDP) D(R) D(LnEXC) D(LIBOR) 
      
CointEq1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.26 -0.01 -0.11 
 [ 1.97213] [ 2.68390] [-7.22402] [-1.61061] [-3.04301] 
D(LnRealM2(-1)) 0.11 0.08 6.59 0.72 7.26 
 [ 0.78619] [ 0.64555] [ 1.61582] [ 1.13795] [ 1.78535] 
D(LnRealM2(-2)) -0.07 0.05 -6.04 0.59 -0.93 
 [-0.48533] [ 0.42096] [-1.54326] [ 0.97044] [-0.23763] 
D(LnRealM2(-3)) -0.13 -0.28 1.86 0.92 -2.15 
 [-0.91074] [-2.31853] [ 0.47384] [ 1.51231] [-0.54670] 
D(LnRealM2(-4)) 0.28 0.03 -1.54 0.32 5.65 
 [ 2.10565] [ 0.23702] [-0.40783] [ 0.54098] [ 1.49419] 
D(LnGDP(-1)) 0.12 0.21 19.98 1.05 -1.02 
 [ 0.58407] [ 1.19931] [ 3.50332] [ 1.19023] [-0.17883] 
D(LnGDP(-2)) 0.01 0.08 -9.23 -1.79 -2.71 
 [ 0.03083] [ 0.47251] [-1.68052] [-2.11205] [-0.49453] 
D(LnGDP(-3)) 0.05 0.06 6.07 -0.79 12.43 
 [ 0.32651] [ 0.45189] [ 1.36576] [-1.15464] [ 2.80199] 
D(LnGDP(-4)) 0.34 0.33 3.43 0.09 -7.32 
 [ 2.05663] [ 2.26425] [ 0.73387] [ 0.12859] [-1.56707] 
D(R(-1)) 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.02 -0.01 
 [ 1.68084] [-0.22334] [ 1.69762] [ 1.12937] [-0.09830] 
D(R(-2)) 0.00 -0.01 -0.23 -0.04 -0.13 
 [-0.89787] [-1.95687] [-2.27744] [-2.38504] [-1.25269] 
D(R(-3)) 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.04 -0.16 
 [-0.13789] [ 0.55907] [ 1.69849] [ 2.02462] [-1.30537] 
D(R(-4)) 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 -0.02 
 [ 0.86863] [ 1.08837] [-1.14620] [-2.42566] [-0.13481] 
D(LnEXC(-1)) -0.01 -0.11 5.63 0.50 1.22 
 [-0.16139] [-2.85972] [ 4.50517] [ 2.62243] [ 0.97850] 
D(LnEXC(-2)) -0.05 -0.10 7.40 -0.19 1.66 
 [-1.15138] [-2.53397] [ 5.87270] [-0.96069] [ 1.31785] 
D(LnEXC(-3)) -0.04 -0.14 4.71 0.24 1.94 
 [-1.01574] [-3.67417] [ 3.79724] [ 1.25743] [ 1.56638] 
D(LnEXC(-4)) 0.01 -0.01 10.97 -0.14 3.18 
 [ 0.27445] [-0.25825] [ 8.93942] [-0.74812] [ 2.59415] 
D(LIBOR(-1)) -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.12 
 [-1.95297] [ 0.85686] [ 0.00888] [-0.99808] [ 0.69892] 
D(LIBOR(-2)) 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.21 
 [ 2.12797] [ 1.36536] [ 1.69317] [-0.08901] [ 1.26220] 
D(LIBOR(-3)) 0.00 0.00 -0.64 0.02 0.15 
 [ 0.40111] [ 0.00550] [-3.52408] [ 0.56426] [ 0.83380] 
D(LIBOR(-4)) 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 -0.14 
 [ 0.19432] [-0.60559] [ 1.77085] [ 0.04444] [-0.76846] 
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The estimate of the error correction model of the M2 money demand function is: 
 
)12.2()95.1(
01.001.0
)01.0()05.2()10.2()97.1(
01.034.02Re28.0002.02Re
21
1441





tt
tttt
LIBORLIBOR
RLnGDPalMLnECTalMLn
 
     R-squared =   0.51       F-statistic    = 1.62       Akaike AIC = -5.14                                   
AR 1-4 test: F (4,44)    = 1.58 (0.19)      ARCH  test:  F (4, 46) = 0.68(0.60) 
Hetero test: F (12,42)  = 1.84 (0.07)        RESET test F (1, 45)          
 
The stability of parameters in the simple M2 money demand function  
 
To test a stability of money demand function, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
proposed by Brown et al. (1975) is employed. If the plot of CUSUM and/or 
CUSUMSQ stays within a given significant level, it can be said that the 
coefficient estimates are stable. As seen in Figure 4.29, the estimate of CUSUM 
seems to be stable over the sample periods as the demand equation stays within 
5% critical. However, the CUSUMSQ show there is evidence of instability 
around 1998-2002. 
 
Figure 4.29 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
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The recursive coefficient is presented in Figure 4.30. It is not surprising that the 
results show the estimated coefficient seems to be unstable during 1996-1999. 
However, the coefficient became constant after 1999. 
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Figure 4.30  Plot of the Residual Recursive 
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Money overhang and inflation 
 
In the next step, we will test whether the estimate of money demand equation is 
helping forecast inflation at differing lags. The money overhang in this model 
is:  
 
)(22 LIBORLnEXcRLnGDPLnrealMEXOM    
 
To analyze the relationship between inflation and money overhang, we 
estimated the forecasting equation for one-quarter-ahead (inflation is regressed 
on one-quarter-ahead and money overhang), four-quarter-ahead (inflation is 
regressed on one to four-quarter-ahead and money overhang), and eight-quarter-
ahead (inflation is regressed on five to eight-quarter-ahead and money 
overhang). The results of money overhang and inflation are the following 
equations. 
 
One-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
                   
)34.2()48.5(
2001.058.0 11   tt EXOMINFINF
 
 R-squared =   0.27        Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.00       DW   = 1.60                      
AR test: F (2,52)    = 1.35 (0.26)           ARCH  test:  F (4,43) = 0.23 (0.92) 
Hetero test: F (4, 51)  = 1.66 (0.17)       RESET test F (1, 53)   = 0.83 (0.36)  
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 Four-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)76.1()54.0()29.0()16.1()23.5(
2003.017.005.020.075.0 14321

  ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   0.35       Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.04       DW   = 1.98                        
AR test: F (2,46)    = 0.00 (0.99)           ARCH  test:  F (4,44) = 0.35 (0.83) 
Hetero test: F (10,42)  = 0.74 (0.67)       RESET test F (1, 47)   = 2.52 (0.11)  
 
Eight-quarter-ahead inflation and money overhang 
)63.2()14.1()30.0()37.0()74.0(
2002.019.006.008.013.0 58765

  ttttt EXOMINFINFINFINFINF
 
R-squared =   -0.05         Prob(F-statistic)    =  0.68       DW   = 0.71                       
AR test: F (15,29)    = 1.82 (0.08)           ARCH  test:  F (8,32) = 1.39 (0.23) 
Hetero test: F (10,38)  = 1.57 (0.15)       RESET test F (1, 43)   = 4.20 (0.05)  
 
Overall, it seems that money overhang can help to predict inflation for only one 
quarter ahead since the money overhang is strongly significant and there is no 
evidence of serial correlation. However, when the model tests for four and eight 
quarter ahead, there is some evidence of negative coefficiency of money 
overhang and serial correlation. 
 
4.3.4 Comparison and policy Implication 
 
This section provides the comparison of the results that were achieved from 
previous parts of the chapter. There are a number of interesting findings from 
this chapter. 
 
Firstly, the cointegration results of the money demand function, both full 
sample data and shorter data sets clearly show that there is a single 
cointegration vector among money demand (either M1 or M2), real income 
(GDP), and interest rates (R) for the simple model. Similarly, the model that 
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includes exchange rates and LIBOR also shows the single cointegration 
between money demand (either M1 or M2), real income (GDP), interest rates  
(R), exchange rates (EXC), and LIBOR. It can be said that there is a stable 
relationship in the money demand function in Thailand and the money demand 
function is stable in the long-run. 
 
Table 4.40  Comparison of Cointegration Results  
 
 Full Sample (1980Q1–2007Q1 ) Short  Sample  (1993Q1–2007Q1 ) 
M1 M2 M1 M2 
Simple Model Single 
Cointegration 
Single 
Cointegration 
Single 
Cointegration 
Single 
Cointegration 
Model with exchange 
rate and LIBOR 
Single 
Cointegration 
Single 
Cointegration 
Single 
Cointegration 
Single 
Cointegration 
 
 
The second interesting finding is the result of the long-run elasticity of the 
money demand function. As can be seen in Table 4.42, the coefficients of 
LnGDP and R are significant for every model. This means that money demand 
in Thailand is strongly dependent on domestic income and domestic interest 
rates. The result of the full data set (1980Q1-2007Q1) shows that income 
elasticity has a positive relationship with both the M1 and M2 money demand in 
Thailand (both simple and open economy models). However, the coefficient of 
M1 income elasticity is smaller than M2. This means that M2 money demand 
has grown much faster than the growth of GDP in Thailand, while it appears to 
be smaller in the M1 money demand. Regarding monetary theory, the growth of 
money aggregate should be similar to the growth of GDP. Therefore, M1 money 
demand seems to be more stable and it is more appropriate as an intermediate 
target of monetary policy. The estimations of the domestic interest rate (R) 
elasticity are significant for both M1 and M2 money demand functions with 
negative signs as expected. The effect of the interest rate on M1 is smaller that 
M2 for the simple model. It is interesting that the interest rate elasticity of M1 
became bigger when the external factors were included. On the other hand, the 
interest rate elasticity for M2 is smaller when the external factor is included. 
The exchange rate plays an important role in both the M1 and M2 money 
demand in Thailand. However, the currency substitution happened only in the 
case of the M2 money demand function since the exchange rate elasticity 
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appeared to be a negative sign. In addition, LIBOR has an affect on only M2 but 
not for M1. 
  
The results from 1993-2007 indicate that both GDP and R have a long-run 
relationship with M1 (or M2) money demands in Thailand. It interesting that the 
income elasticity of M1 income elasticity is bigger than M2 as the M1 income 
elasticity is 1.40 and the M2 income elasticity equals 0.75. This means that M1 
money demand is growing faster than the growth of GDP in Thailand, while it 
appears to be smaller in the M2 money demand.  
 
The test with exchange rates and LIBOR show that the exchange rate and 
LIBOR have no affect on the M2 money demand but it does on the M1 money 
demand. Regarding the shorter data set model, M1 seems to be a more 
appropriate intermediate target for monetary policy, as it responds to external 
factors. 
 
 
Table 4.41 Normalized Long-run elasticity of money demand in Thailand 
 
 LnGDP  R  LnEXC  LIBOR  Trend  C  
Full data set (1980-2007)       
  Simple Model         
         M1 money demand  0.65* -0.06*    2.06 
         M2 money demand 3.26* -0.12*   0.39* 14.01 
            
  Model included EXC and LIBOR       
         M1 money demand  1.14* -0.49* 6.97* 0.02  -22.91 
         M2 money demand 2.27* -0.06* -2.23* -0.02* 0.02* 17.92 
       
Full data set (1993-2007)       
  Simple Model         
         M1 money demand  1.40* -0.02*    7.61* 
         M2 money demand 0.75* -0.03*    -1.10* 
            
  Model included EXC and LIBOR       
         M1 money demand  1.42* -0.01* 0.09* -0.03*  -7.96 
         M2 money demand 0.79* -0.02* -0.06 -0.001  1.00 
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Another interesting point of this chapter is the results of the error correction 
model. The coefficient of error terms appeared to be significant in every model, 
meaning that money demand has adjusted to the long-run equilibrium. The 
coefficient of each model is presented in Table 4.43. The results in the simple 
model indicate that the disequilibrium of the M1 money demand function has 
adjusted to the equilibrium faster than M2, as the coefficient of the error term is 
bigger. It can be said that M1 money demand is more flexible and faster to 
adjust to the equilibrium. 
 
Table 4.42 Error Correction Model 
 
 Coefficient of Error Term 
(1980Q- 2007Q1) 
Coefficient of Error Term 
(1993Q1-2007Q1) 
 M1 M2 M1 M2 
Simple Model  
 
 
-0.19 
( -5.38) 
-0.07 
(-3.60) 
-0.32 
(-2.05) 
-0.08 
(-2.04) 
Model included EXC and 
LIBOR 
 
 
-0.03 
(-2.72) 
-0.11 
(-2.50) 
-0.38 
(-3.07) 
-0.002 
(-1.97) 
 
 
 
The last finding in the chapter is the estimation of the relationship between 
money overhang and inflation. The results indicates that the M1 money demand 
function seem to be more reasonable in forecasting. As can be seen in Table 
4.44, the coefficient money overhang for M1 money demand appeared to be 
significant with a positive relationship with the inflation rate for both the full 
sample data and the shorter data. In addition, the ARCH test shows that there is 
no evidence of serial correlation in the model. It can be concluded that the M1 
money demand model can help in forecasting the inflation rate in Thailand.   
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Table 4.43  The relationship between money overhang and inflation 
 
4.3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter presents the empirical results of the stability of money demand 
function in Thailand by estimating both the M1 and M2 money demand 
function. There are two set of data tested in this chapter, the data from 1980-
2007 and the date set from 1993-2007. Overall, the results show that the money 
demand (both M1 and M2) function in Thailand appears to be stable as there is 
an evidence of single cointegration in every model tested. This evident support 
the study of Chowdhury (1997) , Chowdhundry (2004) that there is evidence of 
stability of M1 and M2 money demand function  in Thailand. Similar to  the 
study of Sunner (2009) also point that money balance in Thailand is stable. In 
addition, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ confirm that the money demand function 
is stable although there was a financial crisis in 1997. Moreover, this chapter 
 1980-2007 1993-2007 
Simple 
model 
EXC and 
LIBOR model 
Simple 
model 
EXC and 
LIBOR 
model 
Coefficient of Money overhang     
 
M1 money overhang and   
     one-quarter-ahead inflation  
     four-quarter-ahead inflation 
     eight-quarter-ahead inflation 
 
 
 
0.005 
0.005 
0.01** 
 
 
0.0007* 
0.005 
0.007* 
 
 
0.014* 
0.011** 
0.020* 
 
 
0.005* 
0.005* 
0.009* 
M2 money overhang and   
         one-quarter-ahead inflation  
         four-quarter-ahead inflation 
         eight-quarter-ahead inflation 
 
 
0.001** 
0.001 
0.003* 
 
0.004** 
0.003** 
0.007* 
 
 
0.01** 
0.02** 
0.01** 
 
0.001* 
-0.003** 
-0.002 
ARCH test  ( value)     
 
M1 money overhang and   
         one-quarter-ahead inflation  
         four-quarter-ahead inflation 
         eight-quarter-ahead inflation 
 
 
 
0.83 
0.91 
0.72 
 
 
0.90 
0.91 
0.68 
 
 
0.64 
0.91 
0.11 
 
 
0.94 
0.98 
0.31 
M2 money overhang and   
         one-quarter-ahead inflation  
         four-quarter-ahead inflation 
         eight-quarter-ahead inflation 
 
0.57 
0.57 
0.33 
 
0.82 
0.82 
0.36 
 
0.74 
0.77 
0.12 
 
0.92. 
0.83 
0.23 
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also tested whether money overhang that is calculated from the money demand 
function can help in forecasting inflation in Thailand. The results show that the 
money overhang in this chapter can be used for estimating the inflation rate in 
Thailand. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL AND 
MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN THAILAND 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Thailand. The outline of the chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first section overviews the concepts of the Vector Autoregression model 
(VAR). There are three major concerns in this section, the concepts of the VAR 
and impulse response analysis, the Granger Causality approach, and the 
Variance Decomposition analysis. The second section is an empirical analysis 
of the monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand by using the VAR model. 
Three channels of transmission mechanism are included in this section: the 
traditional interest rate channel, the credit channel, and the exchange rate 
channel. The last section presents the conclusions of the chapter.    
      
 5.2 Basic Concept of the Vector Autoregression model (VAR) 
 
Generally, the econometric models were created for predicting the effect of 
change in exogenous or endogenous variables. However, in some cases when 
researchers have no confidence that the variable is actually an exogenous or 
endogenous variable, they might be too confused to generate the models. To 
resolve this problem Sims (1980) introduced the Vector Autoregression model  
or the VAR methodology to examine the relationship of the set of variables  
without distinguishing between the exogenous or the endogenous variables. All 
variables in the model are assumed endogenous. In addition all variables in the 
VAR system are allowed to interact linearly with their own and other past 
values. 
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Consider the simple bivariate VAR with two dependent variables ),( ttt zyY   
where t = 1, 2,… T        
   yttttt zcyczbby   1121111210                 (5.1) 
zttttt zcycybbz   1221212120                                     (5.2)            
where both ty and tz  are assumed to be stationary, 
                      yt  and zt  are white noise and they are uncorrelated . 
As can be seen in Equations 5.1 and 5.2, ty and tz are allowed to affect each 
other. The equations can be re-written in matrix form as: 
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Alternatively, we can write in the structure VAR (SVAR) form as: 
ttt XBX  110                                             (5.3) 
where  






1
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21
12
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Multiply Equation 5.3 by the inverse B (B
-1
) to obtain a standard VAR form 
(unstructured form): 
ttt BXBBBXB 
1
11
1
0
11 

             (5.4) 
or,      
                ttt eXAAX  110                   (5.5) 
where,   
                            0A 0
1B , 2A 1
1B , and te 1
1B  
or,  
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It can be written in the equivalent form as: 
tttt ezayaay 111211110                                     (5.6) 
tttt ezayaaz 212212120                                                (5.7) 
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It should be noted that the error terms are composites of two shocks yt and zt . 
Since te 1
1B , we can calculate te1 and te2 as: 
  





















zt
yt
t
t
b
b
bbe
e


1
1
)1(
1
21
12
12212
1
 
 
or                                               
)1( 2112
12
1
bb
b
e
ztyt
t




                                       (5.8)    
 
)1( 2112
21
2
bb
b
e
ztyt
t




                                          (5.9) 
 
5.2.1 The Granger Causality Test  
 
Since Granger (1969) introduced the Granger Causality technique for 
examining whether the time series ( tz ) is useful for forecasting another time 
series ( ty ), the Granger Causality became an important issue in empirical 
macroeconomic analysis. 
 
Granger (1969) defined the time series tz which is said to be Granger-causal for 
the time series ty if the past value of ty affects the current value of ty . A simple 
causality model can be written as follows: 
 
 
 
n
i
n
j
titiitit ybzay
1 1
0         
 (5.10) 
 
 
 
n
i
n
j
titiitit eydzcx
1 1
0     
 (5.11) 
where t  and te are uncorrelated. 
 
Equation 5.10 indicates that tz causes ty if ia is not zero. Similarly, with 
Equation 5.11, ty is causing tz  if id is not equal to zero. In case both events 
occur, it can be said that there is a feedback relationship between tz and ty . 
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However, if both variables fail to cause the other, then both variables are 
independent. 
 
Granger (1969) also offers the estimation of Granger Causality by using the 
VAR technique, which can be written as: 
 
 
 
p
i
p
j
titiitit yzy
1 1
0      (5.12) 
 
 
 
p
i
p
j
titiitit eyxx
1 1
0    (5.13) 
 
Equation 5.12 means that the current ty  is related to the past value of itself 
and tz .If the coefficient on the lag of z  in Equation 5.12 is different from zero 
(  0i ) and the set of coefficients on the lag y in Equation 5.13 is not 
different from zero (  0i ), this means that there is unidirectional causality 
from tz  to ty ( tt yz  ). On the other hand, the unidirectional causality from 
ty to tz  ( tt yz  ) exists if the set of the lag ty  coefficients in Equation 5.13 is 
different from zero (  0i ) and the set of the lag tz  coefficients in Equation 
5.12 is not statistically different from zero (  0i ). 
 
The Granger Causality method can deal with the matrix VAR model. Consider 
the data set of general three-dimensional VAR models in a standard matrix 
form:  
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 where: 
 i  is a matrix of deterministic terms such as trend, intercept, or dummy 
variables 
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ji
u  are the vector of white noise error terms. 
In this model, we can test the hypothesis that tx  does not Granger cause ty  with 
respect to the information set generated by tz  if either 013 A  and 023 A  or 
013 A  and 012 A  
5.2.2 The Impulse Response Function 
 
As the test of causality in the VAR model indicates, the time series variables in 
the model have significant affect on the future value of other variables. 
However, it does not explain the sign of relationship between the variables. 
Brook (2002) states that the F-statistic in the causality analysis will not explain 
whether changes in value of given variables have positive or negative impacts 
on other variables. The impulse offers the test of the response of dependent 
variables in the VAR system to a shock in the error terms.  
 
The impulse response analysis is based on the vector auto regression or VAR 
model. Sims (1980) states that if we want to trace out the time path of the 
various shocks on the sets of variables included in the VAR system, the VAR 
needs to be transformed into a vector moving average (VMA). To transform the 
VAR model into a VMA, we first re-write the standard VAR in the equation to 
be more compact as: 
 
              ttt eXAAX  110           
LAI
e
LAI
A
X tt
11
0



          (5.14)  
                where I = 2x2  identify matrix 
 
Then, re-write the first component of Equation 5.14 to obtain: 
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As a condition of stability is that the root of LAI 1 lies outside the unit circle 
(Ender 2004, p.266), therefore the second component can be written as: 
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Therefore, we can write a VAR as a VMA with a standard error form as: 
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However, the error terms in Equation 5.15 consist of structural innovations. We 
need to re-write the error terms te1  and  te2  in Equation 5.15 with yt and zt . 
From Equations 5.8 and 5.9, we obtain: 





















zt
yt
t
t
b
b
bbe
e


1
1
)1(
1
21
12
12212
1
                  (5.16) 
If we combine Equations 5.15 and 5.16, we obtain: 
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Equation 5.17 can be re-written by defining the 2x2 matrix   with element  
)(ijk  to obtain: 
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Therefore, the moving average in Equations 5.15 and 5.16 can be written in 
terms of yt and zt as: 
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or                                


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In fact, the vector moving average is a basic tool for examining the interaction 
between the variables. The coefficient i  can be used for generating the 
numerical effects of t1 and t2  shocks to the entire time paths of the series  ty  
and tz . It should be noted that the four elements )0(jk  are impact multipliers. 
For example, the coefficient )0(12  indicates the instantaneous effect of one unit 
change in zt  on ty . Similarly, )1(11  is the one period response of unit change 
in 1yt on ty . It can be said that each )(ijk parameter represents the time-
specific partial derivative of the VMA function where: 
   
k
ji
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)(                               (5.21) 
 
Equation 5.21 measures the effect of the shock in the thk  variable in the present 
period to the thj variable, t2 . 
 
Ender (2004) states that the accumulated effects of unit impulses in yt and 
zt can be calculated by the summation of the coefficient of the impulse 
response function. He gives the example that the effect of zt on the value of 
nty  after n period is )(12 n . Therefore, after n period, the cumulated sum of 
effects of the unit impulse of zt on  ty  series is:  
 
                              )(
0
12

n
i
i            (5.22) 
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If n is infinity )( n , we obtain a long run impact multiplier. Given the series 
 ty  and tz  are assumed to be stationary, it must be the case of j and k, )(
0


i
jk i   
is finite. It can be said that the set of coefficients )(ijk are called the impulse 
response function. In general, the plot of the impulse response function is more 
practical to present the response of series  ty  and tz  to the various shocks. 
5.2.3  Modeling of the monetary transmission mechanism in 
Thailand 
 
Since another objective of this thesis is to test the monetary transmission 
mechanism and the effect of monetary policy on economic activities, this 
section will apply the conventional IS-LM model to derive a reduced form for 
testing equations. The IS-LM equation can be expressed in linear form as: 
                   
                IS   :    tt Ry                                              (5.23) 
   
               LM:    
ttt
uRymt 2                                                (5.24) 
 
Reduce form by solving Equation 5.23 for the interest rate (R) and subtract into 
Equation 5.24 to obtain: 
 
           tt my 
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





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








            (5.25) 
 
Considering Equation 5.25, it can be written in linear form as:  
 
            tt my                           (5.26) 
 
The Equation 5.26 implies that monetary aggregate has a positive relationship 
with output. 
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 Recently, the vector autoregressive model (VAR) has become popular in the 
literature of transmission mechanism because the VAR have proved to be a 
convenient method of summarizing dynamic relationships among variables. It 
seems to be that the VAR model was initiated by Sims (1980) as a general 
dissatisfaction with the structural econometric modeling approach, in which 
theoretical restrictions limit the interdependencies of the variables included in 
the model. After that, many scholars adopted the VAR model to estimate the 
affect of monetary policy on the economic activities. For example, Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992) adopt the VAR model to test the response by banks to a rise 
in short-term interest rates (the federal funds rate in the US). The variables in 
this model included the log of the consumer price index, the log of M1 and M2, 
the Federal rate, the three-month Treasury bill rate and the ten-year Treasury 
bond rate. As well, Bernanke and Gertler (1995)  used the VAR to examine the 
dynamic response of variable economic aggregates to an unanticipated 
tightening of monetary policy. The VAR system involved a log of real GDP and 
the price level, a log of index of commodity prices, and the federal fund rate. 
The research found that the unanticipated tightening of monetary policy had 
only an affect on the interest rate. After that many researchers used the VAR for 
testing the transmission mechanism in a different countries, such as Friedman 
and Kuttner (1992)  for the USA and Yu (1997) for China.       
 
This research also employs a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to achieve 
the objective. The VAR consists of a set of endogenous variables and 
exogenous variables.  
 
Since the major objective of this section is to employ the Vector Autoregression 
model (VAR) to investigate the monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand, 
it focuses on the affect of monetary shock on economic growth and price 
stability. In order to achieve the effectiveness of the different channels of the 
monetary transmission mechanism, this thesis starts by estimating a basic 
model, which presents the relationship between money and major 
macroeconomic indicators (economic growth and price stability). Then, we 
analyze each particular channel of the monetary transmission mechanism by 
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adding different variables of monetary policy, which represent each 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Thailand. There are three 
channels of monetary transmission mechanism included in this section, the 
interest channel, the credit channel, and the exchange rate channel. For the 
interest rate channel, the domestic interest rate is included as an intermediate 
target in monetary policy. The aggregate credit (CRE) is added in the credit 
channel, and the exchange rate is used in the exchange rate channel. Therefore, 
there are four models estimated in this chapter; the variables included in each 
models are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Models of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism  
Model Variables included in the VAR system 
Basic model Money (M1 or M2), Real output (GDP), and  Price 
level (P) 
Interest rate channel Interest rate (R), Money (M1 or M2), real output 
(GDP), and  Price level (P) 
Credit channel  Aggregate credit (CRR), Money (M1 or M2), real 
output (GDP), and  Price level (P) 
Exchange rate channel Exchange Rate (EXC), Money (M1 or M2), Real 
output (GDP), and Price level (P) 
 
 
5.3 Empirical Results of the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy 
 
The major objective of this section is to employ the Vector Autoregression 
model (VAR) to investigate the monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand, 
focusing on the affect of monetary shock on economic growth and price 
stability. In order to achieve the effectiveness of the different channels of the 
monetary transmission mechanism, this section starts by estimating a basic 
model, which presents the relationship between money and major 
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macroeconomic indicators (economic growth and price stability). Then, we 
analyse each particular channel of the monetary transmission mechanism by 
adding a different variable of monetary policy, which represents each 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Thailand. The estimation in this 
chapter starts by selecting the optimal lag length for each VAR model. Then, we 
examine the short-term relationship between the set of variables by applying the 
Granger Causality test. After that, variance decomposition is adopted to test the 
response of each variable on the monetary shock. The last test of the chapter is 
to apply the impulse response analysis to show the response of economic 
indicators to monetary policy. 
 
There are two major money demands in previous chapters, and both of them 
appeared to be stable over the sample period. Therefore, this chapter applies 
both M1 and M2 money demand in each transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in order to compare the response of money to monetary policy in the 
sense of selecting the money demand as an intermediate target of monetary 
policy. 
 
 5.3.1 The lag length selection  
 
Regarding the VAR methodology, the lag length selection is a necessary 
condition for estimating the VAR model. Therefore, before estimating the VAR, 
we apply the AIC and LR criteria to select the optimal lag length in each VAR 
model. The results of lag length selection are presented in Table 5.2. Given the 
smallest criteria, the optimal lag length for the M1 basic model is the lag of 
four, while the second lag is selected for the M2 basic model. Consider the lag 
length selection for each model of the transmission mechanism. The fifth lag is 
selected for the interest rate channel and the exchange channel when M1 is 
included in the model, while the lag of four is chosen for the credit channel of 
the transmission mechanism. For the model where M2 is included, the second 
lag appeared to be the optimal lag length for the interest rate channel and the 
credit channel. The most appropriate lag length for the exchange rate channel is 
the lag of three. 
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Table 5.2 Lag Length Selection of the VAR model 
Basic Model  
  Variables: LnRealM1, LnGDP, LnP  Variables: LnRealM2, LnGDP, LnP 
 Lag LogL LR AIC  LogL LR AIC 
        
0 159.23 NA  -6.01  205.76 NA  -7.80 
1 406.96 457.33 -15.19  472.04 491.60 -17.69 
2 420.18 22.89 -15.35  488.56   28.60  -17.98* 
3 440.04 32.07 -15.77  496.07 12.12 -17.93 
4 452.58   18.81  -15.90*  503.56 11.24 -17.87 
5 460.03 10.31 -15.85  508.22 6.46 -17.70 
        
Interest Rate Channel  
 Variables: R,LnRealM1, LnGDP,LnP  Variables: R, LnRealM2,LnGDP,LnP 
Lag LogL LR AIC  LogL LR AIC 
0 48.25 NA  -1.70  85.30 NA  -3.13 
1 354.61 553.81 -12.87  421.11 607.04 -15.43 
2 375.66 34.80 -13.06  443.03   36.24  -15.65* 
3 405.53 44.81 -13.60  458.88 23.77 -15.65 
4 430.96   34.23 -13.96  473.03 19.05 -15.58 
5 449.47 22.07  -14.05*  485.06 14.34 -15.43 
Credit  Channel  
 
Variables: LnCRE 
LnRealM1,LnGDP,LnP  
Variables: LnCRE 
LnRealM2,LnGDP,LnP 
Lag LogL LR AIC  LogL LR AIC 
0 206.95 NA  -8.46  243.32 NA  -9.97 
1 504.97 533.95 -20.21  569.32 584.08 -22.89 
2 522.65 28.73 -20.28  587.07   28.84  -22.96* 
3 544.68 32.14 -20.53  600.07 18.96 -22.84 
4 570.15   32.89  -20.92*  616.7 21.4 -22.9 
5 584.04 15.63 -20.84  629.74 14.71 -22.74 
Exchange Rate   Channel  
 
Variables: LnEXC 
LnRealM1,LnGDP,LnP  
Variables: LnEXC 
LnRealM2,LnGDP,LnP 
Lag LogL LR AIC  LogL LR AIC 
0 218.81 NA  -8.26  263.54 NA  -9.98 
1 501.66 511.31 -18.53  558.45 533.11 -20.71 
2 522.05 33.73 -18.69  582.56 39.87 -21.02 
3 548.36 39.45 -19.09  600.10   26.30  -21.08* 
4 573.58   33.95 -19.44  615.65 20.93 -21.06 
5 592.99 23.14  -19.57*  630.59 17.82 -21.02 
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After the optimal lag length is selected for each model, the next step is to adopt 
the lag length achieved from this section to test the VAR model of each model 
of the transmission mechanism in Thailand. 
5.3.2 Test for the Basic models 
 
The traditional monetary theory claims that change in money aggregate leads to 
change in real economic activities such as real output and price level. The major 
concern of the basic model in this thesis is to test the relationship between 
money and real economic activities. As the aims of monetary policy usually 
focus on economic growth (GDP)and price stability (P), therefore two major 
real economic indicators concerned in this thesis are real output and price level. 
In addition, the paper examines two different basic models, the M1 and M2 
basic models. 
 
This section starts by using the Granger Causality method to examine the short-
term interaction between money and real economic activities (real output and 
price level). The results of Granger Causality in the basic models are presented 
in Table 5.3. Panel (A) presents the Granger Causality of the M1 basic model, 
and the M2 basic model is shown in Panel(B). The numbers in the table present 
the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that variable x does not Granger-cause 
variable y. 
 
The result of Granger Causality indicates that there is bidirectional Granger 
Causality between real output and M1. As the null hypothesis of LnGDP does 
not Granger-cause, LnRealM1 is rejected at 1% significant, and the hypothesis 
of there being Granger Causality from LnRealM1 to LnGDP is also rejected at 
5% significant. Furthermore, there is unidirectionality from the price level to 
M1 (LnP →LnRealM1) in Thailand, since the ρ value is less than 0.01. 
However, the null hypothesis that LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LNP 
cannot be rejected. This means that in the short period change in M1 affects real 
output, while it does not affect price level. The result of Granger Causality with 
the M2 basic model suggests that the null hypothesis that LnRealM2 does not 
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Granger-cause LNP is rejected at 10% significant, while the hypothesis that 
LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnGDP cannot be rejected. This implies that 
changes in M2 do not affect economic growth, while it does impact price levels 
in Thailand. 
 
Given the monetary framework based on the basic models, we found that M1 
seems to have more effect on economic growth while M2 has more impact on 
price levels in Thailand. Based on the results of the basic models above, if  
monetary policy in Thailand aims to stabilize price levels, M2 should be 
selected as an intermediate target in monetary policy. However, in the case of 
the policy focusing on economic growth, M1 appeared to be more appropriate 
as an intermediate target. 
 
Table 5.3  Granger Causality Test for basic models  
 
Null Hypothesis: 
 
F-Statistic 
 
Probability 
 
(A) M1 basic model     
 Variable : LnRealM1 LnGDP LnP (4 lags)  
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 13.40* 0.00 
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 3.10** 0.02 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 4.54* 0.00 
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnP 1.77 0.15 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 1.16 0.34 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 4.30* 0.01 
(B) M2 basic model  
        Variable : LnRealM2 LnGDP LnP (2 lags)  
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 4.89* 0.00 
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 0.54 0.65 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 1.66 0.19 
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnP 2.30*** 0.09 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 2.14 0.11 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 7.72* 0.00 
Note: Note that *, **, and *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level. 
 
Table 5.4 presents the variance decomposition for the basic model of both M1 
and M2. The results give the idea of the fluctuations in each variable that are 
caused by a difference shock. The numbers of variance decomposition shows 
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the percentage of the variance caused by each shock. The results of variance 
decomposition  suggest that after four quarters, the M1 shock caused 13.95% 
fluctuation in real output, while only 4.31% fluctuation of real output was 
caused by the M2 shock. However, the shock of both M1 and M2 had a small 
affect on price levels in Thailand. The variance decomposition of the M1 and 
M2 shock on price levels are 1.94 and 2.59 in four quarters, meaning that the 
M1 shock caused only 1.94% fluctuation in price levels and the M2 shock 
caused around 2.59% fluctuation in price levels. It is interesting to note that the 
M1 shock had more affect on the fluctuation in output. However, the shock of 
M2 had slightly more affect on the price level. This confirms that M1 appeared 
to be more effective as an intermediate target in monetary policy if the 
monetary policy focuses on economic growth. On the other hand, M2 is seen as 
a better target if the monetary authorities are concerned about price stability.  
 
Table 5.4 Table of Variance Decomposition for the basic models 
Cholesky Ordering: 
LnRealM1 LnGDP LnP  
 
Cholesky Ordering: 
LnRealM2 LnGDP LnP 
 Variance Decomposition of LnRealM1:   Variance Decomposition of LnRealM2: 
 Period S.E. LnRealM1 LnGDP LnP  S.E. LnRealM2 LnGDP LnP 
2 0.05 83.18 13.61 3.22  0.02 95.93 1.76 2.31 
4 0.06 78.21 13.96 7.83  0.02 92.37 2.19 5.44 
6 0.08 81.10 14.74 4.16  0.03 87.99 2.44 9.57 
8 0.10 73.82 22.84 3.34  0.03 83.70 3.30 13.00 
10 0.12 68.35 29.13 2.52  0.03 79.31 5.63 15.06 
 Variance Decomposition of LnGDP:   Variance Decomposition of LnGDP: 
 Period S.E. LnRealM1 LnGDP LnP  S.E. LnRealM2 LnGDP LnP 
2 0.02 2.53 92.62 4.86  0.03 0.02 96.09 3.89 
4 0.03 13.95 75.94 10.11  0.05 4.31 90.40 5.29 
6 0.04 36.00 54.55 9.45  0.06 14.53 81.52 3.95 
8 0.05 51.88 40.50 7.62  0.07 24.52 72.63 2.85 
10 0.06 58.48 35.96 5.55  0.08 31.20 66.58 2.23 
 Variance Decomposition of LnP:   Variance Decomposition of LnP 
 Period S.E. LnRealM1 LnGDP LnP  S.E. LnRealM2 LnGDP LnP 
2 0.01 1.99 15.02 82.99  0.01 4.11 7.06 88.83 
4 0.01 1.94 15.73 82.34  0.01 2.59 6.57 90.84 
6 0.02 4.13 15.07 80.80  0.02 5.32 7.57 87.12 
8 0.02 3.76 20.32 75.92  0.02 6.31 18.39 75.30 
10 0.02 3.82 26.23 69.95  0.02 5.21 32.57 62.23 
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The impulse response of the M1 basic models is shown in Figure 5.1. The result 
shows that GDP has a positive response to changes in M1 over the sample 
period. The price level is stable for about four quarters, and then slightly 
decreases until the end of quarter six. After that, it continues to increase. 
 
The impulse response of the M2 basic model in Figure 5.2 suggests that 
economic growth seems to be stable for two quarters after the shock in M2. 
After that, it declines substantially. The response of the price level to the M2 
shock shows that the price level slightly increases for two quarters after the 
shock. Then, the price level dramatically increases in the second to fourth 
quarter. After that, the price level became stable. 
 
Overall, the result of basic model indicates that both M1 and M2 have small 
effect on price level while more effect on output in Thailand. It should be note 
that M 1 has more effect on output while M2 has more effect on price level. 
Given the basic model of transmission mechanism, if the policy maker concern 
more on economic growth, M1 should be better to use as an intermediate target 
in monetary policy  
 
          Figure 5.1 The impulse response of the M1 basic model 
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Figure 5.2 The impulse response of the M2 basic model 
 
 
 5.3.3 The channel of the monetary transmission mechanism 
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5.3.3.1 Interest Rate channel of the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism 
 
In order to estimate the interest rate channel of the transmission mechanism in 
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Therefore, the variables included in the VAR system of the interest rate channel 
are domestic interest rates (R), real output (GDP), the price level(P), and money 
aggregate (M1 or M2). 
 
The Granger Causality result of the interest channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism are presented in Table 5.5. Panel(A) presents the 
interest channel when M1 is included and Panel(B) shows the interest channel 
of monetary policy where M 2 is added. The results found that there is 
unidirectionality from interest rates to real M1 money aggregate. As the F-
statistic of R does not Granger-cause, LnRealM1 is rejected at 1% significant, 
but it is not rejected for the hypothesis that LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause 
R. In addition, the results also suggest that M1 Granger-caused both real output 
and price level in the economy at 5% significance, since the  p value of the 
hypothesis that  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnP and LnRealM1 does 
not Granger-cause LnGDP, being smaller than 0.05. It can be concluded that the 
interest rate has significant affect on M1 and it in turn impacts on real output 
and price level. It is interesting to note that the interest rate also has a strong 
relationship with real output, but it does not affect the price level directly in the 
short term. 
 
Consider the interest rate channel model with M2. The results state that the 
interest rate has a weak relationship with the price level, as the F-statistic of 
Granger Causality is rejected at 10% significance. However, interest rates do 
not affect M2 and real output. M2 does affect price level but there is no 
relationship between M2 and real output. 
 
Given the interest rate channel of monetary policy framework, it seems that the 
interest rate has more affect on economic activity when M1 is selected as an 
intermediate target, since R has a strongly significant relationship with M1, 
economic growth, and price level. 
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Table 5.5 Granger Causality test for the interest rate channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism 
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
Panel(A)     
Variables : R LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 (5 lags)   
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause R 2.784 0.030 
  R does not Granger-cause LnGDP 3.035 0.020 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause R 4.677 0.002 
  R does not Granger-cause LnP 1.943 0.108 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause R 1.305 0.281 
  R does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 7.028 0.000 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 1.383 0.251 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 3.213 0.015 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 2.834 0.027 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 7.034 0.000 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnP 3.364 0.012 
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 2.219 0.071 
   
   Panel(B)  
 Variables : R LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 (2 lags)   
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause R 0.099 0.906 
  R does not Granger-cause LnGDP 1.925 0.157 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause R 9.328 0.000 
  R does not Granger-cause LnP 2.505 0.092 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause R 1.536 0.225 
  R does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 0.639 0.532 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 2.684 0.078 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 8.189 0.001 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 0.210 0.811 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 0.932 0.400 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnP 2.666 0.079 
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 2.386 0.102 
 
The variance decomposition for the interest rate channel is presented in Table 
5.6. The results indicate that after four quarters, the  response of the fluctuation 
in  output to shock in M1 is 22.68% , while only a 8.44% response to shock in 
M2. Both are higher than the response in the basic models. Interest rate shocks 
account for 10% fluctuation in output, 27.4% fluctuation in price level, and 
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account approximately for 24.8% of the fluctuation in M1. However, the result 
of the interest rate channel when M2 is included shows that the shock in interest 
rates is only 10% fluctuation on price level, and is around 7.81% of the 
fluctuation in M2. This evidence indicates that interest rates are a relatively 
weaker determinant of the fluctuation in the price level when M2 is included, 
while it has stronger relationship with real output when M1 is included.  
 
Table 5.6 Variance Decomposition for the interest rate channel 
 
Cholesky Ordering: 
R LnGDP LnP LnRealM1  
Cholesky Ordering: 
R LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
 Variance Decomposition of R:   Variance Decomposition of R: 
 
Period S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM1  S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.89 78.93 2.20 7.64 11.23  1.08 90.63 2.09 5.01 2.27 
4 1.09 62.26 6.62 11.71 19.42  1.45 87.30 1.71 5.95 5.05 
6 1.29 45.71 22.29 9.72 22.27  1.62 81.38 4.40 5.64 8.58 
8 1.83 26.30 53.49 8.37 11.84  1.73 72.23 11.37 7.95 8.45 
10 2.21 19.25 63.10 6.41 11.24  1.84 65.28 17.01 9.32 8.39 
 Variance Decomposition of LnGDP:   Variance Decomposition of LnGDP: 
 
Period S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM1  S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.02 1.45 91.61 3.45 3.48  0.02 4.71 92.75 2.34 0.20 
4 0.04 10.81 61.19 5.32 22.68  0.04 13.95 76.45 1.16 8.44 
6 0.04 8.67 43.16 4.40 43.77  0.05 21.99 56.20 1.18 20.63 
8 0.05 5.91 41.30 4.27 48.52  0.07 26.33 42.03 2.12 29.52 
10 0.07 3.81 51.75 3.46 40.98  0.08 28.35 33.40 3.26 34.99 
 Variance Decomposition of LnP:   Variance Decomposition of LnP: 
 
Period S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM1  S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.01 21.46 12.92 65.47 0.15  0.01 5.80 3.63 90.52 0.05 
4 0.02 27.41 23.65 45.69 3.25  0.01 10.66 2.74 82.66 3.94 
6 0.02 26.00 23.01 45.56 5.43  0.02 12.63 5.02 71.88 10.46 
8 0.02 25.05 24.36 44.87 5.72  0.02 11.27 13.74 62.32 12.67 
10 0.02 22.99 26.93 41.33 8.74  0.02 9.79 24.70 54.45 11.06 
 Variance Decomposition of LnRealM1:  Variance Decomposition of LnRealM2: 
 
Period S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM1  S.E. R LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.04 9.12 4.58 7.74 78.55  0.02 4.97 5.23 6.19 83.61 
4 0.06 24.82 6.92 7.34 60.92  0.03 7.81 5.15 4.85 82.20 
6 0.08 12.81 13.04 8.02 66.13  0.03 8.89 5.13 5.92 80.06 
8 0.11 8.70 37.68 5.72 47.91  0.03 9.08 6.00 7.04 77.89 
10 0.13 5.57 52.65 4.21 37.58  0.03 8.74 8.01 7.97 75.29 
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Figure 5.3 indicates the impulse response function of the interest rate channel of 
the monetary transmission mechanism where M1 is included. The response of 
M1 to interest rate shock appeared to be stable for about three quarters, and then 
it sharply decreased from the third to the fourth quarter. After that, the response 
of M1to interest rate shock increased dramatically until the fifth quarter. The 
response of price level to interest rate shock sharply increased from the first 
quarter to the second quarter, and then the price level continued to decline until 
the seventh quarter. Economic growth (GDP) was predicted to decrease for 
three quarters after the interest rate shock and then increased substantially.    
 
 Figure 5.3 The impulse response of the M1 interest rate channel  
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gradually. The response of the price level to interest rate shock seemed to 
increase for five quarters after the shock. After that, it decreased significantly. 
GDP responds to interest rate shock in a negative way from the first quarter of 
the shock. 
 
Figure 5.4   The impulse response of the M2 interest rate channel  
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5.3.3.2 Credit channel of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
As the suggestion of Miskin (1995) is that the credit channel operates through 
bank lending, the aggregate credit is included in the VAR system to analyse the 
credit channel of monetary policy. Therefore, the variables of the credit channel 
model include aggregate credit (CRE), real output (GDP), the price level (P), 
and money aggregate (M1 or M2). 
 
Table 5.7 reports the Granger Causality test for the credit channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand. The result when M1 is included 
in the model shows that M1 Granger Causality real output (GDP) is at 5% 
significance level, while it does not Granger-cause price level (P). However, the 
results also indicate that aggregate credit Granger-caused price level, real 
output, and M1 at 5% significance level. Based on the monetary theory, an 
increase in domestic credit would increase growth rate and money aggregate. 
This confirms that the credit channel is a major injector of money into the 
economy. 
 
The credit channel of monetary policy when M2 is included as an intermediate 
target shows that only the hypothesis that credit does not cause GDP is rejected 
at 5% significant. However, there is no rejection for the hypothesis that credit 
Granger-causes M2 and P. This means that in the model of the credit channel of 
the monetary transmission mechanism change in domestic credit only affects 
economic growth, but does not affect price level and M2 in the Thai economy. 
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Table 5.7Granger Causality Test for the Credit Channel Model  
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
 Panel(A)   
 Variables : LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 (4 lags)  
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnCRE 2.726 0.043 
  LnCRE does not Granger-cause LnGDP 2.899 0.034 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnCRE 0.450 0.772 
  LnCRE does not Granger-cause LnP 3.426 0.017 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnCRE 1.098 0.371 
  LnCRE does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 3.226 0.022 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 1.163 0.340 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 4.298 0.005 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 3.099 0.025 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 13.400 0.000 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnP 1.771 0.152 
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 4.542 0.004 
   Panel(B) 
  Variables : LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 (2 lags)  
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnCRE 1.539 0.225 
  LnCRE does not Granger-cause LnGDP 3.264 0.047 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnCRE 0.986 0.381 
  LnCRE does not Granger-cause LnP 0.600 0.553 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnCRE 0.271 0.764 
  LnCRE does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 0.202 0.818 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 2.684 0.078 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 8.189 0.001 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 0.210 0.811 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 0.932 0.400 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnP 2.666 0.079 
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 2.386 0.102 
 
 
The variance decomposition of the credit channel of the monetary transmission 
mechanism is presented in Table 5.8. The results of the M1 credit channel of the 
transmission mechanism indicates that aggregate credit shock caused about 
3.23% of the fluctuation in output, while about 11.23% of the fluctuation of 
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price level was caused by credit shock. However, the model of the credit 
channel of the transmission mechanism which included M2 shows that there is 
only 1.37% of fluctuation in the GDP, and approximately 5.05% 1.37% of the 
fluctuation in price was caused by credit shock. This evidence confirms that M1 
is more responsive to the credit channel of the transmission mechanism than M2 
is. In addition, the model in which M1 is included appeared to be significantly 
stronger. It can be said that M1 is more effective than M2 in the sense of 
selecting an intermediate target for monetary policy. 
Table 5.8 Variance Decomposition for the credit rate channel  
 
 Cholesky Ordering: 
 LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 
 Cholesky Ordering: 
 LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
  Variance Decomposition of LnCRE:  Variance Decomposition of LnCRE: 
 
Period S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.03 96.27 2.59 0.20 0.93 0.03 96.27 1.95 0.34 1.44 
4 0.04 78.41 3.39 17.14 1.06 0.05 88.31 10.14 0.62 0.93 
6 0.05 66.63 5.33 27.23 0.81 0.06 75.38 21.92 1.91 0.78 
8 0.06 54.90 6.70 35.34 3.06 0.07 63.25 32.34 2.49 1.92 
10 0.07 43.09 6.20 42.24 8.47 0.08 53.52 40.05 2.40 4.03 
  Variance Decomposition of LnGDP:  Variance Decomposition of LnGDP: 
 
Period S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.02 3.72 70.94 19.41 5.93 0.02 2.64 91.73 5.49 0.14 
4 0.03 3.23 31.57 27.80 37.39 0.04 1.37 90.43 4.61 3.59 
6 0.04 2.32 19.15 25.64 52.90 0.04 2.40 83.73 4.07 9.80 
8 0.04 3.09 16.27 24.64 56.00 0.05 5.46 75.61 6.17 12.76 
10 0.04 3.06 16.36 23.47 57.11 0.05 9.17 69.73 8.08 13.02 
  Variance Decomposition of LnP:  Variance Decomposition of Lap: 
 
Period S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.01 3.50 2.90 93.49 0.11 0.01 4.47 3.73 91.72 0.08 
4 0.01 11.23 2.25 84.13 2.39 0.01 5.05 3.44 89.82 1.68 
6 0.02 14.99 6.44 72.20 6.37 0.01 9.11 5.98 79.45 5.45 
8 0.02 14.21 8.89 69.92 6.98 0.02 11.82 16.68 66.04 5.46 
10 0.02 14.24 11.49 63.81 10.46 0.02 11.56 27.95 55.89 4.60 
  Variance Decomposition of LnRealM1:  Variance Decomposition of LnRealM2: 
Period S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnCRE LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.05 3.02 16.24 8.14 72.60 0.02 14.25 4.03 5.67 76.06 
4 0.06 2.23 12.36 18.35 67.06 0.02 19.25 8.04 7.28 65.44 
6 0.07 4.03 8.53 12.41 75.04 0.02 19.35 9.29 16.91 54.45 
8 0.07 4.88 8.74 13.48 72.91 0.02 18.87 12.86 21.43 46.83 
10 0.08 6.30 8.30 14.28 71.13 0.03 17.80 20.80 20.98 40.43 
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The impulse response of the credit channel of the monetary transmission 
mechanism when M1 is included is shown in Figure 5.5. There is a fluctuation 
response of M1 to credit shock. Price level seems stable for two quarters after 
the credit shock, and then it increased gradually until the fifth quarter. After 
that, the price level dramatically decreased up to the eighth quarter. Economic 
growth appeared to decrease for four quarters after the credit shock and then 
GDP rose substantially until the seventh quarter. Then, GDP continued its fall 
down.   
 
Figure 5.6 presents the impulse response of the credit channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism when M2 is included. The response of M2 to credit 
shock seems to be a slight decrease from the first quarter after the shock. 
Similarly, the response of economic growth was to fall from the first quarter, 
and it continued to decrease. The price level declined for two quarters after the 
credit shock and then it increased. 
 
Figure 5.5 The impulse response of the M1 credit channel  
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Figure 5.6 The impulse response of the M2 credit channel  
 
 
5.3.3.3 The Exchange Rate channel of the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism 
 
In an open economy, the exchange rate also plays an important role in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. As Miskin (2006) claimed, an increase in 
money causes domestic interest rates to decrease. Then, it also causes domestic 
currency to become less attractive, resulting in depreciation of domestic 
currency. As a result, domestic prices are relatively cheaper than foreign 
products. Thereby, net exports increase, and then economic growth rises. To 
analyse the exchange rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism in 
Thailand, the exchange rate variable (EXC) is added into the basic model. 
Therefore, the variables included in the VAR system of the exchange rate 
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channel are the exchange rate (EXC), real output (GDP), price level (P), and 
money aggregate (M1 or M2). 
 
The Granger Causality results for the model where M1 is included are presented 
in Table 5.9. The results suggest that exchange rates Granger-cause M1 and 
GDP at 1% significant level, whereas the F-statistic of EXC does not Granger-
cause GDP, and EXC does not Granger-cause M1, these being at 1% significant 
level. The hypothesis that EXC does not Granger-cause P is rejected at 5 % 
significance, since the p value is less that 0.05. However, there is no reverse 
relationship between LnGDPLnEXC, LnPLnEXC, and LnRealM1 
LnEXC, as the F-statistics are not significant at any given significant level. In 
addition, the results also indicate that M1 Granger-caused both GAP and P at 
5% significant level. Regarding the exchange rate channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism, changes in the exchange rate affect M1 and it in turn 
affects GDP and price level.   
 
The result of the exchange rate channel of the monetary transmission 
mechanism where M2 is included shows that LnEXC Granger-causes GDP at 
5% significance. However, the LnEXC does not affect LnRealM2. 
 
Comparing the models of the exchange rate channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism when M1 and M2 are included in the sense of selecting 
intermediate targets for monetary policy, we found that M1 seems to be a more 
appropriate variable due to the exchange rate affecting M1, but not affecting 
M2.  
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Table 5.9 Granger Causality Test for the Exchange Rate Channel Model  
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
  Panel(A)  
Variables : LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM1(5 lags)  
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnEXC 0.333 0.890 
  LnEXC does not Granger-cause LnGDP 7.294 0.000 
   
  LnP does not Grange-cause LnEXC 1.738 0.148 
  LnEXC does not Granger-cause LnP 2.936 0.023 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnEXC 1.144 0.353 
  LnEXC does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 4.144 0.004 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 1.383 0.251 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 3.213 0.015 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 2.834 0.027 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 7.034 0.000 
   
  LnRealM1 does not Granger-cause LnP 3.364 0.012 
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM1 2.219 0.071 
   
 Panel(B) 
 Variables : LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 (3 lags)  
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnEXC 0.127 0.944 
  LnEXC does not Granger-cause LnGDP 11.362 0.000 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnEXC 1.948 0.135 
  LnEXC does not Granger-cause LnP 4.983 0.004 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnEXC 1.136 0.344 
  LnEXC does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 0.255 0.857 
   
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnGDP 2.145 0.107 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnP 7.720 0.000 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnGDP 0.544 0.654 
  LnGDP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 4.891 0.005 
   
  LnRealM2 does not Granger-cause LnP 2.298 0.090 
  LnP does not Granger-cause LnRealM2 1.663 0.188 
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Table 5.10 presents the variance decomposition for the exchange rate of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. The results show that a shock in the 
exchange rate caused the fluctuation in M1 around 16.23% in the fourth quarter, 
while only 1.17 % of fluctuation in M2. Furthermore, the shock in M1 caused 
about 11.74% of the fluctuation in GDP and 2.37 % of the fluctuation in the 
price level. However, the shock in M2 caused only 2.43% of the fluctuation in 
GDP and accounted for 2.57% of the shock in the price level. 
 
 
Table 5.10 Variance Decomposition for the exchange rate channel  
 
 
 
Cholesky Ordering: 
LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 
Cholesky Ordering: 
LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
 Variance Decomposition of LnEXC:  Variance Decomposition of LnEXC: 
Period S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.07 96.83 0.72 0.14 2.32  0.08 96.68 0.57 1.11 1.65 
4 0.11 71.93 8.88 17.87 1.32  0.10 89.77 0.45 1.14 8.64 
6 0.13 49.30 17.01 31.13 2.56  0.11 76.60 1.06 2.42 19.92 
8 0.14 45.05 16.57 32.43 5.96  0.12 65.29 3.64 2.96 28.11 
10 0.14 43.61 16.68 31.74 7.96  0.13 57.74 6.33 3.06 32.87 
Variance Decomposition of LnGDP:  Variance Decomposition of LnGDP: 
Period S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.02 24.43 70.27 0.84 4.46  0.02 11.92 87.19 0.89 0.00 
4 0.03 53.02 31.06 4.18 11.74  0.04 32.35 64.69 0.53 2.43 
6 0.04 41.04 30.95 13.59 14.42  0.05 25.85 66.28 0.49 7.38 
8 0.05 31.94 32.72 15.85 19.50  0.05 18.20 69.66 0.71 11.44 
10 0.05 28.84 29.20 14.42 27.55  0.06 14.37 72.28 0.68 12.67 
            
Variance Decomposition of LnP:  Variance Decomposition of LnP: 
Period S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.01 26.95 1.60 70.53 0.93  0.01 20.96 1.95 76.73 0.36 
4 0.01 38.54 7.15 51.94 2.37  0.01 38.40 2.03 57.01 2.57 
6 0.01 37.50 14.74 44.70 3.06  0.01 35.51 2.26 58.16 4.07 
8 0.01 37.65 15.30 41.76 5.29  0.02 34.32 4.51 56.52 4.64 
10 0.02 35.11 13.83 45.46 5.61  0.02 32.90 10.00 53.00 4.11 
            
Variance Decomposition of LnRealM1:  Variance Decomposition of LnRealM2: 
Period S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM1 S.E. LnEXC LnGDP LnP LnRealM2 
2 0.05 12.24 14.90 0.48 72.38  0.02 1.28 9.30 5.89 83.53 
4 0.05 16.23 13.64 3.76 66.37  0.02 1.17 7.20 4.97 86.67 
6 0.06 16.28 20.35 2.87 60.50  0.03 3.17 6.88 4.18 85.77 
8 0.07 21.47 18.72 3.29 56.52  0.03 3.13 8.10 3.68 85.09 
10 0.08 20.54 13.42 17.70 48.34  0.03 2.96 10.52 3.47 83.05 
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Figure 5.7 presents the impulse response of the exchange rate channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism when M2 is included. The response of M1 to 
exchange rate shock seems to be stable for four quarters, and then M1 dropped 
in the fifth quarter. After that, M1 sharply increased in quarters five and six 
after the shock. The price level increased for three quarters after the exchange 
rate shock. After the third quarter, the price level continued to decrease until the 
eighth quarter. The response of GDP to the exchange rate shock started from the 
first quarter after the shock. GDP dramatically dropped for four quarters. After 
that, GDP increased continually. 
 
The impulse response of the exchange rate channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism when M2 is included is shown in Figure 5.8. Similar to 
the response of M2 to the exchange rate model, there is a fluctuation response 
of M2 to credit shock. The price level increased for three quarters and after that 
the price level dropped. GDP appeared to decrease for three quarters after the 
exchange rate shock and then GDP rose substantially. 
 
 
Figure 5. 7 The impulse response of the M1 Exchange rate channel  
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Figure 5. 8  The impulse response of the M2 Exchange rate channel  
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the empirical results of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Thailand by using the Vector Autoregression model. There were 
four models tested in the chapter, the basic model, the interest rate channel 
model, the credit channel model, and the exchange rate channel model. The 
main findings in the chapter are that in the case of simple model, change in M1 
has more affect on economic growth, while change in M2 has a stronger impact 
on price stability. Based on the simple model, if the monetary policy in 
Thailand focused on economic growth, M1 should be considered as the 
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNEXC to LNEXC
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNEXC to LNGDP
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNEXC to LNP
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNEXC to LNREALM1
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNGDP to LNEXC
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNGDP to LNGDP
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNGDP to LNP
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNGDP to LNREALM1
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNP to LNEXC
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNP to LNGDP
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNP to LNP
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNP to LNREALM1
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNREALM1 to LNEXC
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNREALM1 to LNGDP
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNREALM1 to LNP
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LNREALM1 to LNREALM1
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
  238 
intermediate target. On the other hand, M2 may be selected if the policy aims 
for stability. 
 
However, the interest rate channel shows evidence that M1 seems to be more 
effective as an intermediate target, since the interest rate has more affect on M1, 
and it in turn affects economic activities. In the case of the credit channel, the 
result confirms that M1 is more responsive to the credit channel of the 
transmission mechanism than M2 is. In addition, the exchange channel also 
indicates that M1 appeared to be more appropriate for the exchange rate of the 
transmission mechanism in Thailand. 
 
 Overall, the results of this chapter indicate that M1 has more response to 
monetary instruments, including interest rates, bank credit, and the exchange 
rate.  Moreover, it has a stronger affect on economic activities. It can be said 
that the monetary authorities should concentrate more on M1as an intermediate 
target in monetary policy in Thailand.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter briefly summarises the major findings and the policy implications 
of the thesis. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will 
present the major empirical findings in the thesis. There are two major findings, 
the empirical findings about the stability of the money demand function and the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand. The last section of this chapter 
provides the policy implications and the suggestion for future research. 
 
6.2 The Main Empirical Findings  
 
In the first stage of the thesis, we detected the stationary of each variable by 
applying the unit root procedure. The results of the ADF and the KPSS clearly 
showed that all variables that were used in the thesis were integrated of order 
one (I (1)) and eligible for testing in the next step. 
 
The second stage of the thesis was the testing of the money demand relationship 
by using cointegration and the error correction model. In this stage, we tested 
both the M1 and M2 money demand functions. There were two data sets that 
were used for the test, the full data set from 1980Q1-2007Q1 and the data set 
from 1993Q-2007Q1. The results of cointegration suggest that there is a single 
cointegration in both the M1 and M2 money demand function in Thailand. The 
long-run elasticity of income to money demand appeared to be a positive sign 
and the interest rate elasticity was negative as we expected. 
 
Moreover, we also estimated money overhangs from the long-run money 
demand relationship and tested whether the money overhang from the 
estimation model can help in predicting the inflation rate in Thailand. The 
results found that most money overhang models could help to predict the 
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inflation rate in Thailand, except the M1 money demand model from 1993Q1-
2007Q4. 
 
The last stage of this thesis was the test for the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Thailand. The test started by estimating a basic VAR model. 
Then, each particular channel of the monetary transmission mechanism was 
analysed by adding a different variable of monetary policy. There were three 
different channels tested in that chapter, the interest rate channel, the credit 
channel, and the exchange rate channel. The results of the basic VAR model 
showed that changes in M1 money demand had more effect on economic 
growth, while changes in M2 money demand had a stronger affect on the price 
level. This evidence was confirmed by the results of the interest rate channel 
that interest rates are relatively stronger in the price level when the model used 
M2 as a target of monetary policy, while it has a stronger affect on economic 
growth when considering M1 as an intermediate target. In addition, the results 
also showed that M1 money demand was more responsive to the transmission 
mechanism in all channels tested in the thesis. 
 
Based on the results of this thesis, it seems that M1 money demand appeared to 
be more stable than M2. Moreover, changes in M1 had more affect on economic 
activities. It can be suggested that the Bank of Thailand should be more 
concerned with M1 money demand when they conduct monetary policy in 
Thailand. 
 
6.3 Policy Implications and Future Research 
 
After adopting inflation targeting as a major framework of monetary policy in 
2000, the major objective of monetary policy in Thailand was to achieve price 
stability rather than focusing on economic growth.  
 
As the empirical results of this thesis show, there does exist a stable long-run 
relationship for both the M1 and M2 money demand function in Thailand, but 
M1 appears to be more stable. This result can imply that M1 would be more 
preferable than M2 as an intermediate target for monetary policy in Thailand. In 
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addition, the results of the monetary transmission mechanism in Chapter 5 
indicate that M1 has greater affect on the price level than M2 does in both the 
basic VAR model and the interest channel model. This confirms that M1 
appears to be more appropriate to serve as an intermediate target in Thailand‘s 
monetary policy. 
 
For future research on money demand and the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Thailand, we suggest that the study of the money demand 
function might consider more about applying multiple structural breaks to catch 
up the long-run money demand function in Thailand. In addition, the role of 
money in the transmission mechanism should be considered for the future 
research as money aggregate also play an important role in the transmission 
mechanism in monetary policy. 
Another final suggestion is that other channels of the monetary transmission 
mechanism should be considered in future research as it has been ignored in this 
thesis due to a limited of data set. 
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Appendix A 
Data and Source of Data 
The research is basically use a quarterly macro economic time series data for estimate 
the money demand function and monetary transmission mechanism in Thailand. The 
sample of data are started from 1980Q1 to 2007Q1.The data are mainly collected 
from the Bank of Thailand (BOT), the office of National Economic and Social 
Development Broad (NESDB), and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) which 
providing by International Monetary Found. The summary of definition and source of 
each data are shown in table below 
Data Definition and Data Source 
Variable Meaning Source 
 
M1 
 
Quarterly Narrow  Money ,which includes 
currency in circulation and demand deposit in 
commercial bank (Billions Baht ) 
 
IFS 
 
M2 
 
Quarterly Broad Money.M2 is the sum of M1 and 
quasi-money in commercial bank.(Billions Baht ) 
 
IFS 
 
 
GDP  
 
 
Quarterly Gross Domestic Product by expenditure 
at 1988 price.  (Billions Baht ) 
 
IFS 
NESDB 
 
P 
 
Consumer Price Index .It can be a proxy of prive 
in Thailand.  
 
Bank of Thailand 
 
R 
 
Discount rate. 
 
IFS 
 
LIBOR  
 
London Interbank Rate  
 
Bank of Thailand 
 
EXC 
 
Exchange Rate (Baht : US$) 
 
IFS 
Bank of Thailand 
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There are two money aggregate used in the research to estimate money demand 
function, narrow money aggregate(M1) and broad money aggregate ( M2).Both data 
are collected from International Financial Statistics (IFS). The variables used in the 
equation in real term, represent by RealM1 and R ealM2.Where Real M1 is calculated 
by  
CPI
M1
 and Real M1 is
CPI
M 2
. 
 
GDP is Quarterly Gross Domestic Product by expenditure at 1988 price. It can be 
used as a proxy of income and economic growth. The data collected from IFS statistic 
and NESDB .As a Quarterly GDP from IFS and NESDB are variable only from 
1993Q1 to 2007Q1, Historical quarterly GDP from 1980Q1 to 1992Q 4 were obtained 
from the estimation of Abeysinghe and Rajaquru (2004)
6
.Seasonal adjustment is 
adopted in QGDP by using X12 - ARIMA
7
 methodology. 
 
P refers to price level in Thailand, proxy by consumer price index (2000=100). R 
represents domestic interest rate, proxy by discount rate. The reasons to use discount 
rate in this research are that the Bank of Thailand usually used discount rate as 
monetary instrument and it sometime appeared as the intermediate target on monetary 
policy. In addition the Bank of Thailand can directly control this interest rate. LIBOR 
is a London Interbank Rate, this variable represent the international interest rate which 
effect on money demand in Thailand.  
 
Exc is the average of exchange rate of Thai baht against the US dollar (baht: us$) over 
the sample periods.   
 
The estimation of money demand function is used the quarterly data over the period 
1980Q1 to 2006Q4.All variables are estimated in form of logarithm except R and 
LIBOR.  
 
 
                                                          
6
 Abeysinghe,T. and Rajaguru, G. ―Quarterly Real GDP Estimates for China and ASEAN4 with a 
Forecast  Evaluation‖  Department of Economics Working Paper No.0404, National University of 
Singapore. 
 
7
 X12 – ARIMA is a seasonal adjustment program developed by the US Bureau of the Census. 
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Appendix B 
Data Used in the Estimation in Chapter 4 and 5 
 
Year  M1 M2 GDP R Exc P 
Q1 1980 49.46 219.43 229.70 14 20.24 39.33 
Q2 1980 47.69 222.99 222.30 12.5 20.48 41.8 
Q3 1980 47.13 233.94 228.94 12.5 20.48 42.52 
Q4 1980 69.89 251.8 234.76 13.5 20.63 43.56 
Q1 1981 76.18 265.13 237.50 13.5 20.63 45.2 
Q2 1981 73.28 269.73 240.56 13.5 20.6 47.01 
Q3 1981 69.13 272 244.67 14.5 20.7 47.57 
Q4 1981 71.58 292.91 246.36 14.5 20 48.62 
Q1 1982 76.3 310.32 249.70 14.5 23 48.98 
Q2 1982 74.1 320.28 257.21 14.5 23 49.45 
Q3 1982 73.99 332.59 257.67 13.5 23 49.6 
Q4 1982 75.66 363.82 255.73 12.5 23 50.28 
Q1 1983 83.72 391.08 265.44 11.5 23 51.3 
Q2 1983 81.74 404.96 264.68 11.5 23 51.5 
Q3 1983 78.65 417.05 270.79 11.5 23 51.99 
Q4 1983 79.52 450.5 276.43 13 23 52.33 
Q1 1984 82.51 464.1 277.48 13 23 51.68 
Q2 1984 81.98 481.93 280.31 13 23 52.02 
Q3 1984 80.71 496.84 285.61 13 23 51.88 
Q4 1984 84.28 537.89 295.66 12 27.15 51.89 
Q1 1985 84.64 549.63 296.37 12 27.55 52.4 
Q2 1985 80.77 563.65 300.69 12 27.42 53.05 
Q3 1985 83.39 474.19 295.43 11 26.3 53.38 
Q4 1985 80.92 593.5 298.82 11 26.65 53.69 
Q1 1986 91.03 613.41 307.21 10 26.47 53.6 
Q2 1986 91.48 627.62 311.66 10 26.01 54.02 
Q3 1986 95.22 641.03 318.27 8 26.13 54.25 
Q4 1986 96.8 672.77 319.85 8 25.87 54.58 
Q1 1987 109.36 703.9 328.98 8 25.84 54.58 
Q2 1987 112.81 726.5 338.54 8 25.83 55.1 
Q3 1987 114.66 749.08 348.44 8 25.83 55.79 
Q4 1987 122.47 808.58 361.11 8 25.07 56.33 
Q1 1988 131.89 833.93 372.75 8 25.15 56.74 
Q2 1988 140.43 865.92 382.97 8 25.47 57.36 
Q3 1988 135.78 887.64 397.52 8 25.55 57.86 
Q4 1988 137.13 956.13 406.59 8 25.24 58.4 
Q1 1989 154.09 1004.31 417.58 8 25.54 59.12 
Q2 1989 166.98 1060.15 439.92 8 25.95 59.9 
Q3 1989 171.78 1113.68 439.18 8 25.79 61.58 
Q4 1989 160.74 1207.1 453.30 8 25.69 62.1 
Q1 1990 186.34 1302.76 462.82 8 25.98 62.73 
Q2 1990 189.25 1376.63 478.86 9.5 25.79 63.81 
Q3 1990 193.67 1447.26 497.70 9.5 25.34 64.46 
Q4 1990 177.79 1529.12 506.27 12 25.29 66.09 
Q1 1991 185.41 1589.8 514.68 12 25.65 66.36 
Q2 1991 192.37 1641.78 519.35 12 25.71 67.78 
Q3 1991 194.25 1718.51 540.21 11 25.54 68.34 
Q4 1991 209.72 1832.38 536.85 11 25.38 69.26 
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Q1 1992 222.31 1911.47 548.72 11 25.6 69.48 
Q2 1992 226.83 1948.69 562.90 11 25.29 70.79 
Q3 1992 231.09 2005.01 578.30 11 25.09 71.62 
Q4 1992 235.27 2117.79 591.82 11 25.52 71.08 
Q1 1993 234.33 2165.88 595.49 11 25.36 71.68 
Q2 1993 248.17 2256.54 604.32 10 25.25 72.7 
Q3 1993 257.15 2350.8 628.51 9 25.2 73.79 
Q4 1993 277.1 2507.1 642.09 9 25.54 74.2 
Q1 1994 274.97 2473.52 661.26 9 25.23 75.12 
Q2 1994 285.55 2539.55 661.69 9 25.99 76.39 
Q3 1994 298.03 2648.34 665.42 9.5 25.97 77.58 
Q4 1994 312.96 2829.38 703.89 9.5 25.99 78.16 
Q1 1995 321.84 2846.69 724.88 10.5 25.74 78.77 
Q2 1995 355.99 3026.33 740.96 10.5 25.66 80.48 
Q3 1995 347.88 3135.45 731.70 10.5 25.07 82.15 
Q4 1995 354.08 3310.56 744.33 10.5 25.19 83.68 
Q1 1996 373.72 3470.28 758.92 10.5 25.23 84.57 
Q2 1996 376.32 3537.28 788.23 10.5 25.36 85.52 
Q3 1996 384.46 3574.12 791.14 10.5 25.42 86.41 
Q4 1996 371.34 3726.65 778.16 10.5 25.61 87.54 
Q1 1997 381.61 3808.18 764.96 10.5 25.89 88.32 
Q2 1997 383.2 3958.09 784.28 10.5 25.79 89.19 
Q3 1997 391.84 4166.27 780.43 12.5 36.52 91.73 
Q4 1997 390.08 4339.34 744.54 12.5 47.24 94.08 
Q1 1998 382.44 4408.75 708.79 12.5 38.8 96.27 
Q2 1998 380.21 4502.49 676.93 12.5 42.31 98.41 
Q3 1998 378.25 4689.3 673.32 12.5 39.3 99.23 
Q4 1998 379.16 4753.36 690.34 12.5 36.69 98.72 
Q1 1999 383.11 4789.06 704.71 7 37.64 98.72 
Q2 1999 399.23 4764.12 703.18 5.55 36.84 98.01 
Q3 1999 418.93 4786.58 730.91 4 40.93 98.31 
Q4 1999 542.76 4854.75 732.95 4 37.47 98.79 
Q1 2000 457.26 4824.47 747.73 4 37.8 99.61 
Q2 2000 461.63 4801.32 747.13 4 39.12 99.57 
Q3 2000 473.92 4907.46 752.07 4 42.21 100.39 
Q4 2000 474.62 5032.68 761.45 4 43.26 100.43 
Q1 2001 497.11 5113.56 758.83 4 44.77 101.01 
Q2 2001 512.46 5122.38 764.70 4 45.2 102.06 
Q3 2001 524.89 5165.68 769.66 4 44.38 102.03 
Q4 2001 533.59 5243.65 780.04 3.75 44.22 101.45 
Q1 2002 559.64 5365.09 792.28 3.5 43.47 101.55 
Q2 2002 569.93 5385.68 803.33 3.5 41.52 102.3 
Q3 2002 585.01 5257.76 815.16 3.5 43.42 102.3 
Q4 2002 608.34 5378.86 825.82 3.25 43.5 102.92 
Q1 2003 637.74 5444.82 846.82 3.25 42.85 103.56 
Q2 2003 650.88 5479.63 857.17 2.75 41.97 104.08 
Q3 2003 667.67 5518.46 869.83 2.75 39.94 104.25 
Q4 2003 715.55 5641.84 893.23 2.75 39.59 104.55 
Q1 2004 730.46 5794.33 903.75 2.75 39.4 105.58 
Q2 2004 751.39 5797.96 913.92 2.75 40.88 106.84 
Q3 2004 769.88 5875.19 923.35 3 41.44 107.69 
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Q4 2004 774.8 5948.37 943.91 3.5 39.06 107.86 
Q1 2005 788.11 6029.52 935.52 3.75 39.11 108.54 
Q2 2005 801.73 5987.77 957.26 4 41.26 110.79 
Q3 2005 820.87 6163.35 973.89 4.75 40.96 113.76 
Q4 2005 829.99 6438.93 984.23 5.5 40.03 114.31 
Q1 2006 837.28 6742.69 993.47 6 38.79 114.75 
Q2 2006 845.64 6671.38 1005.88 6.5 39.33 114.8 
Q3 2006 832.19 6790.72 1018.93 6.5 38.11 115.2 
Q4 2006 844.94 6824.04 1026.02 4.75 37.68 115.6 
Q12007 865.99 6806.1 1033.11 4.25 35.06 118.7 
 
GDP at 1988 Price 
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